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> It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was never of more importance to Americans than today. The spirit of distrust which pervades the Old World is not without its effect upon our own country. How to combat this disintegrating tendency is a problem worthy of the most serious thought. Perhaps one of the best methods is the promotion of a better understanding of other nations through wisely directed educational effort.
>
> The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

In fulfilment of this object, the First Institute was held at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1924. This series of volumes will include the lectures, delivered by foreign scholars at these Institutes, in essentially their original form.

THE OCCIDENT AND THE ORIENT

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THE OCCIDENT AND THE ORIENT

LECTURES ON THE HARRIS FOUNDATION, 1924

By

VALENTINE CHIROL

Sometime Director of the Foreign Department of the *Times*

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FOREWORD

My choice of the subject with which I have attempted to deal in these lectures was largely prompted by the recollection of a conversation during the Paris Peace Conference with one of the members of the American delegation. Hopes were still then entertained that the United States would be willing to accept a mandate for Armenia or Syria, but though my friend was warmly in favor of the mandatory system contemplated by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and fully realized the unique value of American co-operation in carrying it into effect in those regions where alone of all the great Powers the United States could not be suspected of any selfish ambitions, he was frankly skeptical as to the likelihood of his country's assuming such novel and heavy responsibilities. "The Orient," he said, "is too far away from us geographically and historically." The event bore out his prognostication, and one can quite well understand the reasons which induced the United States to refrain in that instance from any direct intervention in the Orient.

26831

But there is a larger aspect of the relations between the Occident and the Orient than the American people were perhaps then inclined to take into account. Time and space are being annihilated today by the conquests of science, and all the peoples of the world are being brought into increasingly close contact with one another under the pressure of material and moral forces of which the irresistible momentum is still only imperfectly apprehended. They had scarcely begun to emerge when nearly a half-century ago I first "heard the East a-calling." I have been a frequent traveler since then over the greater part of the Orient, in the Mohammedan lands of Turkey and Egypt and Persia, in that great Indian subcontinent under British rule which contains alone nearly a fifth of the human race, and in China and Japan, the last countries of Asia to have been forcibly dragged out of their ancient isolation by the masterful impact of the Occident, and I have had somewhat exceptional opportunities of watching at close quarters the changes which have taken place there within the compass of my own lifetime. We may call these changes the reawakening or the revolt of the Orient, but whatever we may call them, they have already profoundly transformed the former relationships between the

Occident and the Orient based upon the claim of Occidental civilization to inherent and indefeasible superiority over the civilizations of the Orient, and they already threaten to raise a still more dangerous issue of racial conflict between the white man and the colored peoples who constitute the vast majority of mankind.

It is from this broader angle of vision that I have ventured now to approach a question to which, in so far as it may involve the future of a civilization common both to America and to Europe, the American people cannot remain wholly indifferent, however remote from them its origins may seem to be "geographically and historically."

VALENTINE CHIROL

CHICAGO
July, 1924

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I. THEIR ANCIENT BATTLEGROUND 3

II. THE PASSING OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE . . . 33

III. THE PECULIAR CASE OF EGYPT 71

IV. THE GREAT BRITISH EXPERIMENT IN INDIA . . 109

V. PROTECTORATES AND MANDATES 149

VI. THE NEW FACTOR OF BOLSHEVISM AND SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 183

INDEX 217

I

THEIR ANCIENT BATTLEGROUND

I

THEIR ANCIENT BATTLEGROUND

When I had the great honor of being invited by the President of the University of Chicago to come over and address this Institute, I selected as my subject the very large question of the "Relation between the Occident and the Orient" for two reasons which I trust you may be willing to regard as adequate. In the first place, I wanted to choose a subject on which I might reasonably hope to speak usefully as it is one in which I have taken a deep interest ever since I first "heard the East a-calling" nearly fifty years ago, and I have been granted a fairly long lifetime to observe the momentous changes in the Orient which have made havoc of all our once comfortable generalizations about an unchanging East. In the second place, the subject seemed to me to come well within the scope of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation as it deals with one of the greatest international problems of our time—a problem of which, absorbed as the Occident is today in probing the deep wounds

of the Great War and groping after a cure for them, many are inclined to ignore or to underrate the magnitude, though it may affect the future of the whole human race.

The discords and the conflicts within the Occident are many and grievous, but the nations that they divide all belong, broadly speaking, to the same type of civilization; and in the fact that they are all partners in that civilization I see a sure ground for hoping and believing that those discords and conflicts will be assuaged and will finally disappear under the healing influence of time and by the development of new processes of international agreement. Between the Occident and the Orient, on the other hand, there is no such bond of a common civilization. On the contrary, the discords and conflicts which divide them arise out of the clash of different, and in many respects mutually antagonistic, civilizations, and the phase upon which they are now entering may be roughly described as a general movement of revolt throughout the Orient against the ascendancy of the Occident on the plea either that it has learned all that the Occident can teach it, or that all the lessons of the Occident are a snare and a delusion. The real significance, I think, of this revolt is that behind it there is the stirring

of ancient world-forces long dormant in the Orient but reawakening once more under the masterful impact of our modern Western civilization. That reawakening assumes many different and sometimes conflicting shapes, for though we may regard the Orient as a whole and the Occident as a whole in so far as they stand for distinct types of civilization, the Orient is not one nor is the Occident.

Contact between individual nations of the Occident and individual nations of the Orient arose centuries ago under the pressure of many different forces and followed in each case different lines of development with results which are even today vitally different, though revolt against the Occident may be their greatest common denominator. As I cannot possibly cover the whole of so large a field, I have selected for special and more detailed treatment the relations of the Occident with the three peoples of the Orient—Arabs, Turks, and Indians—whose history has been most closely interlocked for centuries back with that of the Occident.

The present has its roots in the past and, in the Orient especially, in a very remote past, and it is from no impertinent desire to inflict a superfluous course of history upon you that I shall ask you to explore with me in the first place the

origin of the great world-forces which have dug the deepest lines of cleavage between the Occident and the Orient. For they are in a great measure the same forces with which the Orient confronts the Occident today.

We are all of us more or less familiar from our school days with the earliest conflicts on record between the Occident and the Orient when the ancient Greeks repelled the Persian hordes, and the Roman Caesars in their turn held the gorgeous East in fee. But not until the Greek and Roman civilization had broadened out into the larger civilization, of which Christianity laid the foundations, was the conflict between the Occident and the Orient renewed in a shape which has endured to our own days.

In the Occident the vital force of religion is so largely tempered by the modern spirit of tolerance, often indeed stretched to indifference, that we seldom realize that in most parts of the Orient it is still a tremendously vital force, and that none is more vital there than the great religion which was born fourteen centuries ago in the deserts of Arabia—the religion which we call Mohammedanism, but which Mohammedans themselves call Islam, or "surrender to the will of God."

Unlike any other great world-religion, Islam was born sword in hand, and its message was not, like that of Christ, a message of peace, but one of war. Twice it has threatened sword in hand to overwhelm Europe. Today its sword has grown rusty, but Islam still regards the non-Mohammedan world as the world of war—the *Dar-el-Harb*—which at the appointed time its sword, resharpened by God's will, shall so conquer that the *Dar-ul-Islam*—the world of Islam—may at last spread over the whole earth. There is hardly a city in the Orient, from the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the wilds of Central Asia, where this promise is not implicitly renewed when the Muezzin calls the faithful to prayer, proclaiming, from the top of the minaret, in the stillness of the night and in the busy hours of the day, to some 250,000,000 of the human race that there is no God but God, and that Mohammed is the prophet of God.

What is the secret, what is the history of a creed that has reacted so widely and so continuously upon the relations of the Occident and the Orient? Though the cradle of Islam was not far distant from that of Judaism and of Christianity, and traces of both can be detected in the teachings of its founder, who even professed to revere

Moses and Jesus as his own forerunners, it was cast from the beginning in a very different mold. It is, above all, an unbending creed; for it was revealed, as all orthodox Mohammedans believe, with absolute finality in the Koran, of which the unalterable text was conveyed to the prophet Mohammed in a series of divine revelations through the angel Gabriel.

The sacred book is for all true believers the basis of all spiritual, social, and political life; for it regulates not only the religious beliefs and practices of every good Mohammedan, but his lawful relations with his neighbors and his obligations toward the state which is in theory made up of the whole community or brotherhood of Mohammedans. But Mohammed himself was illiterate, which in the East does not necessarily mean unlearned, and as these successive revelations, of which he dictated the exact tenor immediately after each one had been vouchsafed to him, covered the twenty-three years of his career as a prophet and conformed to the many important changes which his views underwent during that period, the Koran itself contains many variations of doctrine, sometimes almost contradictory, yet all equally immutable. So long as he lived, his commanding personality sufficed to reconcile

those discrepancies, but after his death it became necessary to call in aid the evidence of those who had been in closest contact with him, and were therefore best qualified to interpret his intentions, and their record of his sayings collected under the name of *Hadith*, or *Traditions*, is second in sanctity only to the Koran itself and forms with the Koran the whole gospel of orthodox Islamic truth.

Mohammed was undoubtedly a great spiritual thinker whose soul revolted against the idol-worship and the moral laxity which prevailed among his fellow-tribesmen in Arabia. He made a stern monotheism the foundation-stone of Islam, but in devising a religious, social, and political system which should rescue his people from their loose heathenism, he had enough worldly wisdom not to place any unbearable strain upon their inherited habits of life and thought. There is nothing in the Koran to show the chronological order of the angel Gabriel's revelations, but it is easy to distinguish between those parts of it in which Mohammed expresses himself as a religious seer and those in which he adapts his visions of divine truth to the practical requirements of a human polity. Out of that conflict between ideals and realities the Mohammedan theocratic state

emerged which combines in the same person both temporal and spiritual authority.

The principle of theocracy has been for long periods obscured in the vicissitudes of Islamic history, but how vital it has always remained we have seen once more within the last few years in the sudden frenzy which carried away a large section of the Mohammedan world in the so-called "khalifate movement." The khalifate itself dates back to the death of the prophet. Provision had to be made for the maintenance of the temporal and spiritual authority vested in him during his lifetime, and it was made in the institution of the khalifate. The headship of Islam was to be perpetuated in a *Khalifa-Rassul-Allah*, i.e., vicegerent of the prophet of God, otherwise called *Imam-el-Kebir*, i.e., the great guide, or *Ameer-el-Mouminin*, the prince of the faithful. The theocratic state which Mohammed had founded was then still in its infancy and was centered in the Koreish tribe to which he belonged. Though he passed away without actually designating his successor, his father-in-law, Abu Bekr, was immediately recognized as khalif, but he lived for only two years, and grave dissensions soon arose between those who held that the khalifate

should be elective and those who favored the principle of hereditary succession.

Concord was maintained under Abu Bekr's next two successors, though neither of them died a natural death. Open strife broke out under the fourth khalif, Ali, who was a son-in-law of the prophet. He was murdered just thirty years after the prophet's death, and the khalifate was transferred, by a combination of violence and fraud, to the Ommayad dynasty at Damascus. One immediate result was the great schism which endures to the present day between the followers of Ali, who call themselves Shiahs, and the Sunnis who, being in a large majority, have claimed ever since to represent Mohammedan orthodoxy.

The history of the khalifate has been a stormy one ever since. It was at once repudiated by the Shiahs; it lasted only a short time as a universal khalifate even of Sunni Islam; it has often been claimed simultaneously by different Mohammedan sovereigns; it has sometimes dropped almost out of sight in the clash of worldly ambitions; but its principle as a divinely appointed institution has never been openly denied by any Sunni Mohammedan state until the Turkish Republic proclaimed its abolition a few months ago.

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It was under the early khalifate that Islam spread throughout the Orient with an astounding rapidity which has no parallel in the history of any other of the great world-religions. The small band of semi-barbarous Arabs, who rushed forth from their desert homelands in the first half of the seventh century with the Koran in one hand and the sword in the other, carried everything before them in an irresistible tide of conquest, until within less than a hundred years they had swept eastward through Persia to Central Asia and to the confines of India, and westward along the north coast of Africa across to Spain and into the very heart of France. The Occident at last cried halt to them, but it was for a time desperately hard pressed. Europe had not yet found herself after the long succession of barbarian invasions, which almost submerged the remnants of the ancient civilization of Greece and Rome, and the transfer of the seat of occidental empire to Constantinople had shifted its center of stability to the very outposts of the Orient. The Byzantine Empire, however, still held the fort there, and the Occident was not wholly defeated nor the civilization for which it stood, for in the full tide of victory the Arabs came into contact with forms of civilization already decaying or still

immature, but far more advanced than any that Mohammed or his immediate followers ever dreamed of.

The Arabs are a branch of the Semitic race; they have fine natural gifts; they are intelligent; they are full of imagination; they have a poetic temperament which showed itself creative even in pre-Mohammedan times, and they have a natural aptitude for philosophic speculation. All these qualities received a fresh stimulus when the sword of Islam opened up to the Arabs vast countries in which there lingered the afterglow of Persian and Greek and Roman civilizations. Even the rigidity of Islamic doctrine seemed for a time to yield to new environments.

In Persia and in the adjacent lands of the Orient within the orbit of Persian civilization the Shiah heresy predominated and gave rise to a host of other heresies deeply imbued with earlier, even with Indian, forms of Asiatic mysticism. On the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, where Sunni orthodoxy prevailed, the Arabs came under the influence of peoples who, however degenerate, were the heirs of Greek and Roman culture. They easily displaced Christianity, debased and torn by the bitter feuds of Arian and Athanasian theologians, or petrified in the hermits'

caves of the Syrian and Libyan hills. But the opulence and refined luxury of such great cities as Alexandria, Damascus, and Antioch appealed to the sensuous side of their natures, while their speculative turn of mind led them to explore the new avenues of philosophic thought which the earlier translations of Greek authors into Syriac, a language akin to Arabic, opened out before them. Differences of creed and complexion were attenuated by the intermarriage of the Arab conquerors, relatively few in number, with women of the subject races. A blend of alien elements contributed to the growth of a brilliant and cultured Mohammedan society at Damascus under the Ommayad khalifate (661–750), and at Baghdad under the more somber Abbaside khalifate (750–970), when the ruler seldom appeared in public without the executioner at his side—just as Flecker shows the khalif Haroun-el-Rashid always attended by the sinister figure of Mansur in his "Golden Road to Samarkand."

Bloodthirsty tyrants as were many of the khalifs, they were also, like the "despots" of the Italian Renaissance, generous patrons of art and literature, and so keen was the response of the Arab mind to the finest minds of Hellas that in the reign of Haroun-el-Rashid's successor,

El-Mamun, Aristotle was translated into Arabic, and, in the following century, Ibn Sina, whom we call Avicenna, though born in far-away Bokhara and of Persian parentage, earned imperishable renown for Arab science as a great teacher of medicine as well as of philosophy.

It was not, however, in the lands belonging geographically to the East that Islamic culture reached its high-water mark, but in the farthest Western lands swept by the tide of Arab victories on the actual continent of Europe. With the conquest of Spain in the middle of the eighth century, the Arabs had become masters of so vast an empire that unity neither of religious nor of territorial rulership could be maintained. A separate khalifate arose at Cordova, contemporary with that of Baghdad, and it was there that through the intermingling of Mohammedan and Christian and Jewish elements the civilization which we call Saracenic not only yielded its finest fruits but made an enduring and beneficent mark on the Occident. For while the darkness of the early Middle Ages was settling down upon the Christian nations of Europe and they were being taught to forget their great inheritance of ancient classical learning, it was rescued from oblivion by Arab writers of truly encyclopedic

learning—at Cordova and Granada, at Seville and Toledo. Mohammedan princes ransacked Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad for books both old and new for their own libraries, and surrounded themselves with philosophers and men of science. Now and again the bigots checked the flow of enlightenment, but it resumed its undaunted course until it spread over every field of learning, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, geography, history, metaphysics, and philosophy—above all, philosophy.

It was, however, only after the khalifate of Cordova had itself crumbled away that this intellectual movement reached full maturity in Abdul-Walid Ibn-Rushd, better known as Averroes, who was born at Cordova in 1126, and enjoyed for a long time the protection of the Almohad princes. His influence cannot be measured even by the immense volume of his writings, which almost equals that of his chosen master, Aristotle. Averroes was a keen student of medicine and mathematics, but it was as an indomitable seeker after philosophic truth that he found the fullest scope for his genius. He claimed to be little more than an interpreter of Aristotle, but it is hardly too much to say that through him Aristotle was reborn into the world. In his own

lifetime Averroes had to suffer persecution at the hands even of his earlier patrons who were driven by Mohammedan orthodoxy and popular fanaticism to take alarm at his freedom of thought, and soon after his death the narrow bigotry of Mohammedan divines killed the new life which he had sought to breathe into the dry bones of Islam. The rare flower of Saracenic culture wilted even before the revival in Spain of a Christianity sometimes as fierce and militant as Islam itself drove back the Mohammedan conquerors into Northwest Africa. But through Averroes the torch of learning, which he kept burning at a critical period of human history, was handed on to Western nations, who without his inspiration might have suffered it to perish.

Trampled under foot during the final decay of Mohammedan power in Spain, Averroism, as the new school of liberal thought was deservedly called after its founder, passed, largely through the medium of its Jewish disciples whom Christian as well as Mohammedan fanaticism drove out of Spain, into the cities of southern France, and thence on the one hand to the great Italian University of Padua and on the other to Paris and Oxford. It was as fiercely assailed by the orthodox dogmatists of Western Christendom

as it had been by the orthodox dogmatists of Islam. But it found many courageous champions, and not least among Englishmen.

Michael Scot journeyed to Toledo at the beginning of the thirteenth century to study Arabic and read the works of Averroes in the master's tongue, and it was he who first published an English translation of Aristotle. Later on in the same century Roger Bacon expounded Averroes to an enthusiastic group of scholars at Oxford as the greatest of Aristotelian commentators. Averroism permeated the long period of travail through which philosophy passed in Europe until the Renaissance reopened access for European students to the original works of the Greek masters. Today, when the Mohammedan world is passing through another crisis, it is well to remember that there was once at any rate a period of Mohammedan enlightenment under Arab hegemony to which the civilization of the Occident itself owes a deep debt of gratitude.

Not even during that period, however, was there any peace between the Occident and the Orient. Christendom, long on the defensive against Islam, was passing over to the offensive. The same surge of religious revival that gradually drove the Arabs out of Spain produced the

Crusades, which, with their mingled record of heroic other-worldliness and of a squalidly selfish this-worldliness, constitute one of the most dramatic but also most disastrous episodes in the history of the relations of the Occident and the Orient. In so far as they were directed to the recovery of the Holy Land from the Mohammedan infidels, they were essentially wars of religion in which militant Christendom pitted itself against militant Islam. Even the many instances of splendid chivalry, as frequent on the Mohammedan as on the Christian side, only fitfully redeemed them from the taint of savage fanaticism. From this point of view they widened the gulf between the Occident and the Orient. On the other hand, when the personal ambitions of popes and kings deflected the later Crusades from their first pious purpose and the Latin Crusaders turned their arms quite as often against the rival Christian power at Constantinople as against the Mohammedan masters of Jerusalem, they ended by weakening the Occident as a whole just as it should have been closing up its ranks to resist another and almost more formidable onslaught from the Orient than that of the early Arab conquerors. The Turks had begun to sweep down upon Western Asia from their Central

Asian homelands some time before the First Crusade, but the great Seljukide Empire that they built up on the ruins of the old Arab khalifates had passed away before the last Crusade collapsed ignominiously, not in the Holy Land, but on the shores of the Black Sea, in a vain attempt to arrest the menacing expansion of a much mightier Turkish empire than that of the Seljukides.

The small Turkish clan that was to grow up into the Ottoman Empire only crossed the Euphrates in the middle of the thirteenth century to settle at first on one of the great plateaus of Asia Minor, not far from Angora, which is today the capital of the new Turkish Republic. Though the newcomers had picked up Mohammedanism during their wanderings across Asia, they were essentially soldiers of fortune ready to hire their swords out to the highest bidder, Christian as well as Mohammedan. Some took service in Asia with the Seljukide Empire, which was already tottering to its fall, and some in Europe with the Byzantine Empire or with its Christian rivals, whether Bulgars or Serbs. They were stout fighters, and wherever they went as hired mercenaries they ultimately remained as masters. From Othman, the first of their great leaders to proclaim himself an independent sovereign in 1295, the

dynasty and empire which he founded took the distinctive name of Ottoman. His son, Orkhan, organized his people into a nation in arms whose bravery in the field was constantly stimulated by the prospect of boundless plunder and slaves innumerable.

The Western Crusaders, turning their eyes away from Palestine, tried too late to compose their own differences in order to meet the new storm from the Orient, and the Byzantine emperor, Cantacuzene, himself preferred to seek safety in giving his young daughter, Theodora, in marriage to the Ottoman sultan. The Occident, with never a leader equal to the emergency, and torn by internal dissensions, squandered its forces of resistance, and a succession of fighting sultans who had also a rough grasp of statesmanship carried their empire into Europe, with Adrianople as its first European capital, until the capture of Constantinople in 1452, nine years after the last Crusade, and installed Mohammed the Conqueror in the imperial city which Constantine had created.

The Occident awoke too late to all that the fall of Constantinople meant. There was an end to the ancient continuity of empire of which the tradition had survived the transfer of the seat

of power from Rome to Constantinople. There was a new and formidable menace to Christian civilization itself not long emerged from the twilight of the Dark Ages. It was the triumph of Islam over Christendom that Mohammed the Conqueror celebrated when he rode his horse straight up to the ancient basilica of St. Sophia and converted it into a Mohammedan house of prayer. He was, it is true, wiser than the Turks of our own times, for he realized the value of his Christian subjects as an indispensable economic asset for purposes both of taxation and production, and more or less contemptuously allowed them to retain their own communal and ecclesiastical organization. He was willing, too, to concede certain privileges known as "capitulations" to the foreign merchants established in the chief Turkish seaports. But the conqueror never belied the savagery of his Central Asian race. Christian heads struck off by his orders adorned his great banquet after the capture of the imperial city, which was itself handed over to the tender mercies of the Turkish soldiery. What they did with it we know on the authority of a Turkish historian. He says:

> The soldiers thronged into it with joyous hearts, and there, seizing the possessors and their families, they made

the wretched unbelievers weep. They acted in accordance with the precept, "Slaughter their aged and capture their youth."

Then his victorious armies resumed their onward march. The Turk's only real business was and always has been war. North and south, east and west, the tide of Turkish conquest rolled on for another century and more until the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, whether under the direct rule or merely under the overlordship of the sultan, included in Europe not only all those states now known as the Balkan states, but the Russian littoral of the Black Sea and part of Poland and the whole of Hungary, and Austrian territory almost up to the gates of Vienna and down to the eastern coast of the Adriatic; in Asia, the whole of Asia Minor to the borders of Persia and the Persian Gulf and Syria and Palestine with the Arabian peninsula right away to the Indian Ocean; and in Africa, the whole of Egypt and the coastlands of Tripoli and Tunis and Algiers to the borders of Morocco on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.

The Ottoman armies seemed to be invincible on land, and alone among oriental nations Turkey developed a naval power which for a time almost dominated the Mediterranean. The Turkish flood

rolling in from the east was as grave a threat to the very existence of Western Christendom in the sixteenth century as, in the eighth century, the Arab flood that poured from the south across the Pyrenees into the very heart of France—indeed, a still graver threat, for the Arabs had known not only how to conquer but how to evolve a great civilization, whereas the Turks were conquerors and nothing more, who carried with them everywhere the gross atmosphere of the armed camp.

Sultan Selim the Grim, the conqueror of Egypt, had perhaps some higher vision when he sought to graft on to the immense temporal power of the Ottoman sultanate the spiritual power of the Islamic khalifate, and brought back with him to Constantinople, in 1517, the mantle of the prophet and the rest of the insignia which had remained in the possession of one of the descendants of the Abbaside dynasty of Baghdad who had fled to Cairo and still bore there, under the Mameluke sultans of Egypt, the title, though little more than an empty one, of khalif. Henceforth the Ottoman sultans assumed that title, which none had hitherto ventured to claim who could not at least pretend to trace back his descent to the Arabian prophet. Their right to it was never

universally recognized by orthodox Mohammedans in other countries or by other Mohammedan sovereigns, except as a matter of occasional political expediency or of mere courtesy. But from that time the titular leadership of Islam passed finally from a higher to a lower race, from the Arab to the Turk.

Under Selim's son, Soliman the Magnificent, the sinister growth of the Ottoman Empire reached its climax. He was the last of its great sultans, the tenth in succession from Othman, and at his death in 1566 it entered abruptly upon its decline, which was almost as rapid as had been its rise. Henceforth, with rare exceptions, the power passed for nearly two centuries under his feeble and depraved successors into the Seraglio whence sultanas and concubines misruled the Empire through corrupt and incompetent favorites, shamelessly raised to the highest offices of state. The heirs to the throne were brought up in what was called the "Cage," where, if they were not sooner or later put to death, they were deliberately debauched and emasculated, in order that, if and when they ascended the throne, they should be mere helpless puppets in the hands of the dominant faction. Those who survived exerted whatever energy was left to them on their acces-

sion in killing off their brothers or other members of their family who, so long as they lived, might be deemed potential rivals.

The Janissaries were almost the only check upon the Seraglio. Levied from the Christian subject races who had to give up their first-born sons to be brought up as Mohammedans for the military service of the Empire, they had been the *corps d'élite* of the Ottoman Army during the long period of unbroken victory. But in the hour of its decay they degenerated into a treacherous Praetorian guard ready to sell its support to anybody who could afford to purchase it. When war no longer meant new kingdoms to be delivered over to their predatory instincts, the Turkish armies in the field, led by generals as corrupt and incompetent as the Seraglio favorites who appointed them, ceased to be invincible, and after their last assault upon Vienna had been repelled in 1683 by the gallantry of the king of Poland, John Sobiesky, the European frontiers of Turkey receded almost continuously after each disastrous campaign, while anarchy spread throughout the provinces under increasing misrule, and the Christian subject races themselves awoke out of the lethargy of prolonged enslavement to a returning sense of national consciousness.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the progress of disintegration had already gone so far that the French ambassador in Constantinople wrote to his government describing the Turk as a "sick man" for whose inheritance the European powers should provide without delay. The phrase soon came into common use, but it was premature mainly because the European powers could not agree among themselves as to the distribution of the Turk's inheritance. The relations of the Orient and the Occident were however entering into a new phase. As the menace of Arab Islam to medieval Europe had passed away, so also did the menace of Turkish Islam to modern Europe. The Ottoman Empire lived on to be in its decrepitude a dangerous temptation to rival European ambitions as a bone of contention and more than once a cause of war between the great powers.

With this phase I shall deal on another occasion. I will conclude today by recalling the one great service which the rise of the Ottoman Empire rendered to the world, lest perhaps you should grow impatient of a story which may seem to have nothing to do with America. It has, in fact, everything to do with America, for in far-away Asia, the Turk, quite unwittingly,

precipitated at least one great event, and a most vital one, in your history, namely, the discovery of this great continent. It happened in this way. The ancient Greeks who covered Asia Minor with their colonies and the Romans whose Empire at its apogee stretched far into Asia, carried on a considerable overland trade with the more distant regions of the Orient; and in the Middle Ages Genoa and Venice derived much of their wealth and power from the valuable commerce which Europe still maintained with Eastern lands across the Mediterranean. When the Ottoman Empire grew up, it blocked one by one the old Asian land routes of European trade with the Orient, and its corsairs even made access to them across the Mediterranean impossible or at least very risky. But Europe was not to be balked. The Western nations with an Atlantic seaboard began to turn their eyes toward the boundless horizon of the Atlantic, and Amerigo Vespucci and Christopher Columbus and other hardy navigators launched their frail craft upon the unexplored ocean and opened up new highways to a new world.

The Spaniards and the Portuguese were the first to make the great adventure, and they made it in the sole hope of discovering a new trade route across the seas to the legendary wealth of the

Indies. Columbus himself was in quest of the Indies when he stumbled upon America, and he indeed imagined that he had reached the Indies when, as it turned out, he was landing on a brand-new continent. Hence for some time the Spaniards and the Portuguese, who were the pioneers of ocean navigation, called both North and South America "Las Indias," and their delusion has been preserved in the name "Indians," which the aboriginal races of this continent still bear, as well as in that of the West Indies, the group of islands still under the British flag in the Caribbean Sea. Indeed, the discovery of America did not divert the resolute navigators of Western Europe from their original search for an ocean route to India.

While after their first great achievements the Spaniards applied themselves chiefly to tightening their hold upon Central and Southern America, the Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed on the western shores of India. By the time the English followed in their wake, the Turkish conquest of Egypt had closed the last of the old avenues of European trade with the East which the Mameluke sultans of Cairo, so long as they were independent of Constantinople, had allowed to remain open for the sake of the enor-

mous tolls they levied upon it in transit across Egypt.

It was, like Columbus, with the hope of reaching India that John Cabot first sailed from England across the Atlantic, in the last years of the fifteenth century, and merely discovered Newfoundland. Not until Sir Walter Raleigh, as a graceful compliment to Queen Elizabeth, gave the name of Virginia to a large tract of country in North America, did his fellow-countrymen's eyes begin to turn with no less curiosity to the new continent of America than to the legendary shores of India. Then and for nearly two centuries the history of the early British colonies in North America was closely bound up with that of the early British settlements in India.

Of all this the Turk was blissfully unaware. He understood nothing about economic pressure. He believed only in the power of his sword. The vast Empire which his sword conquered has passed away, but the great historical fact remains that, when his sword closed to Western trade its old rights of way to the Orient, it was he who drove Europe to discover America just when she did, and to call in the New World to redress the balance of the Old more than three centuries before Canning uttered his famous phrase just a century ago.

II

THE PASSING OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

II

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The chief innovation in the domain of international relations during the nineteenth century was the assertion of the principle of nationality i.e., of the right of peoples to group themselves according to their ethnical and ethical affinities into independent political entities or states. After long struggles with the old principles of paramount dynastic interests exalted at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and in the Holy Alliance, the principle of nationality won through in Europe in the unification of Italy and of Germany, as it had already won through in the successful revolt of the Spanish and Portuguese dominions in South America, and as it won through also in the preservation of the North American union in this great Republic, though at the cost of a terrible Civil War.

From the very beginning of the nineteenth century the same principle began also to affect very profoundly the relations between the Occident and the Orient, with the decay of the old Ottoman

Empire built up on the destruction of whole nations, and with the reawakening of the Christian subject races in European Turkey. Pitiful remnants of the medieval Occident, they had been mangled for centuries under the Turkish harrow, but their spark of life had never been wholly extinguished. The Turkish hand had been heavy upon them, and every family had to surrender a son to be brought up as a Mohammedan for military service in the corps of Janissaries, but they had collectively retained their own faith. It was in the interests of the ruling race to conserve the Christian communities as hewers of wood and drawers of water. There was a limit under the Sacred Law to the taxation which could be imposed upon the sultan's Mohammedan subjects; there was none to the taxation of his Christian subjects.

So the Christians had been allowed to preserve their churches and their priests, their separate languages and their ancient folksongs, and with them some things of their national soul. The vast majority belonged to the Eastern or Orthodox church, and for this reason Russia, who was of the same communion, was the first great European power to take a not altogether unselfish interest in their fate.

In the eighteenth century Catherine the Great at war with Turkey openly proclaimed herself the champion of the orthodox Christian populations of the Balkan peninsula, and the partition of European Turkey was mooted between Russia, Prussia, and Austria and only postponed because they found it easier for the time being to satisfy their ambition by the partition of Poland. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, which convulsed the whole European continent, sent a fresh thrill of hope through the Balkan peoples. To the Serbs belongs the honor of having been the first to rise in open rebellion in 1805 against their Turkish masters, and, though their heroic struggle ended in temporary failure, they blazed the trail for others. When the Greeks in their turn rose, they had this advantage, that their cause appealed directly to all those who remembered what Western civilization owed to ancient Greece.

In spite of many cross-currents that favored Turkey, the most staggering blow since Lepanto was dealt to Turkish naval power when the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia under Admiral Codrington destroyed the Turkish fleet in Greek waters at Navarino in 1820; but only after a Russian army had entered Adrianople in

1829 did Turkey recognize the Hellenic kingdom as the first independent state carved out of her dominions in the Balkan peninsula. And let me say here straightway with regard not only to Greece, but also to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania —all Slav Balkan states carved out of European Turkey—that with all the grave shortcomings of their rulers and their peoples, there is not one that on its record taken as a whole has failed to justify its emancipation. Nobody who had an opportunity of comparing conditions in those countries before the Balkan wars with the condition of the provinces then still under Turkish rule could for a moment question the social and intellectual and economic strides which they had made since their liberation. They were nations instinct with life, whilst the dead hand of Turkey still weighed heavily on every people still subject to the Ottoman sultans.

When at the end of the Greek war of independence the Ottoman Empire seemed to be at the last gasp, it received a fresh lease of life from Anglo-Russian rivalry, henceforth until nearly the end of the nineteenth century the dominant factor in the relations between the Occident and the Orient. Russia was known to have long cast covetous eyes upon Constantinople, which she significantly

called Tsargrad, the city of the Eastern Caesars, to whom the Russian czars claimed mystic heirship.

This was a claim into which British statesmen had some excuse for reading a dangerous challenge to British power in Asia as well as in Europe. They remembered the plans discussed between Napoleon and Alexander I at Tilsit for a joint invasion of India across Persia by Russian and French armies, and they scented in Russia's expansion at the cost of Turkey a definite menace to India on her northwest land frontier which British supremacy at sea could not by itself avail to counter. Moreover, British naval power was being confronted with new and difficult problems. Steam navigation was promising to open up quicker lines of communication with India through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea than round the Cape of Good Hope, and the safety of the new overland route across Egypt would, it was felt, be gravely imperiled if the eastern Mediterranean came to be dominated by a great European power intrenched at Constantinople and on the straits.

This danger could no longer be regarded as remote when the revolt, for a long time victorious, of the great pasha of Egypt, Mohamed Ali,

against his Turkish overlord suddenly threatened to disrupt the Turkish Empire and led Russia to show her own hand somewhat prematurely. For, on the plea of protecting the Turkish capital against the rapid advance of the Egyptian armies, Czar Nicolas I made haste, in 1833, to land large Russian forces at Constantinople, and he only withdrew them, under strong diplomatic pressure from the rest of Europe, after he had wrung from the sultan the Treaty of Ungkiar Skelessi, which, had Russia been allowed to carry it into effect, would have meant placing the whole Ottoman Empire under a virtual Russian protectorate. Apart from that treaty the special title which the Czar claimed to the protection of the sultan's Christian subjects as fellow-members of the same Christian communion could still be pressed at any moment, and to much the same purpose.

Was there any other way of averting this menace than by constraining Turkey to put her house in order and deprive Russia of her excuse for interference in a reformed Ottoman Empire? This was at any rate the policy urged upon British ministers by a masterful ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, who had watched the tortuous methods of Russian diplomacy at

close quarters, and was honestly convinced that there might yet be time to make Turkey mend her ways and convert her, with British support, into a solid bulwark against further encroachments of Russian power in the East, either toward Constantinople or toward India. Canning's policy postulated, of course, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and was therefore in direct conflict with Russian policy which aimed at its destruction, either by direct action, or by promoting under her *aegis* the rise of independent Christian states, to be carved, as the Hellenic kingdom had already been, out of the Turkish dominions in Europe.

The czar Nicolas had vast ambitions, but they were not directed merely toward the material aggrandizement of his Empire. He believed himself to be specially charged with the providential mission of removing from the map of Europe the incurable plague spot which he, and many Englishmen too, saw Turkey to be. But he professed himself ready to seek, in the fulfilment of his mission, the co-operation of other powers, and even of Great Britain, the only other European power that already had, like Russia, a great stake in the Orient. Twice, in 1844 and 1853, he made overtures to British ministers, with every appear-

ance of sincerity and on not ungenerous terms, for a final partition of the Ottoman Empire, which he at least was convinced would never mend its ways, and must therefore be ended once and for all.

It is idle to speculate on what might have happened if Britain had entertained those overtures. But suspicion of Russia was too deep seated, and they were rejected. It was the parting of the ways, and England took what many Englishmen, including myself, have long since held to have been the wrong turning. Only a few years later she found herself fighting the Crimean War against Russia and in defense of Turkey, and, when it was over and Russia temporarily defeated, the Ottoman Empire was solemnly admitted by the Paris Treaty of 1856 into the "comity of civilized nations."

This was a theatrical transformation scene in the relations between the Occident and the Orient, but nothing more. Another two decades showed the Turk to be as incorrigible as ever. The only thing that the Turkish ruler had learned was how to borrow and squander huge sums of money which European financiers were willing to lend him as soon as he had been welcomed into the comity of civilized nations. All his promises of reforms remained a dead letter.

When in the seventies rebellion broke out in various Christian provinces of European Turkey, the customary methods of repression were employed as of old and culminated in the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876. The powers were agreed that the Turkish situation had become intolerable but they could not agree upon the remedy. They held a great conference at Constantinople at the end of 1876 which ended in failure. Then the czar, Alexander II, took the law into his own hands, and early in 1878 his armies stood at the gates of the Turkish capital.

Once more the old fear of Russian ascendancy drove Britain to the verge of war in order to save Turkey. In spite of Gladstone's fiery crusade against Turkish misrule, Disraeli, who was then British prime minister, carried the country with him in crying halt to Russia, and in view of the imminence of war Indian troops were brought as far as Malta. Orientals had already often fought side by side with Europeans against other Europeans on eastern battlefields, but never before had it been proposed to array them against Europeans on European battlefields. This was a new and momentous precedent, though on that occasion the Indian troops never went beyond Malta. Russia could not afford to embark on

another war, and after having imposed upon the beaten Turk the Treaty of San Stefano, which would have liberated the greater part of European Turkey from the Ottoman yoke, she agreed to have it referred to a Congress at Berlin which whittled down its most important provisions and restored large areas to Turkish rule.

Turkey was, indeed, bound over to reorganize her bankrupt finances, and besides the customary promises to introduce large administrative reforms in all the provinces, she was specially pledged in regard to her Asiatic provinces to Great Britain who undertook to defend them against external aggression under a secret agreement by which the sultan handed over to her the island of Cyprus save for the retention of his nominal sovereignty and a fixed portion of revenue.

But the powers claimed no direct control over the execution of the reforms, and though a watchful eye was to be kept upon them by their ambassadors at Constantinople, their angles of vision were apt to be very different, and in the person of Abdul Hamid a new sultan was now on the throne whose sinister statesmanship soon broke up the so-called "Concert of Europe."

Even before Selim the Grim's conquest of Egypt, the Ottoman sultans had sometimes

boastfully called themselves khalifs, though it is from his reign that the Turkish khalifate is generally held to date. But until the latter part of the nineteenth century his successors had made very little capital out of the spiritual authority which that title implied. Selim died too soon, and his immediate successor, Soliman the Magnificent, was too much absorbed in the European wars of conquest which filled his long reign. After him the power of the sultans passed to the Seraglio, and that was not an atmosphere in which much thought was given to spiritual authority.

More recently, when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Turkish statesmen under British influence were trying to fit a modern façade on to the decaying Empire, they were so anxious to affect European usages and to dissemble the old oriental Adam that the ruler of Turkey preferred for a time to adopt in international treaties the title not of "sultan," and still less of "khalif," but of "emperor" of the Ottomans, which at least sounded more occidental. Abdul Hamid II, whom a succession of palace tragedies had put on the throne in 1876 just before the Russo-Turkish War, was the first to turn the khalifate to practical account. When he was a youth, a pious fakir, who claimed to have dis-

covered his star in the heavens, prophesied to him that he was destined to revive the ancient glory of Islam as sultan and khalif. Perhaps it was in remembrance of that prophecy that he called his new palace Yeldiz Kiosk, or the "pavilion of the star," and he was at any rate determined to remind the world that he was khalif as well as sultan, and that he meant to seek in the exercise of his spiritual sovereignty as khalif substantial compensation for the curtailment of territorial sovereignty which infidel Europe had inflicted upon him as sultan.

It was a bold reversion to the original conception of Islamic theocracy, and one cannot deny a certain element of greatness both to the conception itself and to the systematic if ruthless determination with which he labored to carry it into effect. His first care was to restore the autocratic power of the sultanate. He quickly rid himself of the paper constitution which Midhat Pasha had devised, chiefly, it must be said, in order to throw dust in the eyes of Europe, and banished its author into Arabia, where he conveniently died of a cup of coffee. He broke up the old Turkish bureaucratic ring which for two or three generations had ruled or misruled the Empire from the offices of the Sublime Porte at Stamboul,

and he made his palace, from which he seldom ventured forth even into the streets of his capital, the one center of government from which his immediate orders traveled, often over the heads of ministers and governors, to the most distant parts of his dominions and to his carefully selected representatives and agents abroad.

The first public intimation of the new Pan-Islamic policy by which he hoped to rally the whole Mohammedan world around the Turkish khalifate was the appointment in 1881 of a Tunisian as grand vizier, and he emphasized its significance by declaring in the firman of appointment that as khalif he had the right to claim the services of all orthodox Mohammedans throughout the world of Islam. I was in Constantinople at the time and well remember what a sensation it produced among all the old Turkish officials who looked upon the grand vizierate as part of their monopoly.

It was not among his own slow-witted Turkish people that Abdul Hamid meant to look for the instruments of a policy ranging far beyond his temporal dominions. He surrounded himself at Yeldiz with Arab Syrians and Kurds and Albanians who were his secretaries and confidants and spies, and even the garrison at Constantinople that watched over his safety was composed of regiments

drawn mainly from the non-Turkish Mohammedan races of his Empire. Like a spider in his web he spun from Yeldiz an ever expanding web of Pan-Islamic propaganda which carried his fame as sultan and khalif among Mohammedans far and near, and especially among those whose loyalty to their alien rulers he hoped to shake as a means of large political reprisal. It was his good fortune ultimately to enlist the support of one great European potentate.

Germany had stepped into England's shoes at Constantinople after Lord Salisbury had come at last to the conclusion that in backing Turkey we had backed the wrong horse. But so long as Bismarck was in power German influence at Constantinople was exerted mainly for the purpose of warding off a conflict between Russia and Austria which might have compelled him to take sides with the one or the other power—the very thing he most dreaded having to do. William II, on the contrary, saw in Turkey Germany's bridge head to world-dominion, and his first quarrel with Bismarck arose when the old chancellor replied to him that in his political dictionary there was no such term as "world-dominion."

Bismarck fell, and a few years afterward, in 1898, William II, throwing his mantle over

Turkey, was the first and only Christian sovereign to hail Abdul Hamid, in his famous speech at Damascus, as "his friend and ally whom 300,000,000 Mohammedans throughout the world revere as their khalif." This effusive demonstration, only a few days after the German emperor had been masquerading as a crusader at Jerusalem, was particularly precious to Abdul Hamid, for the Armenian massacres had just then sent a thrill of horror through the Western World.

Abdul Hamid was no fanatic; he often showed a great personal liking for individual Europeans and for many European customs. He had even a taste for European music and drama and built himself a private theater in the grounds of Yeldiz. He was an adroit diplomatist and could knock the heads of the European ambassadors together in order to set the concert of Europe at loggerheads, but he would make up for it at once by lavishing the most delicate attentions upon them and still more upon their wives. But in matters of policy he had no bowels of compunction.

He was pledged by treaty to introduce far-reaching reforms into his Armenian provinces, but what would the Islamic world say if the khalif were to grant equality to one of his Christian

subject races? These Christian subject races had already disintegrated his Empire in Europe. Were the Armenians to disintegrate his Empire in Asia? He could see no practical solution that would rid him of the noxious Armenian question except to get rid of the Armenians themselves, and he felt he could defy the judgment of all other civilized nations if the German emperor stood by him in his shining armor. William II was quite satisfied with the bargain. He got his Baghdad Railway Concession and many others, besides the congenial privilege of reorganizing the Turkish Army under German officers.

Abdul Hamid continued to misrule despotically his own long-suffering people and intermittently to kill off his Armenians whenever occasion offered, while he built with German help his Hejaz Railway to the Holy Places of Arabia, which was certainly the finest bit of Pan-Islamic propaganda he ever did, as agents from Yeldiz perambulated the whole Mohammedan world to collect subscriptions for that pious work and to sing the praises of the great khalif and sultan who was its author.

But he had turned his own people against him by an inquisitional system of government working chiefly through corruption and delation. No one was safe whom his legions of spies chose to

denounce as disloyal, and disaffection was equally rife in the army, which he had always dreaded and kept at arm's length.

The Turkish revolution of 1908–1909 began as a military revolt, but it ended by placing in power a committee known as the Union and Progress Committee, which was composed not only of revolted officers, but of a younger generation of Turkish civilians, many of whom had spent years in exile and had caught up some of the catchwords at least of Western democracy and freedom of thought. Religion sat very lightly upon them, and some of them were not even Mohammedans, but Jews and crypto-Jews from Salonica, which had long been a hotbed of disaffection.

Under Abdul Hamid's semi-imbecile successor, a brother whom he had kept a state prisoner for thirty years in a gilded cage, members of the Union and Progress Committee were the real rulers of Turkey. The Occident hailed in them at first the advent of a new era in the Orient, and in Turkey itself all Ottomans, irrespective of creed and race, celebrated a short, delirious honeymoon to the tune of "Liberty, Justice, and Fraternity." Even during the honeymoon, however, the Turks carefully eschewed the word "equality," and the Union and Progress men soon began to

display the cloven hoof of their new Turkish nationalism, which they enforced almost as ruthlessly upon Mohammedan non-Turkish as upon Christian subject races. Their dream was to build up a great Turkish state which should include all the peoples of northern Persia and Afghanistan and Central Asia with whom the Turk could claim to have or to have had at any time in history some racial or linguistic affinity. This was known as the Pan-Turanian movement of which Enver Pasha was to become the chief apostle during the Great War.

Meanwhile, Pan-Islamism receded into the background. But it was too useful a second string to be given up altogether, especially when the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 gave the Young Turks a plausible excuse for appealing to the sympathies of the whole Mohammedan Orient against the European powers who, with the one exception of Germany, were denounced as conspiring to crush Turkey as the last bulwark of Islam. Even Germany's attitude sometimes perplexed the Young Turks, but William II always knew how to humor them and retain their affections against "the day" which he had long foreseen when Turkey's fourteen army corps would provide

a valuable adjunct to the great Germanic armies.

When the Young Turks dragged their country into the Great War at Germany's heels, they made one desperate attempt to turn the Turkish khalifate to account. In the name of the khalif, a *Jehad*, or "holy war," was proclaimed against the Allies. It helped, perhaps, in Turkey itself to create a proper atmosphere for resuming on an unprecedented scale the Hamidian policy of exterminating the Christian populations, but it fell completely flat amongst the Mohammedans outside the Turkish Empire, who seemed to realize that it was something of a paradox for Turkey to proclaim a holy war against infidels when she was herself in alliance with other infidels.

Indian and French Mohammedan troops fought loyally on the Western front against the Germans, and, still more significant, Indians and even Egyptians fought equally well against their Turkish co-religionists on the Suez Canal, in Syria, and in Mesopotamia.

For our knowledge of what happened in Turkey during the Great War we are indebted largely to many brave American missionaries in the interior, and to Morgenthau, the United States ambassador in Constantinople, while Lord Bryce, whose

memory is still I think as much honored on your side as on our side of the Atlantic applied himself to collect the overwhelming mass of evidence on which he framed for the British Parliament his formidable indictment of Turkish savagery.

The outstanding features were the wholesale massacres and mass deportations, scarcely less deadly, which were deliberately and systematically carried out in 1915–16 throughout the principal Armenian districts of Asia Minor by the Turkish military and civil authorities under Enver, the minister of war, and Talaat, the minister of the interior. Compared with such atrocities, the brutality of the Turks toward British prisoners of war is a minor matter, but Englishmen cannot easily forget that nearly 50 per cent of them perished in consequence of Turkish callousness and ill-treatment. Throughout the Empire, corruption and misrule surpassed all records, and while Enver, who, though commander-in-chief, did not shrink from starving the Turkish armies in order to fill his own pockets, and Talaat and the rest battened at Constantinople on state plunder, famine and epidemics devastated the civil population throughout the whole length and breadth of the country.

By the time the Turks sued for an armistice in October, 1918, we have it on the authority of the American Relief Committee that a quarter of the whole population of the Ottoman Empire had perished since 1914 from war casualties, disease, starvation, and massacre.

Most of the war leaders fled as soon as they saw the game was up, and the new Turkish government was quite prepared to accept the penalties of defeat. Had the Allies imposed their terms of peace at once, they would have been accepted even had they been as severe as those which were embodied two years later in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres. The war aims of the Allies had been repeatedly proclaimed. Turkey was to be banished from Europe, and if Constantinople itself was not to go to Greece, with the rest of Thrace, it was to become a free city under international control. In Asia Minor, Smyrna and the surrounding region, in which the Greek population undoubtedly predominated, was to form an autonomous province. The remnants of the Armenian people were to be gathered into an independent Armenian state, the Arab provinces were to be permanently detached from Turkey, and a drastic control established over the whole Turkish administration in order to make all

subject races and the Turkish people themselves safe against any renewal of the worst forms of Turkish oppression.

But the long delays of Allied diplomacy and the revival of European jealousies, and, more indirectly, America's withdrawal into her own shell after the Treaty of Versailles, gave Turkey breathing time and allowed Mustapha Kemal, one of the few Turkish generals who had earned the respect of his adversaries during the war, to reorganize the Turkish armies and get Turkey, though heavily beaten in the first round, into condition to fight a second round as soon as a Greek army landed in Asia Minor.

There have been many lamentable pages in the long history of the relations between the Occident and the Orient on which the bankruptcy of occidental statesmanship has been writ large, but none more lamentable than those on which will stand forever recorded in the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent victims the failure of Western statesmanship in the Near East during the five years that followed the end of the Great War. Things might have been very different had America with her fine record of educational and cultural activities in Turkey been willing to undertake mandatory responsibilities

in Armenia or even in the Arab lands detached from the Ottoman Empire, but for reasons which it might be unseemly for me to criticize on this occasion, she declined, and with that decision which I may at any rate be permitted to deplore, her responsibility begins and ends.

Not so the responsibility of the European powers concerned, and painful as it is to me to have to admit it, the heaviest responsibility of all must rest on my own country. It was the British armies and the British fleets that had broken the power of Turkey. Not only did we hold Syria and Mesopotamia, but Constantinople and the chief strategic points of Asia Minor had passed into British hands immediately after the Armistice.

I was attached to the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, and there among those who had any knowledge of the East was no one who could fail to realize the urgency of imposing the Allied peace terms upon Turkey while we were still in a position to enforce them.

But Lloyd George knew better. Someone had told him that the East was never in a hurry and that Turkey could wait. So for reasons of internal policy and to meet the popular clamor for demobilization and retrenchment, the greater part of the British forces were withdrawn and French and

Italian troops were invited to take their place and supply the material pressure which we were no longer prepared to maintain.

Far be it from me to excuse the part which the French and the Italians subsequently played in parleying with the Turks on their own account and in what they with incredible folly deemed to be their own national interests. But had we ourselves shown greater steadfastness in holding the fort, our allies would never have been given the opportunity to succumb to the temptation offered to them by proximity to the Turkish Empire.

Similarly, with the landing of the Greek armies in Asia Minor, Lloyd George was at last compelled to recognize what was to be the outcome of his strange notion that Turkey could wait. The Greek troops landed, it is true, in the first instance at the joint invitation of the three Allied Powers, but that the invitation was issued at Lloyd George's instance has never been in doubt. It is also clear that even when at a later date the British government joined with the French and Italian governments in advising Greece to withdraw her forces from Asia Minor and proclaiming their neutrality should Greece persevere in a military adventure which they professed equally

to condemn, Lloyd George continued with strange levity to hold a language which the Greeks could not construe otherwise than as a direct encouragement to disregard the advice officially given to them—a language which, whatever his intentions may have been, directly contributed to the final disaster.

Unless the Allies, and more especially England, were prepared to see the Greeks through, the landing of the Greek Army in Asia Minor was unquestionably a most dangerous challenge to Turkish racial pride. Then, too, and only then, was a considerable part of the Mohammedan world which had remained almost entirely indifferent to the fate of Turkey during the Great War suddenly seized with an overwhelming anxiety as to the terms to be imposed upon her. Nowhere, as I shall show on another occasion, was the excitement greater than among Indian Mohammedans, who professed to see in the policy of the Allied Powers, and more especially of Britain, an attack upon the Turkish khalifate and therefore upon the Mohammedan religion. It was a belated revival of Hamidian Pan-Islamism. The Turks naturally played up to it. But the Graeco-Turkish conflict in itself had nothing to do with the question of the Turkish khalifate, which was

not even mentioned in the national pact in which the Grand National Assembly embodied its challenge to the Allied Powers.

It was not so much a religious as a racial war which revived and fired to white heat the fierce nationalism of a ruling race who still regarded all Greeks as mere rebels, to be expelled and exterminated as such, not on any purely religious ground, but on the same grounds of high policy on which Abdul Hamid had determined to root out the Armenians.

One has only to look at what happened at Angora after the Turks had smashed the Greek armies and turned the essentially Greek city of Smyrna into an ash-heap as a proof of their victory. The British forces at Chanak on the Asiatic side of the straits and at Constantinople prevented a Turkish rush across to Thrace. But the Turks nevertheless got their own terms before the Mudania Convention brought hostilities to a close on October 11, 1922.

Then, to use a trivial phrase, Mustapha Kemal and the new Turkey represented in the Grand National Assembly gave the show away. For it became evident that they had merely exploited both the sultanate and the khalifate as useful assets in a conflict in which the Turks had been

fighting, above all, for their racial supremacy, when on November 2, 1922, they not only deposed the sultan but put an end to the Ottoman sultanate and deprived the khalif of all temporal power. The word "republic" was not yet uttered, and the khalifate itself was not actually abolished. But, if a new khalif was appointed, who was still chosen from the ancient House of Othman, he was no longer to be sultan nor to be invested with the sword of Othman.

This was already a negation of the theocratic state which Abdul Hamid had tried to revive in the Ottoman Empire. By the strange irony of things it happened, too, that the first member of the House of Othman to be cast for the new part of a purely spiritual ruler in the Mohammedan world was also the only one who had received something of a European education, who had some knowledge of European languages, and who had often displayed in public a very unorthodox liking for European ways of life.

All this was already a thoroughly revolutionary departure from both Turkish and Islamic traditions. But much more was to follow when the final treaty of peace between Europe and the new Turkish state was at last signed after many diplomatic vicissitudes at Lausanne on July 24,

1923. The treaty itself was an abject surrender on the part of a war-weary and divided Europe. It was also on the part of England especially a surrender to a pro-Turkish Mohammedan agitation in India which, wholly artificial as it was at first, assumed, thanks to the weakness of the government of India, such a menacing character that it ended by intimidating the government of the British Empire. It restored not only Constantinople but eastern Thrace to the Turk and placed him once more in possession of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles—subject only to conditions of demilitarization which may read well enough on paper but which have as their only safeguard the authority of the League of Nations, and, remembering Corfu, that is still rather a weak reed to lean on.

Turkey, it is true, had to acquiesce in the loss of her Arab provinces with the exception of Mosul, reserved for subsequent negotiation between Turkey and England or for reference in the last resort to the League of Nations, whose name seems to have been called in aid in this as in many other cases as the one means of disguising failure to agree. Throughout Asia Minor Turkish rule was revived without any of the restraints which the Treaty of Sèvres would have placed upon it. The cruelest mockery of all was the clause that

professed to provide for the rights of minorities which have in fact almost entirely ceased to exist. Not a word was said about the unfortunate Armenians, whose scattered remnants were abandoned to the tender mercies of the Turk, or about the Greeks of Asia Minor, who had been driven forth over a million in number from their ancient homelands. Even the few that still remained were compelled to follow them into exile under an article of the treaty providing for the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations with the sole exception of the 300,000 Greeks residing in Constantinople itself.

A large part of the Mohammedan world hailed Mustapha Kemal once more as the ever victorious sword of Islam. Mustapha Kemal had no further use for the sword of Islam. Intoxicated, perhaps, by his own personal triumph, he felt himself free to throw off all further restraints. On October 29 Turkey was declared a republic by the Grand National Assembly and Mustapha Kemal unanimously elected to be its first president with practically dictatorial powers, for, besides being head of the state and commander-in-chief of the army, he was made president of the Grand National Assembly and president of the Council of Ministers. The position of the khalif still remained nominally

unchanged but signs were soon not wanting that his days as khalif were also numbered. He had remained in Constantinople, and Angora suspected him of encouraging the discontent of which the old imperial capital, now turned into a mere provincial capital, was the center.

An ominous campaign in the press controlled by the men of Angora was the prelude to a resolution passed on March 3, by the Grand National Assembly, with only two dissentient votes, for the summary abolition of the khalifate. The very next day the sentence of deposition was read to the khalif at Constantinople and that night he and his son were put across the European frontier; a few days later all the remaining members, male and female, of the House of Othman were likewise banished, and all their inherited and personal possessions, palaces and jewels and the rest, were confiscated for the use of the state.

To emphasize the significance of this action a series of drastic measures were forthwith enacted by the Grand National Assembly. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, who had formerly held rank immediately after the grand vizier, was to be no longer even a member of the cabinet, and his functions were to be purely religious. All the property of the *Evkaf*, or pious foundations, was appropriated

to the state. The administration of the law hitherto based entirely upon the Koran was subordinated to the civil authority, just as national education also was by the abolition of all religious state schools.

Not only have the Ottoman sultanate that had existed for seven centuries and the Ottoman khalifate which had existed for four centuries passed out of the pages of history, but the Turkish Republic has come into being as a lay-republic which is the very negation of Islam. One of the great factors in the relations of the Orient with the Occident has disappeared with consequences which cannot yet be fully foreseen. In the first place, we cannot yet fully apprehend the reasons which have prompted the rulers of Turkey, or one should perhaps say, the ruler rather than rulers, for Mustapha Kemal stands out so far as the one absolutely dominant figure in the new Turkish state. His personality is a perplexing one. The British Army knows him as the able soldier and clean fighter of Gallipoli, who defeated its last great effort on the heights above Suvla Bay in August, 1915; his patriotism and integrity are alone singled out for praise in the singularly dispassionate work, *Five Years in Turkey*, in which Liman von Sanders has described Turkish

military and political conditions while he was head of the German Military Mission in Turkey before and during the Great War. To his energy and capacity must be mainly ascribed the reorganization of the Turkish Army after the Great War and the national effort by which the Greek armies were driven out of Asia Minor, though the Greek disasters were in fact due in a far greater measure to the dissensions among the Allies, who finally abandoned Greece to her fate and to the folly and incompetence of King Constantine and his ministers in Athens. That there are in Mustapha Kemal elements of real greatness can hardly be disputed, and such has been the obstructive influence exercised with rare exceptions on human progress, social and political, that we have no reason to regret the shattering blow dealt by Mustapha Kemal to the revival of a militant Pan-Islamism.

How far bolshevist influences and the example of Lenin may have affected him I shall come to in one of my subsequent addresses on the new factor which bolshevism has imported into the relations between the Occident and the Orient. Those who would put the best construction on his policy still contend that he is above all an enlightened reformer, and, from the absence of any at

all considerable opposition to the revolutionary changes which he has enacted, they are disposed to infer that he himself merely reflects a great psychological change wrought in the mentality of a large majority of the Turkish people by the terrible ordeal of almost continuous warfare and the frightful hardships which Turkey has passed through during the last twelve or thirteen years.

But it is difficult to see how far Turkey has profited by exchanging a narrow religious fanaticism for an equally narrow racial fanaticism. Turkish dreams of a great Pan-Turanian Empire may be dismissed as more visionary than ever since bolshevist Russia has resumed the hold which czarist Russia had established on Central Asia.

All we need consider is what Turkey actually is today. Her population is estimated at between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000, decimated by the war and believed to be still shrinking, as it was already doing before the war, from congenital disease. It will, it is true, be for the first time an almost purely Turkish population, for of the Greeks and Armenians who in 1914 still numbered some 3,000,000 in Asia Minor only the scantiest remnants are left. Yet they were the most intelligent and economically valuable communities in the old Ottoman Empire. They were almost

everywhere the chief and often the only traders, petty shopkeepers in the villages, and merchants and financiers sometimes on a large scale in the towns. They are gone. They may have been in many ways unworthy successors to the splendid Hellenic culture of which the memory lingers in the names of the old Greek cities of Asia Minor and not less in the epistles of the New Testament, but though on a lower plane they were still until yesterday the brains of the country.

The European settlements which also played their very important part in the economic development of Turkey have lost, by the abolition of the capitulations, under the Treaty of Lausanne, the permanent safeguards which all Western powers had hitherto deemed essential for the security of foreign life and property in a state where justice, as administered in a Turkish court, has been hitherto a byword. The new Turkey has not formally repudiated her old financial obligations abroad as soviet Russia has done, but in practice she has already begun to scrap them. Yet she can be saved from absolute bankruptcy only by restoring her shattered credit abroad.

Owing to her geographical position and to the fighting qualities of her people, the new Turkey may never be a wholly negligible factor in the

Near East, but she can hardly aspire to a much higher position than that of a third-rate power barely equal in general resources to any of the Balkan states over which she used to rule, and she has herself abdicated the prestige and influence which the possession of the Turkish khalifate had, in our days at any rate, conferred upon her. The khalifate as a Mohammedan institution will not cease to exist, for as such it must not be confused with the Ottoman khalifate because it has lately suited the purpose of many Mohammedans to identify the one with the other. It existed long before the Ottoman Empire and may continue to exist long after it.

But wherever else the khalifate may be revived, the Ottoman khalif has disappeared with the Ottoman sultanate, and this is one of the great events—so great that a few years ago it would have been deemed unthinkable—in the history of the relations between the Occident and the Orient.

III

THE PECULIAR CASE OF EGYPT

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Egypt deserves, I think, separate treatment, for nowhere else have we a better illustration of the play of modern economic as well as social and religious forces on the relations between the Occident and the Orient.

The land of the ancient pharaohs was conquered by the Persians in the fifth century B.C., and became in turn subject to the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire and the Arab Empire under the khalifate. But not until it was conquered by the Turkish sultan, Selim the Grim, in 1517, did it sink into complete obscurity, like all the Arab lands incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. Its existence was almost forgotten until the very close of the eighteenth century, when it was suddenly galvanized into life again by two great soldiers of fortune, neither of them of Asiatic or African, but both of European stock, and both born by a curious coincidence in the same year, 1769, in different parts of the Mediterranean—the Corsican, Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Albanian, Mohamed Ali.

Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt plunged her into the whirlpool of European strife. But he was much more than a mere military genius. He took with him a French scientific mission whose amazing work during the brief years of the French occupation revealed Egypt to herself as well as to the Western World. It was the dawn of a new life for her.

After the British and the Turks had driven the French out of Egypt, Mohamed Ali, who had landed with the Turkish Army as a captain of Albanian auxiliaries, remained and fought his way to power out of the chaos in which the first clash of European ambitions on her soil had left Egypt. He leaped into the saddle as Turkish governor, and after he had tried his new armies and ships first on the Wahabis of Arabia and then on the Greeks of the Morea in revolt against Turkey, he himself rebelled against his Ottoman overlord whose Empire he nearly destroyed twice in the course of a ten-year struggle for independence. He failed because, with the exception of France, the European powers, and especially Great Britain, saw in the independence of Egypt a menace to their own interests.

Nevertheless, in the end, he secured hereditary rights of government for himself and his family and a large measure of autonomy for Egypt,

while by promoting Western education, by encouraging Western trade, by introducing Western industries, and by opening up communications between Europe and India through Egypt, though his methods were often crude and tyrannical, he laid the rough foundations of modern Egypt. In many ways a barbarian, who only learned to read and write in middle age, he had a touch of genius. He was a Mohammedan, and Turkish was his mother-tongue, but the strain of European blood in his veins made him singularly tolerant in matters of religion and willing to break down many of the other barriers between East and West in his adopted country.

After his death in 1849, the contact which he had established between Egypt and the Occident continued for the next quarter of a century to be mainly economic. A large inflow of Europeans, unfortunately not always of the best type, discovered that there were still abundant fleshpots in Egypt. The American Civil War gave Egypt her chance to become a great cotton-growing country when the rapidly expanding cotton industries of Europe found themselves suddenly deprived of their American raw material.

The use of steam power on sea as well as on land restored Egypt to her ancient position as a

highway between Europe and the more remote parts of the Orient. But though the construction of railways between Alexandria and Suez enabled England to rush troops to India during the mutiny of 1857, British statesmen entirely failed at first to recognize the commercial value of the great scheme revived by the great Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, for the construction of a ship canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Mainly from political jealousy of France, Palmerston fought a long and stubborn fight against it, but England's short-sighted opposition was at last overborne and within a few years of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, it proved to be of greater value to British shipping than to that of all the other European nations put together as one of the great arteries of the world's trade.

But if in Egypt the Orient was being drawn into such close intercourse with the Occident that she could be described without much exaggeration as a "European corner of Africa," her rulers were at the same time showing how much easier it is for Orientals to contract the vices than the virtues of the Occident. Mohamed Ali's successors had not his rugged qualities, and in the khedive Ismail, who bought that high-sounding title as well as the right of primogeniture for his

dynasty from his Turkish overlord with untold gold, profligate indulgence in the worst foibles of the West was combined with the worst methods of Eastern despotism. If he filched from his subjects fully a quarter of the best lands in the valley of the Nile, that was merely straining an oriental practice.

It was as a reckless borrower on the European money markets that he struck out a new and most dangerous line. The financiers of Paris and London received him with open arms, for the credit of the Egyptian state seemed to be ample. European money poured in, and Ismail spent it chiefly on his own pleasures, on his palaces, and his pleasure gardens, on occidental theaters and oriental harems, on the pomp and circumstance of a court which, he fondly imagined, rivaled those of European sovereigns, on futile armaments and vast schemes of aggrandizement in Abyssinia and the Sudan. It was the oriental rake's progress, and it showed even more clearly than what was happening at the same time in Turkey, where his Ottoman overlord was also borrowing with both hands in the European money markets, how dangerous for an oriental state are the facilities which modern financial methods afford to the boundless extravagance common to so many oriental rulers.

There was a limit to the golden eggs which Egypt could lay. It was soon reached. Her creditors grew exacting. Ismail mortgaged his own property as recklessly as that of the state, if indeed any distinction could really be drawn between them; he foisted personal bills and treasury notes upon money-lenders, great and small, and, unable to meet them, when they fell due, renewed them on increasingly ruinous terms. The wretched Egyptian peasant on whose shoulders the whole burden ultimately rested was bled white. He was made to pay his taxes for years ahead and often twice and thrice over; he was forced to sell his standing crops at derisive prices to the tame usurer whom the tax-gatherer carried round with him; he was dragged away in chains from his own fields to work under the overseer's whip on the khedive's huge personal estates. The end came in 1879, when Ismail was deposed by the sultan at the instance of France and England, who at once introduced a rigid financial control over Egyptian expenditure in the interests of Egypt herself no less than of her bondholders abroad.

The misery into which Ismail had plunged the Egyptian people was intense, and in their despair they were unable to discriminate either between the oppression of their own rulers, or the greed

of the bondholders in the background, or the somewhat severe discipline of the foreign administrators brought in to extricate them from the morass in which all were floundering. Arabi, the Egyptian, headed a crude movement of popular revolt and carried the army with him into open rebellion against Ismail's well-meaning son and successor, the khedive Tewfik. Many elements contributed to this upheaval, for Western education had spread sufficiently in Egypt to produce an educated or semi-educated class which had imbibed some occidental conceptions of freedom together with Europe's nineteenth-century faith in the saving principle of nationalism. There was also, however, a darker background of Mohammedan fanaticism, and after a murderous popular outbreak at Alexandria on July 11, 1882, European intervention became inevitable. But none of the European powers was keen to bell the Egyptian cat.

Great Britain ultimately did so after having vainly endeavored to induce France and Italy and even Turkey to join her in putting down the Arabi rebellion. A purely British expedition landed in Egypt and on September 13 the whole Egyptian Army was scattered to the winds at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir; on the following day a British

Army entered Cairo and has remained there ever since. The first Egyptian nationalist movement collapsed like a pricked bubble, but with it also most of the framework of indigenous government and administration, already eaten away with dry rot in Ismail's days. British ministers found themselves in an awkward dilemma. They had repeatedly declared that the occupation would only be temporary, but they could not evacuate and leave the country helpless and beggared. International treaties and French hostility to the British occupation which had ousted France, though through her own default, from the privileged position which she had previously shared with Great Britain, precluded them from cutting the Gordian knot by the annexation of Egypt or even by proclaiming a British protectorate. They shrank from any definite decision and drifted almost unconsciously and rather reluctantly into accepting responsibilities never clearly defined, of which the purpose may be roughly described as "putting Egypt on her legs again."

Thus in Egypt the relations between the Occident and the Orient entered upon a new phase. Egypt was not incorporated into the British Empire. She remained, from the point of view of international law, what she had hitherto

been, an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. She retained her dynastic ruler under a somewhat amorphous constitution with an Egyptian council of ministers and an Egyptian administration.

But behind that façade Britain claimed and exercised the right to give advice and guidance through her representatives and official experts, at first few in number and very carefully selected, and to insist upon their being accepted and followed by the Egyptians. This peculiar system came to be described as the "British control." It was a difficult system to work, but in Sir Evelyn Baring, afterward Lord Cromer, England found a quite exceptional man, perhaps the only man, to work it. He worked it for a quarter of a century so successfully that when he retired in 1907 he had done far more than merely "putting Egypt on her legs again." I cannot do better than quote the language which he himself used in his farewell speech to defend British control against the charge that, while having done great things for the material advancement of Egypt, it had done little for the intellectual or moral improvement of her people. He asked:

What! Has there been no moral advancement? Is the country any longer governed, as was formerly the case, ex-

clusively by the use of the whip? Is not forced labour a thing of the past? Has not the accursed institution of slavery practically ceased to exist? Is it not a fact that every individual in the country, from the highest to the lowest, is now equal in the eyes of the law? That thrift has been encouraged, and that the most humble member of society can reap the fruits of his own labour and industry; that justice is no longer bought and sold; that every one is free, perhaps some would think too free, to express his opinions; that King Baksheesh has been dethroned from high places and now only lingers in the purlieus and byways of the administration; that the fertilising water of the Nile is distributed impartially to prince and peasant alike; that the sick man can be tended in a well-equipped hospital; that the criminal and the lunatic are no longer treated as wild beasts; that the solidarity of interests between the governors and the governed has been recognised in theory and in practice; that every act of the Administration even if at times mistaken—for no one is infallible—bears the mark of honesty of purpose and an earnest desire to secure the well-being of the population; and further, that the funds, very much reduced in amount, which are now being taken from the pockets of the taxpayers, instead of being for the most part spent on useless palaces and other objects in which they were in no degree interested, are devoted to purposes which are of real benefit to the country? If all these and many other points to which I can not allude do not constitute some moral advancement, then, of a truth, I do not know what the word morality implies.

The historian will not find much fault with Cromer's language, and he spoke in no boastful

spirit. The work had certainly not been only his own, and he had been admirably served by most of the Englishmen chosen by him as agents of British control. His, nevertheless, had been the driving force and above all the great moral force behind the control. He was a man of exceptional ability and sober judgment, who possessed a rare combination of both energy and patience, and, what is more, his example set up for all Englishmen in Egypt the highest standard of conduct in private life as well as in public service.

It was perhaps inevitable that the quality of British control should have deteriorated after he left Egypt. There was no one who could fill his place. But his titular successors encountered difficulties of which he had only himself experienced the first beginnings, though he fully realized that they were bound to grow, for in five-and-twenty years of undisturbed peace and restored prosperity a generation had grown up which knew not Joseph or the days of the oppression. The Egyptians had forgotten that it was England who had rescued them from the ruin which Ismail had wrought, and they began to resent the slighter restraints inseparable from foreign tutelage. Resentment was keenly felt at the growing number of British officials that

blocked the way to legitimate promotion against many young Egyptians who, perhaps rightly, considered themselves deserving.

But it was the spread of Western education and the atmosphere of freedom created by increasing intercourse with the West and by the very influence of the Englishmen in their midst that engendered among the Egyptian people a new sense of nationhood. Cromer himself, as he has told us in his *Modern Egypt*, had carefully watched this birth of Egyptian nationalism, and not without sympathy with its better aspects. For he realized that British control could only represent a period of transition leading either to direct British rule or to the gradual emancipation of Egypt from foreign leading strings, and to the former alternative he had always refused to listen. That the second alternative was the one he contemplated, though still a long way off, he clearly indicated when, a couple of years before he left Egypt, he himself brought into the forefront of official life an Egyptian of approved faith in the future of Egyptian nationhood. It was at Lord Cromer's instance that Saad Zaghlul Pasha, who in his youth had been a follower of Arabi and is now Egyptian prime minister, was appointed minister of education in 1905, and before leaving Egypt

two years later he singled him out for exceptionally high praise.

Under Cromer's successors the new Egyptian nationalism continued to grow apace, though by no means always wisely. The khedive, Abbas Hilmi, had inherited the despotic and grasping instincts of some of his forebears. Soon after his accession in 1892 he had a sharp lesson or two from Cromer which taught him to keep them under restraint. But when Cromer had gone he gave freer vent to his hatred of British control in the very things in which he stood in greatest need of it, and in his intrigues to free himself from it for his own ambitious purposes he knew how to exploit the impatience of some of the nationalist leaders to whom on other grounds British control was equally irksome. Hence many tares as well as good wheat grew up in the enlarging field of Egyptian nationalism.

The British government had, however, definitely pronounced after Cromer's retirement in favor of the progressive policy initiated by him with the inclusion of Zaghlul Pasha in the Egyptian cabinet. In 1908 local self-government was extended "as the best preparation and education for the ultimate exercise of more responsible functions." In 1913 a new organic statute was

drawn up under the advice of Lord Kitchener, who was then British representative in Cairo. It provided for the creation of a legislative assembly of a genuinely representative character and with something of the powers of a real parliament, and Zaghlul Pasha who had resigned from the cabinet owing to differences with the khedive in which he had not received from Kitchener the support he expected, was elected by the nationalist majority to be its non-official vice-president. These constitutional changes did not, however, satisfy the advanced nationalists, while they were at least as distasteful to the khedive, who aimed at a great deal more than the position of a merely constitutional ruler. But their value had not been thoroughly tested when the Great War broke out in 1914 and the whole world, including Egypt, was thrown into the melting-pot.

The fiction—for it had become little more—of Turkish sovereignty over Egypt became untenable when Turkey entered into the Great War three months after its outbreak as the ally of Germany and Austria, and the khedive, Abbas, who was spending the summer as he often did in Constantinople, threw in his lot with her. Great Britain might have taken the opportunity to annex Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire with which

she was at war. That solution was considered in London, but was rejected in view of the agreement between the Allies to refrain from any final decisions as to the future of conquered territories until the end of the war. But because, among other reasons, the Egyptians had to be given some temporary status to take the place of their former Ottoman status, a British protectorate was proclaimed and a new ruler was installed with the higher title of sultan in the person of Prince Hussein, then the eldest surviving son of the khedive Ismail, who was generally well liked and respected throughout the country. The dynasty was thus preserved and the same Egyptian ministers, who stood loyally by England throughout the war, continued in office.

But Egypt, placed under martial law, became a great military camp as the most convenient base for operations against Turkey. The Egyptian government placed all the resources of the country at Britain's disposal. The premature death in October, 1917, of the first sultan of Egypt, and the appointment in his place of Prince Fuad, the youngest son of Ismail, whom many Egyptians suspect of having unfortunately inherited his father's least estimable qualities, passed almost unnoticed amid the growing preoccupations of

the world-war. Whatever may have been the secret sympathies of the masses, who had no love for the Turk but were his brothers in the faith, internal tranquillity was never once seriously disturbed during the war. The Egyptian nationalist leaders, however, were never taken into British confidence, though a suggestion once came from Cairo, but was rejected in London, that Zaghlul should be invited to join the Egyptian cabinet. The nationalists kept their own counsel, but took careful note of the frequent declarations of allied statesmen that they were fighting for the freedom of all nations, small as well as great, and welcomed, above all, President Wilson's apostolic pronouncement in favor of self-determination.

Two days after the Armistice, Zaghlul Pasha and some of his political friends called upon the British high commissioner and claimed full and complete independence for the Egyptian people in accordance with the principles laid down by the spokesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers. Their claim was ignored, and while they addressed frantic appeals to President Wilson and the big five in Paris, they started a raging and tearing propaganda which spread like wildfire over the country. For if Egypt was richer by some £200,000,000 of English money spent there during

the war, much of that wealth had accrued merely to a few classes, and the masses had undoubtedly suffered grave hardships during its later stages when recruitment for labor corps on military railways and the collection of supplies in kind for army transport and for the maintenance of the British expeditionary forces at the front were often carried out very ruthlessly under the pressure of military necessity, though in 1914 the British authorities in Cairo had publicly declared that Egypt would not be called upon to bear any of the burdens of the war. For all those hardships the presence of the British in Egypt and a war waged by them ultimately far beyond the frontiers of Egypt were held alone responsible, though much of the trouble had been caused by subordinate native officials who seized the opportunity to fill their pockets and satisfy personal grudges.

Zaghlul had therefore the inarticulate masses as well as the politically minded classes behind him when he inveighed against the continuance of an oppressive alien tutelage. Egyptian ministers were alarmed, and they requested to be allowed to confer directly with the British government in London. This very reasonable suggestion was dismissed as inopportune, and the Egyptian cabinet resigned. British ministers, busy with

the Paris Peace Conference, were too much preoccupied with the situation in Europe to realize how grave was the situation in Egypt. The agitation there grew red-hot, and the British military authorities set the spark to the train by arresting Zaghlul and three of his chief supporters and deporting them to Malta. Within a few days the whole of the country was in a blaze of revolt. Railways, telegraphs, and telephones were destroyed, and, besides arson and plunder and promiscuous rioting, some horrible outrages were perpetrated on isolated British soldiers and civilians. Nor were Europeans of other nationalities safe. At one moment Cairo was cut off from all communication with the outside world except by aeroplane. But the British had plenty of troops in Egypt, and as soon as flying columns could be organized to quell the insurrection, it collapsed completely.

Active resistance had almost ceased when Lord Allenby, the conqueror of Syria, who happened at the time to be attending the Paris Peace Conference, was sent back posthaste to Egypt as British high commissioner. Armed rebellion was over, but he was still confronted with a prolonged campaign of passive resistance in the shape of political strikes which were just as much directed

against the British protectorate when the strikers were merely humble municipal scavengers or railwaymen or postmen as when they were members of the bar or of the higher staff of the chief public departments.

There was still no Egyptian government, and no Egyptian could be found to form one until the British government agreed to release Zaghlul and the other Malta deportees. They were not, however, allowed to return to Egypt but were landed in France, where they installed themselves in Paris. There they continued to conduct their agitation for Egyptian independence almost as effectively as from Cairo, where they, meanwhile, controlled a great political organization, and they sent their own deputations abroad to plead their cause with the Allied and Associated Powers, and not least forcibly in Washington.

The British government very tardily realized that something had to be done, but, as usual in most emergencies when government is in search of a policy, that "something" did not go beyond the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. It was to go out and investigate the causes of the recent troubles, and it was also to make recommendations for placing the relations between England and Egypt on a more satisfactory footing

by the grant of a generous measure of self-government, but without prejudice to the protectorate which was then for the first time receiving the *imprimatur* of international recognition in the Treaty of Versailles. It was a strong Commission, presided over by Lord Milner, a member of the British cabinet and one of Lord Cromer's ablest lieutenants in the first decade of British control. But, unfortunately, seven or eight months elapsed before it landed in Egypt in December, 1919.

By that time the agitation for complete independence had been resumed with fresh vigor. In nothing have the Egyptians, and indeed most Orientals who have been brought into contact with the Occident, shown themselves more adept pupils than in the art of political agitation. Before the Commission arrived public meetings at which the bar was conspicuous were held to denounce the Commission, and as the Egyptian legislature was closed, its members held informal but well-advertised gatherings, and adjured the country to have nothing to do with the accursed thing.

The Omdehs, or village headmen, who have always wielded considerable influence in the rural districts, telegraphed their indignant protest to Zaghlul in Paris, who replied with a message of

warm encouragement and approval. Notables and Ulema, the leaders of Mohammedan opinion, even the princes of the reigning dynasty, followed suit, and the students of the government colleges as well as of the great Mohammedan University of El Azhar in Cairo, the boys in the secondary and primary schools, and even the girls' schools, in which the limit of age is between five and eleven years, went on strike and promenaded the streets to swell the boycott chorus and cry shame upon the protectorate.

In Cairo and in Alexandria there were street demonstrations on a large scale, frequently ending in violent rioting as they always attracted a large tail of rabble out for any mischief that might be going. When that mischief assumed the shape of looting Greek and Jewish shops and attacking harmless foreigners, British troops had to be sent in to reinforce the Egyptian police, and on November 16, close to the sultan's palace in Cairo, a mob attacked and set fire to a couple of police stations, and held its ground so fiercely that nearly a hundred rioters were killed and wounded before order could be restored.

It was in this explosive atmosphere that Lord Milner's Commission landed in Egypt in December, 1919. But in spite of the boycott its

members carried on their work in Cairo and in the provinces, though sometimes not without disagreeable incidents. Some of them had many old friends in Egypt, and there were a number of representative Egyptians who were willing enough to see them privately. But the Commission needed no close investigation to gauge the state of the country when bombs were thrown in open daylight and in frequented thoroughfares on Egyptian ministers suspected of lukewarmness on the question of full and immediate independence. The pre-war system of British control had clearly broken down and could never be restored on pre-war lines. The relations between England and Egypt would have to be placed on a new basis of mutual consent if Egypt was to be saved from the demoralizing consequences of a lawless agitation, and if England was to remain faithful to her own liberal traditions and redeem the promises she had repeatedly given to the Egyptian people. One strong argument against the unconditional recognition of Egyptian independence was that Egypt could not yet hope to uphold it without British support against possible foreign aggression.

But the protectorate, at any rate, would have to go by the board, for its very name, which in its

Arabic form connoted a humiliating status of inferiority, had come to stink in the nostrils of all Egyptians, who, moreover, professed never to have accepted it as anything but a war measure. If Great Britain, to whom Egypt owed her release from Turkish sovereignty, was entitled to claim definite safeguards for her special interests in the country and for those of the large foreign communities who looked to her to protect them, they would have to be embodied in a bilateral treaty in return for Britain's acknowledgment of Egyptian independence.

These were roughly the conclusions at which the Commission arrived when it left Egypt three months later, and Lord Milner felt that, if an agreement was to be worked out on those lines, it was essential for him to establish contact with Zaghlul himself, who still substantially controlled the situation from his hotel in Paris. This was achieved through the good offices of Adly Pasha, a moderate Egyptian statesman from whom the Commission had received a great deal of help in Cairo. The result of their meeting in Paris was that Zaghlul agreed to follow Milner to London and continue their conversations there. Together, after long but friendly discussions, they finally outlined an agreement acceptable to both parties

as the basis for a formal treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Egypt.

The terms leaked out prematurely, but on the whole they were favorably received in both countries. Lord Milner's Commission then proceeded to complete its report, which was laid before Parliament. It concluded with the following weighty recommendation:

> We therefore strongly advise His Majesty's Government to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a treaty on the lines which we have ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the present opportunity was lost.

That statesman-like document marked an important stage, not merely in Anglo-Egyptian relations, but in the readjustment of the wider relations between the Occident and the Orient. It recognized that in Egypt at least the Orient had gone far to establish its claim to be treated on a footing of equality. Whether or not the Egyptians were really yet fitted for self-government, the experiment could no longer be postponed without going back on the principles of British policy which shrank more and more from a resort to violence for the mere purpose of maintaining an alien people in continued subjection.

A new cabinet was constituted in Egypt under Adly Pasha, who had first brought Zaghlul and Milner together, and it was avowedly constituted in order to carry on negotiations with the British government on the lines of the Milner Commission's report. But when Adly arrived in London he was soon disillusioned. When he called on Lloyd George, the British prime minister, professing to ignore the Egyptian demand for independence, pointed dramatically to a chair in the Imperial Conference room which he invited Egypt to occupy as a valued member of the British commonwealth of nations. Utterly ignorant of the Orient, he had listened to the voice of the tempter, Winston Churchill, who, though he called himself a Liberal, had always remained at heart much more reactionary than many of the Conservative party to which he originally belonged. He cared nothing for Lord Milner's recommendations. The one aspect of the Egyptian question, as he saw it, was its strategical aspect, and under his inspiration negotiations centered upon the nature and extent of the military hold which Britain should retain upon Egypt. While Adly was disposed to accept the retention in Egypt of a small British force as before the war, but wished it to be transferred from Cairo to

some locality near the Suez Canal, and with a special view to its protection, Churchill was determined not only to keep a garrison in the capital but to bind Egypt down to a formal and unreserved recognition of British rights of military occupation wherever the British government pleased and for however long, going thereby far beyond anything demanded of her before the war.

The London negotiations might have broken down on other points, but it was on this point that they actually broke down in November, 1921. Adly returned to Egypt and he and his colleagues resigned, and when the British government followed up the rupture of the negotiations with a note which in effect implied a reversion to a policy of domination, events at once bore out the wisdom of the Milner Commission's warning. Fresh disturbances broke out and Zaghlul was once more deported with a number of his followers.

Order was restored, but England had laid herself open to a charge of bad faith, and not only her Egyptian friends, but her own people in Egypt, were driven to despair. The four principal British officials who, as advisers, were still to some extent responsible for Egyptian administration in the important departments of the interior,

finance, education, and justice, addressed a remarkable memorandum to Lord Allenby expressing their unanimous opinion that any decision which did not admit the principle of Egyptian independence, and which forcibly maintained the protectorate, must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country, and would in any case produce complete administrative chaos, rendering government impossible. The whole structure of government was Egyptian, and British control could not possibly, they contended, be exercised without full Egyptian co-operation in all branches of administration, as it had been proved in the spring of 1919 when an attempt had been made to carry on the government without a ministry and with a large proportion of Egyptian officials on strike.

Lord Allenby himself, to the dismay of the British government, indorsed those views, and, when he was sent for to London, told Lloyd George to his face that he would have to decline to bear responsibility for a policy which could only be carried through with a large British army behind it. Lloyd George seldom held out against anyone who stood up to him, and within a few days, while boldly maintaining that British policy in Egypt remained unchanged, made a new

"declaration of principles" (February 28, 1922) to the effect that the British protectorate over Egypt was terminated; that Egypt was declared to be an independent, sovereign state; and that martial law should be withdrawn as soon as an act of indemnity had been passed by the Egyptian government. He merely added that, pending the conclusion "by free discussion and friendly accommodation" of agreements concerning the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt, the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression and interference, the protection of foreign interests and of minorities in Egypt, and, finally, the Sudan, His Majesty's government reserved these matters to their own discretion, the *status quo* remaining intact in regard to them.

These "principles" were practically those of the Milner report, with this tremendous difference, however, that the latter proposed to have them set forth in a bilateral treaty by which Egypt would have simultaneously contracted binding obligations in regard to the points which Lloyd George airily remitted to future negotiations, without in the meantime securing anything in the shape of binding obligations from Egypt.

Since then Egypt has been recognized by Great Britain as a free and independent sovereign

state. King Fuad has assumed the royal title and appointed his own diplomatic representatives abroad, a new Egyptian constitution has been enacted, martial law has ceased, general elections have been held, and Zaghlul has not only returned to Egypt, but is now prime minister with a huge majority behind him in the new Parliament.

On the other hand, the points reserved by Lloyd George for future negotiations are no nearer a settlement. A small British force is still stationed in Cairo and Alexandria, and Egypt has become if anything a more important base than ever for British military aviation, while at the last Imperial Conference the British dominions laid renewed stress upon the necessity of safeguarding the Empire's line of maritime communications through the Suez Canal. Things have been complicated also by the entire surrender to Turkey, under the Lausanne Treaty, of the capitulations which constituted throughout the whole Ottoman Empire the only final guaranty for the material interests of foreign residents of all nationalities. It has become much more difficult to insist upon the maintenance of the same system in Egypt where justice has at any rate long since ceased to be the mere byword it has always been in Turkey.

It is, I may remark in passing, one of the anomalies of the Egyptian situation that the whole economic life of the country is controlled by foreigners, not only or chiefly Englishmen, but Frenchmen, Italians, Greeks, and many other nationalities, including before the war large numbers of Germans and Austrians who will soon be returning there. For while the Egyptians have responded to Western education in many of the liberal professions, and have often become efficient administrators as well as skilful adepts in the political arts of the West, they have always kept entirely aloof from the higher walks of commerce and industry and finance. They have left it to the foreigner to develop the great natural resources of their country, and while his brains have developed its material prosperity, his example has encouraged a taste for all the luxuries and amenities of life unknown to former Egyptian generations.

The Egyptians may well have grown impatient of the restraints imposed upon them by the ancient system of capitulations under which every large foreign settlement in their midst enjoys a privileged position under its own consular jurisdiction, and has almost become an *imperium in imperio*, since even in the matter of taxation the hands of the Egyptian government are tied up in a network

of treaties which cannot be modified without the consent of some seventeen or eighteen foreign powers. In this matter England is not even free to deal with the Egyptian government on her own account alone and independently of other foreign powers toward whom she incurred implicit if not explicit responsibilities when she assumed sole control over the Egyptian government and administration.

On many points one may sympathize with the demands which Egypt has now raised under altered conditions, but Zaghlul appears unhappily resolved to place in the forefront of Egyptian demands the very worst one of all, namely, the recovery of Egypt's full rights of sovereignty over the Sudan. For, on the same principle of self-determination on which the Egyptians have based their claim to independence, the people of the Sudan have the right to reject Egyptian rule and do emphatically reject it.

Mohamed Ali conquered the Sudan for Egypt a hundred years ago, and Egypt so misruled it for over fifty years that the Sudanese responded at once to the call of the able if fanatical leader who in the early eighties drove the Egyptians out with great slaughter. The Mahdi, it is true, himself in turn chastised them with scorpions,

and Kitchener was hailed as a deliverer when, in 1898, he reconquered Khartum, where Gordon had died in 1884, like the great Christian hero that he was, in a vain attempt to stem the desolating tide of Mahdism. Since then, in recognition of Egypt's financial and military contribution to the reconquest of the Sudan, the Egyptian flag has been flown side by side with the British flag as an emblem of joint sovereignty, but the administration of the country has been wholly in British hands and has restored to the country a marvelous degree of prosperity when one remembers that under the Mahdi's barbarous despotism its population was reduced in some fifteen years from 8,000,000 to a little over 2,000,000 people.

All that the Egyptians can rightfully demand is that nothing shall be done in the Sudan to curtail the flow of water from the Blue and White Nile on which Egyptian irrigation, i.e., the life of Egypt, depends. For this, ample guaranties will not be refused them. But England cannot consent to hand over the Sudanese to the Egyptians, whom they hate and despise, and who could never enforce their rule on a much more warlike race, much better equipped today than it ever was before for resistance. Unless Egypt is prepared to yield on that point it is difficult

to see how Zaghlul can hope to succeed in the negotiations for which he has been invited to London, and if these negotiations break down one does not know where to look for the possibility of an accommodation of which many patriotic Egyptians and sensible Englishmen alike admit the urgency.

For the Egyptian has not yet put off the old Adam. With the relaxation of British control, nepotism and corruption, never wholly exorcised, are again creeping into the public services, and the mere withdrawal of the European expert's hand from the administration of the state railways has already caused general and not unwarranted alarm. The harm done to the rising generation by the introduction of political agitation into schools and colleges cannot be easily repaired. The machinery of parliamentary government has yet to be tested by experience, even if an Egyptian minister as popular as Zaghlul can hold his own against King Fuad, who is scarcely of the stuff of which constitutional rulers are made. He takes far too much after his father, Khedive Ismail, of whose autocratic instincts he has inherited a goodly share. He is adroit and knows how to bend people of all classes to his will, and even how to gain the plaudits of the crowd, though,

when he returned to Egypt a grown man after having accompanied his father into exile and having been educated almost entirely in Italy, he could neither speak Arabic properly nor go through without careful prompting the complicated ritual of Mohammedan worship.

Western civilization is certainly something more than a mere veneer in Egypt, but the masses, too easy-going as a rule to be aggressively intolerant, are still apt to be swayed by sudden gusts of Mohammedan fanaticism, and the great Egyptian University of El Azhar, still steeped in Mohammedan medievalism, turns out every year a larger number of students than any of the modern government colleges. El Azhar has sent out to the Mohammedans all over the world an invitation for a conference to be held next year on the future of the khalifate. It may never be held, and, if held, it may fail to promote unity. Considering what are King Fuad's idiosyncracies, it would be the crowning paradox in the land of paradoxes if he were chosen as the successor to the Turkish khalif whom the men of Angora have dethroned. While it would bring the khalifate into much closer contact than it ever was at Constantinople with the modern Occident, it might equally well serve to strengthen the reactionary forces in

Egypt and imperil the equilibrium, none too stable already, between the Occident and the Orient which the more progressive Egyptians claim to have achieved.

But I do not wish to lay excessive stress on the disturbing features of the Egyptian situation. There are brighter sides to the picture. The Egyptians have become more of a nation than anyone would have believed possible a half-century ago. Nationalism has not been a vain word with them, for it has done a great deal to draw together the Mohammedan majority and the Coptic Christian minority of the population. Though they may seem to us to be trying to run before they can walk, careless of the pitfalls with which their adventure as an independent and sovereign country is beset, they are at any rate looking forward, and not backward to a mythical past. They may find the task of governing themselves more difficult than they imagine, but they base their claim to make the attempt on a principle which the Occident cannot deny, namely, that it is through freedom and the exercise of independent responsibility that nations can in the long run alone learn to govern themselves. If they succeed, England will be able to claim some share of credit for herself, for it is she who will have given the

Egyptians their chance in the modern world, first, by ending the old system of indigenous despotism which had brought them near to ruin, and then by voluntarily releasing them from her own tutelage to which they owe whatever fitness they now possess for democratic freedom.

IV

THE GREAT BRITISH EXPERIMENT IN INDIA

IV

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Nature herself seems to have set India apart as a unique field for such a unique experiment as the government of 300,000,000 Asiatics of different races and creeds and languages by a small and remote island kingdom of the Occident.

A vast lozenge-shaped projection from the great continent of Asia, inclosed within stupendous mountain ranges on its northern land frontier, and everywhere else by the wide, encircling ocean, and inhabited by a multitude of peoples in various stages of social development, India had no direct contact with the Occident after Alexander the Great's meteoric invasion, third century B.C., which only reached to the Indus, until the first landing of the Portuguese in 1498, when they rounded the Cape of Good Hope and discovered a new highway from Europe across hitherto untraveled seas. Another century passed before the English followed in the wake of the Portuguese. On the last day of the year 1600,

near the end of her reign, Queen Elizabeth granted to a "company of merchants of London trading in the East Indies" a charter out of which grew up the most powerful trading corporation known in history as the Honourable East India Company, and finally, the great British Empire of India.

If time allowed, I should like to show you how British power beyond the seas was built up simultaneously during the next two centuries in India and in America. In such very different fields the attempt naturally worked out on very different lines and with very different results, though in both cases there was at first a similar purpose of commercial enterprise only. In North America the British found almost empty coast-lands not entirely unlike their own in climate and natural surroundings, ready to be peopled and developed by men and women of their own race who made their homes there and founded sturdy communities resolved to preserve the habits and traditions and even the institutions of the old country. In India, on the contrary, the British found an immense and populous sub-continent with powerful rulers and an ancient civilization as strange to them as its fierce sunshine and tropical vegetation. Only in the prime of life could they withstand its oppressive climate, and

they were content to secure by agreement with its local rulers a precarious foothold at a few isolated points on the far-flung coast for the establishment of small settlements or "factories," as they were then called, which they never regarded as their permanent homes.

On the Coromandel coast at Madras, on the Arabian Sea at Surat, and later on at Bombay and in the Bay of Bengal where Calcutta ultimately grew up, they slowly but steadily prospered as traders, and mainly because, unlike the Portuguese who had been ruthless both as conquerors and missionaries, they had made it their rule not to meddle with the religious and social customs of the natives, and avoided all interference in the internal affairs of the country, where the great Moghul Empire was at that time the undisputed paramount power. Their chief troubles at first were not in India itself, but at home, with the vacillating policies of kings and ministers and the intrigues of rival trading interests, while they had to reckon with the competition, by no means always peaceful, of other European nations equally bent upon securing for themselves new markets beyond the seas.

In the development of their trading settlements in India, just as in the consolidation of their

colonies in North America, the British had to fight in turn the same European rivals. The Portuguese power in India was rapidly decaying before the British made their appearance on the scene, but the Dutch traders who had got ahead of them were at least as enterprising as the British, and, for some time more vigorously supported by their own government at home, they had larger resources, both financial and naval, at their backs. Protracted and often unofficial warfare, conducted mainly on the eastern seas between Dutch and British, and often while the two nations were themselves at peace in Europe, ended in the withdrawal of the Dutch to the East Indian Archipelago where they remained and are still firmly established.

No sooner had the Dutch retired than the French entered the lists as still more formidable rivals. Events followed much the same course in North America where New York was first of all New Amsterdam, and, when the Dutch had been ejected, a far more obstinate struggle was fought out between England and France for the mastery of the North American continent. In India, likewise, as soon as the Moghul Empire began to disintegrate, the question that arose was whether British or French ascendancy should prevail. It

remained for a long time in the balance, and the genius of Dupleix might have turned it in favor of France had he not been sacrificed to the greed and sordid intrigues of the French court in the worst days of Louis XV. The issue of that duel between France and England was finally settled mainly by the superiority of British naval power.

Two locally decisive land battles were fought almost at the same time in North America and in India, namely, the battle of Plassey in 1757, which led straight to British dominion in India, and the battle of Quebec, which shattered French dominion in North America. To make the parallel more complete, the obstinacy and short-sightedness of a British king was one at least of the many causes that ultimately led to the loss of the old British colonies in America just as the corruption and incompetence of the French court had already destroyed the promise of a French empire in India. Thus it came to pass that almost at the same time as with the American War of Independence Britain ceased to be the dominant power in North America, she became the dominant power in India. For, after many vicissitudes and much jealousy and opposition at home, the East India Company had grown so powerful in London and British trade with the East had become so

great a national asset that when they were vitally threatened by the state of anarchy which had spread over India with the decay of the Moghul power and by the competitive ambitions of France who was England's great rival in Europe, the East India Company had been at last driven to depart from its settled policy of non-intervention in Indian quarrels and the British government in like manner compelled to stand by the East India Company.

The British entered, as did the French, into local alliances with rival Indian potentates, and, following the French example, raised and organized native armies with European officers and equipment and discipline to fight their battles. These were in turn reinforced by fleets and armies sent out from England and France, and when the French ultimately gave up the contest, the British were so firmly anchored in India, not only by their material interests, but by the engagements into which they had entered with many of the peoples and princes of India, that they were almost unavoidably constrained to assume the full responsibilities of rulership as the one governing power that could save India from floundering in chaos.

But my purpose is not to describe the gradual expansion of British dominion over the whole of

India, from Cape Comorin, only a few degrees north of the Equator, to the Himalayan Roof of the World, but to focus your attention on the peculiar relationship between the Occident and the Orient which has arisen out of British rule in India.

I would ask you, however, to bear in mind that, until British rule, India had only on rare occasions and for relatively short periods, attained to political unity, and still less to a sense of national unity. For from the dawn of history we find the peoples of India with their various quite distinct races and languages almost always split up into a vast number of kingdoms and confederacies constantly at war with one another.

Even the great Moghul Empire, to which the British Indian Empire may be said to have succeeded, was in no sense a national Indian empire, nor was its authority ever established over the whole peninsula. The Moghuls were the last of a long succession of Mohammedan conquerors who had poured down from Central Asia through the mountain passes of northern India, and built up their power on the ruins of earlier Hindu states. The Moghuls were originally in race and in religion just as much aliens in India as the British, and they subdued India by the sword alone. Their system of government was a masterful, but under

some of their greatest emperors such as Akbar, a not unenlightened despotism. Though for reasons of policy they converted only a portion of the population to their Mohammedan creed, those conversions were largely effected by force, and the Hindus were seldom allowed to forget that Islam was the dominant faith throughout the land.

I would also remind you that to the present day, one-third of the area of India and one-quarter of its population is subject only to British overlordship without any rights of internal administration, and that overlordship is conditioned on ancient treaties of alliance under which the hereditary rulers of what are called the "native states" of India—some of them almost as large as the minor states of Europe—retain all their autonomous rights of government and administration, the British government of India controlling only their foreign relations and matters of all Indian interest, ports, railways, etc. Most of the native states themselves sought this form of British protection against the political anarchy which threatened to overwhelm them when the Moghul Empire fell to pieces through the weakness and corruption and incompetence of its later rulers. British rule was never established through-

out India by the sword alone, but by the promise of law and order which India was looking for in vain elsewhere at one of the great crises in her history.

The magnitude of the responsibilities which devolved upon the East India Company when, in the second half of the eighteenth century, it found itself, through the sheer force of circumstances rather than through any deliberately preconceived design, transformed from a mere trading corporation into a great agency of government and administration, was at first only imperfectly apprehended in England. Clive, the victor of Plassey, was the first to recognize that such vast responsibilities could not be properly discharged by a trading company, and he urged the British government to assume without delay full sovereignty over all the British possessions in India.

But public opinion at home was not yet ripe for such a change, and only after the scandals of misrule and corruption among officers of the company in Bengal had alarmed the better conscience of England was the British government moved to assume very real responsibility by bringing under its direct control the company's Board of Directors in London and its chief agents in India. The American War of Independence had

taught England a costly lesson in statesmanship, and no sooner was it brought to an end by the recognition of the independence of the United States of America than Pitt's Government of India Act of 1784 laid down a new and far-reaching principle for the future governance of British India—the principle of trusteeship, to be carried into practice by Englishmen on the spot but under the supervision and responsibility of the British Parliament.

Dominion over alien races was for the first time recognized to involve a great moral obligation toward them. Their interests, and not those merely of their alien rulers, were to be a principal consideration. The rulers were to regard themselves as trustees for those over whom they ruled. It is a principle which in our own times has been at least formally accepted by all Western nations who hold dominion over alien races, and it has been consecrated under a new form by the Covenant of the League of Nations. But to Pitt belongs the credit of having been the first to use the word "trust" in this connection, and the man who prevailed upon him to use it was Wilberforce, to whom more than to any other single individual the world was to owe the abolition of the slave trade.

The East India Company set its house in order and organized great public services which, whatever their other shortcomings, have maintained to the present day the highest possible standards of integrity and even-handed justice. Nor were British administrators concerned merely to establish the rule of law in the vast territories committed to their care. They began to look forward. Exactly one hundred years ago, in 1824, one of the greatest of them, Sir Thomas Munro, then governor of Madras, boldly raised the whole question of England's mission in India. Her duty, he declared, was "to train Indians to govern and protect themselves." It was a far-reaching pronouncement, and though Munro was in advance of his times, he gave a new orientation to British statesmanship.

The first step clearly was to give India the same education which had trained the British people to self-government and self-protection. The atmosphere at home was favorable, and under the same liberal impulse that had carried the great Reform Bill of 1832 in England, the famous minute drafted by Macaulay in 1833, while he held high legal office in Calcutta, finally committed the British rulers of India to the introduction of Western education. It was a tremendous experi-

ment, for it meant nothing less than taking the peoples of India into partnership with Western civilization, and the gulf between it and their own ancient civilization was profound.

India's civilization is bound up with Hinduism, which is a great social as well as religious system. As a religion it is singularly elastic, ranging from the gross idol-worship of the masses to the most subtle conceptions of pantheism and even atheism, which have been elaborated in the course of centuries by Indian philosophers out of the primitive mythology of the sacred Vedas. As a social system, however, Hinduism is the most rigid that the world has ever seen, for it is based on the bed rock of caste which governs life not only from birth to death, but through an endless cycle of rebirths from death to life again. Nothing can be more utterly opposed to the sturdy individualism which has been hitherto the bed rock of Western civilization. For under the Hindu caste system every Hindu is born into a particular social group of which the laws govern every incident of his life, prescribing minutely those whom he may marry and eat with and converse with and the daily ritual which he must perform and the manner in which he must be buried, his inheritance distributed, and the continuity of ancestral worship preserved.

At the apex of the caste system stands the Brahmanical caste, semi-divine in origin, invested with exclusive spiritual authority, and below it a long gradation of other castes reaching in a descending scale down to millions of human beings who are regarded as outside the pale and treated as untouchable, i.e., that social and physical contact with them is deemed to constitute religious pollution. Considering how strong the racial feeling is today in India against the British as the ruling white race, it is as well to note that the Sanskrit word for caste means "color," and, as the early invaders of India who came down from Central Asia in prehistoric times were Aryans of a lighter complexion than the populations commonly called Dravidian whom they subdued, it may be reasonably inferred that the caste system was primarily developed by the Aryan Brahmans in order to preserve the prestige and purity of the conquering race. The Aryan Brahmans were, in fact, the ruling "white race" of those remote ages, and their purpose, though not their methods, was precisely the same as that of the white race today seeking to maintain its superiority over the colored races of the world.

Nowadays the spread of Western education and the everyday exigencies of modern life have

led to some relaxation of caste observances, but still almost only in non-essentials, and in a large part of rural India, especially in the south, they have lost very little of their rigidity. I have myself seen a Brahman judge on circuit in a native state of southern India holding his court in the open, outside a village of low-caste untouchables, and, as both the plaintiff and the defendant were untouchables, the laws of caste compelled them to stand at such a distance from the Brahman judge in order not to pollute him by undue proximity to his person, that their statements, and those of many witnesses also, had, like his questions, to be carried to and fro by ushers of intermediate castes within a lessening range of pollution. Even today there are many village schools in which boys belonging to the lower castes have to sit apart on the veranda just outside the schoolroom and pick up what they can of the lesson given by the Brahman teacher to the higher-caste boys inside the schoolroom who would not be allowed by their parents to attend if they had to rub shoulders with their lower-caste school-fellows.

Another puzzling feature is that superiority of caste does not by any means always correspond with superiority of what we call worldly position. Brahmans often pursue very humble avocations,

whereas lower-caste Hindus may acquire great wealth, and, under modern conditions, rise to positions of considerable influence. But the Brahman *qua* Brahman always remains entitled to the reverence due to his caste from every Hindu who clings to orthodox beliefs.

I will give you another instance from my own experience. I was staying at Viceregal Lodge at Delhi when a Hindu of a lower caste but high up in the public service, Western educated and wearing European dress, came to have an audience with the viceroy, and as he passed up the steps, I saw him stoop almost to the ground to do homage and go through the form of kissing the naked feet of the *chuprassi*, or doorkeeper, who wore the viceroy's scarlet and gold livery, but was a Brahman.

In these circumstances you can imagine the immense and peculiar difficulties and pitfalls with which Western education was and still is beset among Hindus. The response which it met with in the earliest days of its introduction was nevertheless marvelous, and not least among the higher castes of whom some of the most gifted members actually embraced Christianity. But the reaction was bound to follow. Western education struck at the roots of too many ancient customs and beliefs, and at too many vested interests, and,

not least, at those of the higher castes, especially those of the Brahmans, while the political changes, which were steadily extending the area of direct British administration in India and sweeping away some of the worst survivals of indigenous administration, where they proved themselves utterly incorrigible, spread equal alarm in other intensely conservative quarters.

Nor was it only with Hindu civilization that Western education was in conflict. The vast majority of the peoples of India were Hindus, but there was also a large Mohammedan minority. The fundamental monotheism of the Indian Mohammedan drew him in some respects nearer than the Hindu to his new British rulers, but there was nevertheless the same deep-rooted antagonism between the Mohammedan outlook on life and all forms of Western progress in India as in other parts of the Islamic world. The Indian Mohammedans proved, in fact, for a long time more refractory to Western education than the Hindus, and though there was no love lost between Mohammedans and the Hindus, those who stand in the ancient ways, whether Mohammedans or Hindus, were alike rebels at heart against the Western civilization which British rule was importing into India.

That rebellion was at the bottom of the great Mutiny of 1857. It was on the surface a military revolt, but, if Mohammedans did most of the fighting, Hindus supplied the brains and a great deal of the driving power. It was a disastrous episode, for, though it was a short one and confined to a relatively small area of upper and central India, the horrors which accompanied the rising and the sternness of its repression gave a deplorable setback to the better influences on both sides which before the mutiny had been steadily moving toward mutual understanding and good will.

The East India Company, which had long ceased to be a trading corporation but had remained under Parliament the principal agency of government and administration in India, disappeared altogether after the mutiny, when the crown assumed, as Clive himself had urged a whole century earlier, direct and sole responsibility. The central government was invested under the control of the British Parliament with supreme authority over the provincial governments and with power to maintain the old treaty connections with the autonomous native states and their princes. The machinery remained practically the same, except that the secretary of state for India who was henceforth a member of the

British cabinet superseded the Company's Board of Control in London, and the governor-general of India came to be described as viceroy.

Queen Victoria's proclamation conveyed to her Indian peoples a generous assurance of her undiminished confidence and affection. "In their prosperity," she said, "will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward."

Then followed fifty years of internal peace and great material progress, for though one is shy to use the word "prosperity" in relation to a country where the standard of living is still incredibly low among the toiling masses, the extraordinary growth of the population, which rose within that half-century from two to three hundred millions, affords ample evidence of steadily improved conditions. In the towns and especially among the Hindus, the demand for Western education increased continuously. The rising generation thronged to the high schools and universities, of which the first was founded at Calcutta just after the mutiny, on the model of the then recent University of London, which, unlike Oxford and Cambridge, has no residential colleges but is mainly a teaching and examining body. The Indians, as was their wont, looked of

course to the government to provide them with educational facilities, and the Education Department became one of the most important of government departments.

Looking back now, it is easy to see the weak points of an educational system too closely and mechanically modeled on our own for such a widely different country as India. In the first place, it was concentrated mainly upon higher education, and began from the top, in the oversanguine belief that education would ultimately filter down from the higher to the lower strata of Indian society, with the result that it tended to widen the gulf between the educated urban classes and the great peasant masses forming three-quarters of the whole population, who remained as they had been, time immemorial, absolutely illiterate and sunk in ancient depths of ignorance. Instruction in the various courses, mostly literary, which were held to constitute higher education, was conveyed solely through the medium of English, which in extremely few cases was spoken or even understood in the homes of the students, who were to great extent, as a rule, largely estranged from their families.

As the government of India deemed itself bound to maintain complete neutrality in all

matters of religion, education was not only strictly undenominational and absolutely divorced from religious teaching, but also very largely from all moral training and discipline. It was, in fact, mainly confined to the training of the intellect, and could do little for the vital side of education, which consists of the forming of character. Such criticisms apply only in part to the excellent educational work of the missionaries—quite a few of them Americans—which has in some parts of India extended also to the masses. But they, too, were bound to a system in which examinations tended to become the one supreme test and the results to be judged too often rather by quantity than by quality.

But with all its shortcomings, the system did great things. In a country where there are twenty quite different languages, each spoken by millions of people, besides an immense number of minor dialects, the teaching of English as the common tongue of all the Western-educated classes created a bond of unity which the peoples of India had never before possessed. The Western-educated Indian began to fill all the subordinate branches of the administration and all the liberal professions, and to have a distinct mentality of his own. But he remained essentially a townsman,

and his influence at first was slight outside the great cities in which his own interests centered.

Another result followed which might have been foreseen but was not. You could not make textbooks out of the speeches of Burke and Fox and out of Mill "On Liberty" and expound the history of British political institutions "broad-based on freedom" to a highly intelligent race without inoculating it with the germs of political liberty and even of nationhood. Western-educated Indians not unnaturally began to demand a larger participation in the control of the public affairs of their own country, and a larger share in the official bureaucracy. But the distrust engendered by the mutiny had obscured the earlier vision of men like Munro, who looked forward to the time when England should have trained Indians to govern and protect themselves. The latter were no doubt still unfit, but Englishmen were less willing than before the mutiny to believe that they could ever be made fit. Racial feeling had been revived and embittered, and on the British side it showed itself, for instance, strong enough to compel the viceroy, Lord Ripon, to yield to the clamor of Englishmen in India, official as well as unofficial, and water down the famous Ilbert Bill of 1883, which, with the full

approval of the Liberal British government at home, had been drafted for the redress of certain racial inequalities in forms of judicial procedure. That unfortunate episode led to a momentous parting of the ways.

In the following year, a small group of progressive Indians, though still thoroughly devoted to the British connection, founded the Indian National Congress as an informal parliament to ventilate Indian grievances and to appeal to British opinion at home in England, over the head of the constituted government of India in whom they had lost faith. Englishmen, official and unofficial, instead of lending them a helping and guiding hand, which might have kept the Congress on permanently constitutional lines, viewed that movement with suspicion and resentment, and drove it almost inevitably into more and more vehement opposition which has grown today into open and bitter antagonism.

But there was this excuse for the British attitude toward the Indian National Congress, that it represented from the outset only that small section of Indians who had been brought together by common contact with the Occident and were scarcely at all in touch with the great rural masses, while the Mohammedans held for a long time

entirely aloof from it. It served, however, as a focus for every form of discontent and, before the present century was many years old, British rule had to reckon not only with the reactionary forces banded together against all the liberal tendencies of Western education, but with a stream of revolutionary forces claiming to draw their inspiration from the Occident, but unfortunately just from those parts of the Occident where revolutionary methods were regarded as alone capable of effecting political and social progress. These revolutionary forces were recruited mainly amongst immature youths who distorted the meaning of their schoolroom lessons or were embittered by failure in their examinations and the consequent closing against them of the avenues to lucrative employment and especially to official employment by the state which they had been apt to regard as the assured reward of Western education.

The same sort of intellectual proletariat grew up in India that has provided the rank and file of revolutionary movements in many European countries. Young Indians, who borrowed the doctrines and the bombs of Russian anarchism, formed themselves into secret societies dedicated to the goddess Kali, the dark and sanguinary consort of Shiva, the god of destruction; and to

all the increasing manifestations of Indian discontent on more constitutional lines was added an epidemic of political assassinations of which the victims were not only British officials but Indians whose only crime was that they were loyal servants of government.

The emergence of Japan and her resounding victories in Manchuria against a great European power helped at the same time to undermine the Indian belief in the material invincibility of the Occident. Western-educated public opinion in India grew demonstratively impatient at the tardiness and inadequacy of the concessions with which the British government had hitherto met the Indians' demand for a larger share in the administration and government of their country. They were not satisfied with municipal institutions kept in official leading strings or with the small legislative councils which gave to Indian members little more than a consultative voice in public affairs, or with the admission of a mere sprinkling of Indians in the higher branches of the public services, though the lower branches were already almost exclusively manned by Indians.

Public opinion in England was perplexed and alarmed, but with the advent of a liberal government in 1906 and John Morley's appointment to

the India office, a serious attempt was made to meet Indian desires. The Indian Councils Act of 1909 gave a large extension of powers both to the central and provincial legislatures, and Indians were for the first time appointed to the viceroy's Executive Council, hitherto the citadel of British authority in India, and to the India Council in London, also until then a stronghold of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy. These measures were at first warmly welcomed in India, and when King George and Queen Mary paid at the end of 1911 their first visit to their Indian Empire as reigning sovereigns, they were greeted with universal enthusiasm, carried in some places to the embarrassing lengths of that semi-divine worship which Hindu tradition accords to kingship.

But the great waves of emotion which sweep over India often subside as rapidly, and the worst revolutionary elements were shown to be still in being when just a year afterward a bomb was thrown with very nearly mortal effect at the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, while he was making his state entry into Delhi, which the king-emperor had himself proclaimed to be the new capital of his Indian Empire.

Political agitation was once more acute when the Great War broke out. Then it was suddenly

hushed and England herself was astonished at the wonderful outburst of loyalty among the princes and peoples of India. They were, above all, proud to see the Indian Army sent to Europe to fight shoulder to shoulder with the British Army in France, and right gallantly did it help to hold up the Germans during the very critical winter of 1914–15. Asquith, who was then prime minister, gave genuine expression to England's gratitude when he declared that Indian questions would henceforth have to be approached from "a new angle of vision." But in the protracted stress of war, the fulfilment of that promise was so long delayed that within the next two years all the old discontents flamed up afresh in the shape of another raging and tearing campaign, this time for immediate *Swaraj*, an elastic term which, though it may mean only local self-government, was then clearly intended to mean complete autonomy or even absolute independence. British ministers were compelled by urgent appeals from the government of India itself to lay their war-maps aside for a moment and remember Asquith's pledge.

In August, 1917, Montagu, a radical statesman who had lately gone to the India office, in Lloyd George's coalition government, made the most

momentous declaration which the British Parliament had ever listened to in connection with India. The purpose of British policy in India was to be henceforth, he stated,

> not only the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, but also the greatest development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.

He himself proceeded shortly afterward to India and drew up, in consultation not only with the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, but with representative Indians of all political complexions, an exhaustive report which served as a basis for the great Government of India Bill adopted by both Houses of Parliament at the end of 1919.

That measure embodied profound constitutional changes in the government and administration of India. It endowed India with representative institutions in the shape of an all-Indian legislature as well as provincial bodies, in which the Indians were assured of an elected majority. The ultimate responsibility of the British government was fully safeguarded, but in the Indian provincial governments large fields of administration were transferred to Indian ministers responsible to their provincial legislatures, and even the

supreme executive government of India with almost half of its members henceforth Indian had henceforth to reckon, for the first time, with a great Indian popular assembly. A great impetus was given at the same time to the Indianization of all the public services, which is now steadily proceeding. The elections took place in the following year, 1920, and the Duke of Connaught, sent out to represent the king at the opening of the new legislatures, delivered a royal message in which King George did not hesitate himself to use the word *Swaraj* that had come to be regarded by British officialdom in India as an almost openly seditious war-cry:

> For years—it may be for generations—patriotic and loyal Indians have dreamed of *Swaraj* for their motherland. Today you have the beginnings of *Swaraj* within my Empire, and the widest scope and ample opportunity for progress to the liberty which my other Dominions enjoy.

This new constitutional charter represents the boldest attempt that has ever yet been made to graft political institutions of the democratic Occident on an ancient and still vital form of oriental civilization. A disastrous combination of circumstances tended to jeopardize the success of this great experiment at its very inception. It was fiercely denounced by the extreme national-

ists, for whom it did not go far enough to satisfy their dream of complete Indian independence, and by the old reactionaries, who resented any endeavor to build up the framework of modern European institutions on the ancient and sacred soil of Hinduism, which was supposed to have enjoyed a golden age—quite mythical—of wealth and knowledge and freedom beyond all nations of the earth before the Occident broke in upon it.

Out of these conflicting discontents there suddenly emerged the magnetic personality of Mahatma Gandhi, whose ascetic life and prophetic eloquence invested a widespread movement of revolt against the Occident with something of a religious halo in a country where religion is still a supremely vital force. A Hindu, but of the somewhat lowly caste of *Bunnias*, or traders, he had received a thorough Western education and had been called to the bar in London. But he had been embittered against the Occident first by the hardships which he had seen inflicted on his fellow-Indians in South Africa under the plea of preserving the superiority of the white race, and more recently by the harsh methods of repression employed in the Punjab after the revolutionary outbreak of April, 1919, and especially by General Dyer's ruthless action at Amritzar,

of which it may be said, to borrow the Duke of Connaught's weighty language, "the shadow has lengthened over the face of India."

For Gandhi it was not merely British rule in India but Western civilization itself that was "Satanic." Against every manifestation of that civilization he exhorted his people to rebel and as a first step to refuse any sort of co-operation with government and to boycott the elections for the new representative assemblies. He urged them equally to shun modern schools and law courts, and even hospitals, as "Satanic," and he would have them shun as equally "Satanic" all the inventions and appliances of modern science, and above all every form of modern industry. What he would have India return to besides the domestic spinning-wheel and homespun clothes is hard to say. I had one long and interesting talk with him but I vainly tried to obtain from him some picture of what India would be like under *Swaraj*, as he understood it. He spoke vaguely of restoring the old Indian village community, with its *Panchayats*, or Councils of Elders, in which justice would be dispensed "in accordance with the conscience of India," and of substituting for ponderous school and college buildings "as stifling to the boy's body as modern

educational processes are to his soul," simpler structures "open to God's air and light" in which "the learning of their forefathers would make free men of them once more." Then, quit of railways and telegraphs and all other instruments and symbols of Western economic bondage, India, he assured me, would return to the pristine felicity of prehistoric Vedic times. All this was to be achieved by soul force, and he himself constantly preached non-violence.

Yet this Hindu prophet and apostle of non-violence was induced to throw his mantle over a purely Mohammedan movement in support of Turkey engineered by Indian Mohammedans, who barely did lip-worship to his doctrine of non-violence. The leaders of the Indian khalifate movement belonged to the new school of Mohammedans, who, turning their backs upon the old traditions of their community, had joined hands in the National Congress with the Hindu extremists for the subversion of British rule. Some of them, and notably the brothers, Mohamed and Shau-kat Ali, had been in contact with the Young Turks before the war, and as they refused to give any assurances of loyalty when the war broke out, they had been interned for its duration. Released after the war, they had seen their opportunity

in the difficulties which the resurgence of Turkey created for the Allies and especially for Great Britain.

But they could not hope to carry the bulk of their co-religionists with them unless they affixed a religious label to their pro-Turkish campaign. That label was the khalifate. The Occident, they preached, was banded together under the leadership of Britain to destroy Islam by robbing the sultan of Turkey of the territorial and temporal power essential to the discharge of his spiritual duties as khalif. It was an adroit move and singularly successful. A hundred years ago the Indian Mohammedans knew little about Turkey. It was indeed the British rulers of India who themselves first magnified Turkey in the eyes of the Indian Mohammedans when they courted their support during the Crimean War, and again when Lord Beaconsfield sent an Indian force to Malta in 1878 in anticipation of another war against Russia in defense of Turkey.

Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda did not make any very widespread impression in India, though he had started it there as far back as 1884, but it was not wholly ineffective, and things happened before the Great War—more especially the Italian invasion of Tripoli and the Balkan wars—to fill the whole Mohammedan

world with deep anxiety as to the future of all Islamic states. All this was for a time almost forgotten during the Great War, though the revolt of the sherif of Mecca against Turkey shocked many Indian Mohammedans as an act of treachery to Islam. The khalifate propaganda in favor of Turkey did not, at any rate, fall upon entirely unreceptive ears. On the contrary, it very soon assumed proportions which so seriously alarmed both Delhi and London that the British Empire had finally to join in the collective surrender at Lausanne with which I have dealt in one of my previous lectures.

Gandhi, without stopping to probe the merits of the case, bestowed his blessing on the khalifate movement as a great demonstration of religious faith on the part of his Mohammedan fellow-countrymen. He, of course, did not fail to preach to them the duty of non-violence. But he had reckoned without the militant spirit of Islam, and the khalifate movement was responsible for more outbreaks of violence than Gandhi's own Hindu revivalist campaigns. The rising of Mohammedan Moplahs on the Malabar coast, in 1921, recalled the worst atrocities perpetrated by the early Mohammedan conquerors of India many centuries ago. It was nominally directed at

first against British rule, but the Moplahs promptly turned upon their Hindu neighbors whom they either slaughtered and plundered ruthlessly or compelled at the point of the sword to embrace Mohammedanism, until British troops came to their rescue.

The lesson was not lost on the Hindus in other parts of India, and many of them learned to dread a return to the old days of Mohammedan domination if ever India's connection with Britain were finally severed. One of the leading Hindu extremists in Bengal has sought this year to devise a pact which would secure continued co-operation between Hindus and Mohammedans for the attainment of Indian independence, but in spite of his great personal influence its terms have been indignantly rejected by a large proportion of Hindus as far too favorable to the Mohammedans whose prestige has suffered at the same time grievously from the Turkish change of front and the abolition of the khalifate at Angora. The relations between the two communities are perhaps more strained than ever at the present day, and the British power alone prevents them from flying at each other's throats.

An intolerable strain was put upon the forbearance which the government of India had extended to the non-co-operative movement when Gandhi

proclaimed the boycott of the Prince of Wales's visit to India eighteen months ago. Though some violent rioting occurred as soon as he landed in Bombay, the boycott was on the whole a failure. But Gandhi himself admitted that the government was acting entirely within its rights when it at last had him arrested and placed on his trial as a persistent disturber of the public peace. He was condemned to two years' imprisonment, but he was released this winter before the end of his term on grounds of ill-health, and having recovered from his illness, he has now promptly revived his original program, including passive resistance and at some future date a general refusal to pay taxes. But during his imprisonment other and less unworldly spirits had been fighting to get control of the movement which he had started.

Three years ago Gandhi had banned all participation in the elections to the new representative assemblies, but he failed, and the new assemblies showed, on the whole, a great deal of capacity and discretion. At the second general election held at the end of 1923 many of his former followers, disregarding his injunctions, stood for election and were returned, largely at the expense of the more moderate Indians who had accepted the reforms as at least a first and

material step toward dominion self-government in India. The avowed purpose of this change of front on the part of the Extremists is to wreck from inside the assemblies the constitutional scheme of reforms which Gandhi had failed to wreck from outside. But he is not to be moved from his old position, and the breach between him and the new school has been widened by a sensational demonstration which more directly than anything that has yet happened challenges his doctrine of non-violence. A few months ago a young Bengali student murdered an inoffensive English merchant in Calcutta whom he admitted to have mistaken for a British official. It was a dastardly crime, but the provincial branch of the Indian National Congress actually passed a resolution commending the murderer for his patriotic devotion, and passed it with the support of the new Swarajist leader, Das, who seems to have now set himself up almost openly against Gandhi.

It is not by such methods, though they may produce in some a feeling akin to despair or provoke others to advocate hasty and unworthy reprisals, that Englishmen's patient faith in their capacity to train Indians to govern and protect themselves will be seriously shaken. Have they not, after all, succeeded already in training them to play

a great part today in every field of the new India's life? Indians today are members of the executive government at Delhi and in the provinces. They are judges of the high courts, and one of them even sits on the judicial committee of the Privy Council at home. There is an Indian high commissioner in London, and Indians sit on the Council of the secretary of state for India, in Whitehall. There is no position in the great public services to which Indians cannot aspire on terms of equality with Englishmen. There are among them men of letters and of science whose names are honorably known throughout the Occident. They are rapidly becoming the captains of industry and commerce. All these we can claim as the intellectual offspring of Western education which the British rule brought with it. We clearly have to do our duty by them.

But we have also a duty toward the scores of millions of inarticulate Indians, who if they know nothing else of the Occident, have learned to put their trust in British rule as that which divides them least and is best able to hold the balance between all their conflicting creeds, castes, and races. There are only 120,000 Englishmen in India, including the British garrisons—the merest handful among a population of 320,000,000—and

it is certainly not by the sword alone that they can hold the fort for Western civilization, not in India alone but throughout the Orient. For it is not in India alone but all over the Orient that the prestige of the Occident has suffered grievously from the spectacle which it presents today of a battered and bleeding Europe.

The critical period of transition in India, which was precipitated by the Great War, may prove longer and more difficult than was anticipated when India received five years ago her great constitutional charter, and the relatively small but undeniably influential class of Indians upon whom it conferred unprecedented constitutional powers have been slower to learn how to exercise them constitutionally. But it is all part of the great experiment upon which Britain entered a hundred years ago when she gave Western education to India, and she owes it not only to herself but to the Indians, and even to those who now revile her, to go through with it. For upon the success or failure of an experiment conducted on so vast a scale, involving the future of a great subcontinent, inhabited by nearly a fifth of the human race, depends more than upon anything else in the Orient the peaceful readjustment of its relations with the Occident.

V

PROTECTORATES AND MANDATES

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The proclamation of a British protectorate in Egypt took place under such exceptional war conditions that it cannot be regarded as typical of the systems of European protectorates over oriental states which grew up in the latter part of the nineteenth century as an alternative to annexation pure and simple. The germs may be found in the treaties of subordinate alliance concluded much earlier in that century between many of the Indian native states and the British government of India, which secure to the latter absolute control over foreign relations and to the Indian princes the maintenance of their hereditary rights of rulership and a large measure of autonomy in regard to internal administration so long as they conform to minimum standards of decent and humane government.

It is the French who in recent times have applied that system with perhaps the greatest success. Whereas when they occupied Algiers in 1830 they ended by annexing Algeria and

assimilating its administration largely to that of continental France, they were content in 1881 to establish a protectorate over the adjoining territory of Tunis, taking over control of its foreign relations and to a lesser extent of its internal administration, but maintaining the hereditary rights and formal authority of its ruler under French overlordship. Protectorates have been established on similar lines by the British over Zanzibar and other parts of tropical Africa, which do not come within my purview. The most useful illustration I can take is, I think, the French protectorate established in 1912 over the greater part of Morocco; for Morocco has had altogether a peculiarly interesting history.

Unlike Egypt and indeed unlike all the rest of the Arab world which had shared in the brilliant Mohammedan civilization of the early Middle Ages, Morocco escaped Turkish domination, though the Ottoman Empire once stretched along the southern shores of the Mediterranean almost to her doors. Thus when the Moors were finally driven out of Spain and retired to their own country in a sheltered corner of northwest Africa they were left in possession of their national independence and of the memories at least of the glorious age in which their forebears had

ruled in Spain. The people of Morocco converted to Islam when the Arab followers of Mohammed swept them along with them to the conquest of Spain never had and have not today much Arab blood in them; for the majority of them, especially on and beyond the great Atlas range, are Berbers of north African stock, speaking their own north African tongue, and while professing Mohammedanism, still in a very primitive stage of tribal evolution, in which ancient tribal custom refuses as yet to yield even to Mohammedan canon law. But Arabic is still the polite language of Morocco, and whatever of civilization endures in Morocco derives from the Arab civilization of Spain and is indeed still commonly called Andalusian.

The noblest surviving monument of its ancient glory, the Kutubia at Marrakesh, was built by the same Arab architect who reared the Giralda at Seville. The beautiful Medersas of Fez belong to the same order, and all that is best in the arts and crafts of Morocco is still rightly termed Andalusian. Some of the great Moorish families are reputed to have still in their possession the keys of the houses in which their ancestors lived in Seville or Granada. Others pride themselves on a common ancestry with distinguished families of Arab descent still living in France and Spain.

When I was in Morocco last winter I paid my respects to the governor of Rabat, Mohamed Burgash, a dignified old gentleman of ancient Arab lineage, who told me that two branches of his family were still extant in Southern Europe, both now of course Christian, the one Spanish, the other French.

The Moors are a proud race, and they have not forgotten the bitter story of their expulsion from Spain. The University of Fez, founded a thousand years ago, is today still a stronghold of Mohammedan orthodoxy, and in Fez, which is the northern capital, there lingers perhaps more than in any other Moorish city a subtle atmosphere of inherited anti-Christian and anti-European hostility.

They never owed allegiance either temporal or spiritual to the Turkish sultans, and though they have passed through stormy periods of internal strife, they have always had their own independent sultans who have been also their khalifs in complete disregard of all the Turkish sultans' claims to the khalifate. They set their face equally against the Occident, and if occidental nations like the Spaniards and the Portuguese sometimes got a foothold on their coast—England held Tangier for twenty inglorious years as part

of the dowry which Catherine of Braganza brought to King Charles II—the Barbary pirates from the Atlantic ports of Morocco boldly raided across the ocean and often on to the very coasts of England all through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Tens of thousands of Europeans were carried away as captives to Morocco and sold into slavery. Some of them, having embraced their new masters' faith, rose to high positions in which their Western knowledge was frequently put to use. Foreign trade, too, was somehow maintained in the coast towns even in the worst days of piracy, and foreign merchants were allowed to reside there, some of them with consular privileges.

But the sultans of Morocco rarely demeaned themselves to hold diplomatic intercourse with the infidels, and when representatives of the foreign powers came to reside at Tangier, they were held there at arms' length, and, even when they occasionally braved the difficulties of a long journey through a roadless country to the Moorish court at Fez or Marrakesh, in order to present their credentials or to settle outstanding questions, they had, until quite the end of the last century, to stand bareheaded and on foot in the presence of the sultan when he gave them their first public

reception in his camp, while he himself sat on his horse under his great umbrella of state.

Even when a hundred years ago the conquest of Algeria first gave Morocco a European neighbor, her aloofness from the West was only temporarily disturbed, and she continued to stagnate in her own medieval backwater until it was stirred by the uninvited intrusion of European powers in quest originally of new markets for their increasing industrial output. The rivalry between France and Britain, who were with Spain the first to appear on the scene, soon, however, ceased to be purely economic, as besides her commercial interests Britain as a naval power could not remain indifferent to the fate of Morocco who held one side of the Straits of Gibraltar and had a long and strategically important seaboard on the western Atlantic.

France, on the other hand, with her great possessions reaching to the borders of Morocco on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and stretching across the Sahara toward her growing West African colonies on the Atlantic, held that she had equal if not superior claims to political ascendancy in the northwest corner of Africa which she had already almost enveloped. Spain also had ambitions in Morocco, but she was relatively a negligible quantity, and France and

Britain wisely settled their differences when the German emperor suddenly entered the lists and threatened to cast his sword into the scales. In the Anglo-French Convention of 1904, which covered the whole field of Anglo-French overseas rivalry, France undertook to leave Britain a free hand in Egypt in exchange for the British recognition of superior French interests in Morocco.

Germany had until then hardly ever concerned herself with Morocco, where even her commercial interests were insignificant. For a whole year she nursed in silence her resentment of the Anglo-French agreement. Then in 1905 William II's demonstrative visit to Tangier was the crowning incident in a systematic campaign of intimidation against France in which Germany put the question of Morocco in the foreground—almost to the point of war—as the acid test of Franco-British friendship in the hope of driving in a wedge between France and Britain before their renewed intimacy had had time to consolidate. This hope was doomed to speedy disappointment, for, though France yielded so far as to agree to the Moroccan question's being referred to an international conference at Algeciras, France and England made common cause there, and Germany was fain to accept the compromise offered to her in the shape

of an understanding for joint co-operation in the development of Morocco's economic resources.

The political independence of Morocco was, however, still nominally intact, and she might have saved herself had she taken time by the forelock and put her house in order. But of this she was incapable. Only the religious fanaticism of her people reacted against the interference of infidel powers, and early in 1911 a general rising of the tribes against the sultan, Mulai Hafid, assumed such proportions that at his instance the French sent an expedition from Algeria to relieve the beleaguered city of Fez. Then followed another acute crisis, which again brought Europe to the verge of war when Germany challenged the action of France by sending the German cruiser "Panther" to the faraway port of Agadir in which German interests were nil. This was a more threatening demonstration than even the emperor's visit to Tangier six years before and was equally intended to test Anglo-French relations. It failed again, and once more Germany was fain to accept a compromise by which in return for a transfer of territory in the French Congo to Germany the latter recognized a French political protectorate over Morocco, economic equality alone being reaffirmed.

In 1912 the sultan, Mulai Hafid, signed the treaty by which he formally accepted the French protectorate, but only after a fresh period of serious disturbance and risings, directed as much against an unpopular and worthless ruler as against the French infidels, did the Moorish people as a whole resign themselves to the protectorate. Even to the present day the Berber tribesmen of the Atlas Mountains maintain a desultory struggle against it in the same spirit in which they have fought from time immemorial against every attempt on the part of their own sultans to enforce any settled form of government upon them.

Tangier, which almost faces Gibraltar on the Straits, has been recently placed under a separate international administration, and south of it there is a narrow Spanish zone extending from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic in which the Spaniards are still engaged in fighting down, sometimes with disastrous results to themselves, the stubborn resistance of the Riff tribesmen in their almost inaccessible mountain fastnesses. The French protectorate extends over the rest, i.e., nine-tenths of Morocco, or roughly the same area as that of continental France.

The success of a protectorate depends very much upon the spirit in which it is administered.

The French have been fortunate enough to find in Marshal Lyautey an agent who laid himself out from the very first to make their protectorate acceptable to the Moorish people. Though essentially a soldier, Lyautey combines the gift of broad and far-sighted statesmanship with a rare combination of energy and patience and an abundance of human sympathy. For him the protectorate has been no mere diplomatic figment invented to disguise an alien domination imposed by force. Soon after he had been appointed resident general he formulated his conception of a protectorate as

> a system under which the country preserves its own institutions and governs and administers itself through its own organs under the mere general control of a power, who, having taken charge of its foreign relations, assumes the general direction of its military forces and finances and economic development. The dominant characteristic of a protectorate is control as opposed to direct administration.

In Mulai Hafid's successor, Mulai Yusef, the present sultan, Marshal Lyautey has found a ruler who has loyally accepted that interpretation of a protectorate.

Marshal Lyautey seeks and generally follows the sultan's advice in matters not only affecting the internal administration of the country which

is left very largely in the hands of the sultan's officials, but also in those which he might well regard as reserved to the discretion of the protecting power. It has, in fact, been the marshal's policy to maintain and even to enhance the sultan's position as both a temporal and spiritual ruler. The restoration of law and order to an extent which no ruler had ever achieved in former times has already been carried so far that the sultan can now make a peaceful progress through many parts of his dominions into which he would never have ventured before, except at the head of a large army recruited mainly by the promise of plunder.

It must inevitably be a strain upon the conscience of orthodox Mohammedans to see their khalif acquiesce in the protectorate of an infidel power, but the strain has been relieved in Morocco not only by the misfortunes which have overtaken a rival khalif in Turkey, but still more by the scrupulous regard which the French, and the marshal first and foremost, have always shown for their religious and social customs. Just as before the occupation, no non-Mohammedan is allowed to enter their mosques; the seclusion in which they keep their women is respected; their own law courts sit as of old for the administration of

justice in accordance with Mohammedan Sacred Law. Ordinary relations between Frenchmen and Moors are as a rule friendly and often cordial, and in this respect Frenchmen doubtless have an advantage over Englishmen as they seem to be almost entirely free from the color prejudice which has grown upon us nowadays considerably. They have even sought to bring their new public buildings into harmony with Moorish architecture, while they have established a strong claim on the gratitude of the Moors by taking in hand and carrying out most admirably under the expert direction of their *beaux arts* the restoration of the ancient monuments which the Moors themselves with all their piety were allowing to fall into decay.

The French no doubt keep a firm hold upon the country, but with singularly little display of military force. There have been no regular French troops in Morocco since the early part of the Great War when Lyautey took the risk of releasing them for the Western front. Since then he has relied entirely on African troops, some of them raised in Morocco, but mostly Tunisian, Algerian, and Senegalese, and their only European stiffening is provided by the Foreign Legion, a peculiar force recruited entirely from volunteers of all nationalities of whom, strangely

enough, 65 per cent are today Germans. During the war practically all who were not Germans were sent over to fight in France, and Lyautey likes to boast, laughingly, that throughout the war he held Morocco for France with his Africans and his own Germans.

To those who do not understand the German mentality, it must seem almost incredible that since the war Germans have been tumbling over one another to be accepted for service in the French Foreign Legion. Their French officers admit that they make excellent soldiers, and only a few months ago Marshal Lyautey recognized the gallantry displayed by one of them in the fighting last summer in the Atlas Mountains by bestowing on him the French Military Medal which he, a former officer in the German Army (I believe in the Prussian Guards), now wears as well as the German Iron Cross for the Great War.

I have not time to dwell on what the French have done within the short span of twelve years since the establishment of the French protectorate for the material development of the country. Splendid roads for motor traffic now connect all the chief cities; the railways which were originally built for military purposes are being transformed and extended for general purposes; they have

made new ports and harbors, and laid out new towns, generally quite outside the Moorish walled cities so as to diminish the chance of friction between the newcomers and the Moorish population; they have created schools and hospitals, of which the Moors are beginning to appreciate the value.

Everything, however, bears the impress of one great personality, and when Marshal Lyautey retires—an event which cannot be far off in view of his advancing years and frequent ill-health—one wonders whether the French will find for him a successor capable of carrying on his work on the same lines. Perhaps the greatest tribute to him is the anxiety which prevails on this subject among the Moors themselves. He has had one singular advantage in carrying out his great experiment. All he has had to contend with, besides the impatience sometimes of his own people who would prefer the more drastic methods that obtain in other French dependencies, is the innate conservatism of a Mohammedan country to whose religious and social customs our Western civilization is necessarily repugnant. He has not had to reckon with the cross-currents which a growing familiarity with the history and traditions and political conceptions of the Occident tends to create in many other oriental countries.

The French are now importing Western education into Morocco where hitherto it was almost unknown, but they are doing so slowly and very cautiously in order to avoid the pitfalls which have beset it elsewhere in the Orient. Lyautey wants to carry Mohammedan opinion with him, and he can claim to have achieved a remarkable success in securing the consent and even to some extent the good will of the ancient University of Fez for a new Mohammedan college under French direction with a broad modern curriculum. But, dreading to create a half-educated semi-Europeanized intellectual proletariat, he is anxious that Western education, primary as well as secondary, should not outrun the capacity of the country to absorb its products and provide sufficient openings for their useful employment.

For the present, however, Morocco knows nothing of the ferment of Western education which has been already long at work upon many other oriental peoples, and has engendered among them political aspirations and discontents directly derived from the Occident. Hardly the remotest breath of the Occident had passed over Morocco until the French went in and built up an occidental framework around the weather-beaten structure

of an ancient oriental civilization which they have hitherto been at great pains not to disturb.

In Morocco the protectorate system is seen at its best as a milder substitute for the older and more forceful methods of annexation. But even there it stands for the definite subordination of an oriental country to the paramount authority of a single European power. Since the Great War, on the other hand, a distinctly progressive step has been taken in other parts of the Orient for the readjustment of the relations between the Occident and the Orient by the creation of the mandatory system and its application, imperfect as it still is, to the Arab provinces detached from the Ottoman Empire.

When the Allied and Associated Powers met together at the Paris Peace Conference, one of the most important questions with which they were faced was the disposal of the territories outside Europe of which the enemy states were to be permanently dispossessed. It was, I think quite wisely, recognized that those territories could not properly be handed over to any one of the victorious powers, and when the League of Nations took shape, on President Wilson's initiative, it opened up a new solution of the problem. Article 22 of the Covenant declared that in such territories

as were inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, their well-being and development should form a sacred trust of civilization, and that the best method of giving practical effect to that principle was to intrust the tutelage of such peoples to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position could best undertake that responsibility and were willing to exercise it as mandatories on behalf of the League.

As I am concerned here merely with the provinces detached from the Ottoman Empire, I need only quote the paragraph that deals specifically with them. It runs:

> They have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Not only was the mandatory system largely due to President Wilson's inspiration, but the word "mandate" was, in fact, used for the first time in this connection by an American writer, George Louis Beer, in an essay written before the war was over with special reference to the

future of Mesopotamia, and it is in Mesopotamia, now called Iraq, that the system has had its fairest trial.

It was the British armies that drove the Turks out of Mesopotamia, and they remained in occupation. The rough and ready system of administration, not always very wise, which the military authorities extemporized on the spot, created all the more disappointment in that the Arabs of Iraq had, as elsewhere, been led by the declarations of British statesmen to believe that they would not only be liberated from the Turkish yoke, but allowed to join with the rest of Arabia in the creation of a great Arab state under the leadership of the ruler of the Hejaz at Mecca, who had actually joined the Allies during the Great War in open revolt against Turkey, and had been recognized accordingly as king of the Hejaz with full rights of sovereignty.

I shall not attempt to plead that these expectations were not in a large measure justified, or that France and England, the two powers chiefly concerned, can be absolved from blame for having in the first place rashly raised them and then for refusing to fulfil them, or at least postponing their fulfilment more or less indefinitely. The always dormant fanaticism of a Mohammedan population

combined with the newly awakened sense of nationhood to produce in 1919 a serious rising in Iraq which required a considerable military effort for its repression. The mandate for Iraq was not formally conferred upon Great Britain till 1922, but from 1920 onward, when military administration was superseded by civil, British policy was framed in anticipation of the responsibilities to be ultimately assumed under the mandate. The British government set steadily before itself the task of facilitating the evolution of Iraq toward self-government and even independence. Under an Arab king, Feisal, son of the king of Hejaz, Iraq already possesses its own national government, responsible to an Arab Assembly under a constitution of its own making.

The ultimate recognition of Iraq's complete independence was embodied together with the necessary safeguards for special British interests and general foreign interests, in a bilateral treaty of alliance drafted in the same spirit as that in which Lord Milner had in 1920 recommended the negotiation of a bilateral treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. That treaty under which Britain undertakes to support an application from the Iraq government to be admitted to the League

of Nations has been adopted but only after much hesitation by the newly elected assembly at Baghdad. There was a very stubborn minority composed of extreme Nationalists and of a fanatical section of Mohammedans of the Shiah persuasion determined to reject any agreed settlement. But the majority finally realized that but for British support the independence of Iraq might be very short-lived, for the Turks will in any case be unpleasant neighbors on the northern frontiers of Iraq, and that frontier is not yet finally drawn.

At Lausanne, Turkey claimed the whole province of Mosul though the vast majority of the population is Arab and not Turkish, and it has always looked down stream, economically and politically, toward Baghdad, whereas the natural boundary lies well to the north in the mountains of Kurdistan. The question of oil, of which the district of Mosul is reputed to contain large undeveloped supplies, has added a new economic factor to the issue, though I believe it has never played the decisive part which some publicists, more especially on this side of the Atlantic, are apt to ascribe to it.

Agreement having proved impossible at Lausanne, the question was reserved for further

and separate negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey, and should they fail, for a final reference to the League of Nations. So far Turkey has not abated her extravagant demands, and England may have to appeal to the League of Nations, and put the good faith of the new Turkish state to a public test.

Iraq, moreover, still lacks many of the elements of stable government, and has not a tithe of the leaven of Western knowledge and experience which Egypt, for instance, possesses. The population is largely nomadic, and even the townspeople were never brought into contact under Turkish rule with the better Western influences which had long been at work in Egypt, and scarcely at all with Western education. The British government has declared that within four years from the ratification of the treaty by the Iraq Assembly, or at an earlier date, should Iraq become a member of the League of Nations, it will withdraw the last of the British forces, already very considerably reduced, and, if so desired, all the administrative agencies of British guidance and assistance which the Iraq ministers have themselves expressed the desire to retain for the present. There are good men in Iraq who have shown themselves quick to learn, but they will

have to carry the bulk of their fellow-countrymen with them during the next four years if Iraq is then to stand on her own legs. But if Britain can secure a satisfactory settlement of the Mosul question with Turkey, she will be in a position to claim that in Iraq at least she has done her best to discharge her responsibilities as a mandatory power in accordance with the spirit of the League of Nations Covenant.

In Syria and Palestine, which was formerly regarded as one with Syria, the Arabs had been led to conceive during the war even higher expectations of the future than in Iraq. For if a great Arab state was to be formed out of the provinces released from the Turkish yoke, the Syrian Arabs were entitled to hope that they would play a leading part in it. They were in every way more advanced than the Arabs of the Hejaz, of which the Allies had already recognized the independence. Many of them had received good Western education, especially in two great institutions at Beirut—the one a large Jesuit university which enjoyed the whole-hearted support of France, and the other an admirable American university conducted, like Robert College at Constantinople, also American, on the best modern lines.

They possessed commercial and financial enterprise which had been developed in increasing intercourse with the West, and a large number of Syrians who found employment in Egypt during the long period of British control had brought home to their people the contrast between occidental and Turkish methods of government. From all these elements there had grown up a vigorous national movement which had been sealed with the blood of martyrs in the days of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress and still more when Enver and Talaat ruled at Constantinople during the Great War.

These hopes were raised to a high pitch when the Turkish armies were driven headlong out of Syria, and General Allenby, who commanded the British forces, allowed the Arab flag to be hoisted at Damascus. But they faded away, or were at least relegated to a very distant future, at the Paris Peace Conference, when the Allied and Associated Powers agreed that, until such time as it would be practicable to create a great independent Arab state, Syria should come, like Iraq, under the mandatory system. An American Commission sent out by President Wilson reported a very widespread desire for an American mandate, but no effect could be given to it when

the United States rejected the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The door was at once reopened to Anglo-French jealousies reaching far back into history, which were only composed by the attribution to Britain and France of two separate mandates for Palestine and Syria, respectively.

Again, I do not propose to plead that the attribution of those mandates by the League of Nations is above criticism. The Covenant of the League provides that the wishes of the populations concerned should be a principal consideration. There is abundant evidence to show that the majority of the Syrian population strongly objected to a French mandate, and that the majority of the Palestinian population did not desire a British mandate if the latter was to be used as an implement of the Zionist policy to which the British cabinet had committed itself during the war by the Balfour Declaration. That Declaration, I need hardly remind you, contained the promise of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, and though it was specifically added that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in another

country," it involved an experiment which imported into the relations between the Occident and the Orient an entirely new element of racial and religious discord. For if the Jews are an oriental race and their religion has remained an essentially oriental religion, those who were most intimately associated with the Zionist movement were just those who drew their inspiration from the most advanced schools of occidental political thought, or were ready to flood Palestine with the most undesirable class of Jewish immigrants from the ghettos of Russian and Polish cities.

Wealthy Jewish philanthropists have for the last thirty or forty years founded and supported a certain number of Jewish settlements in which Jews rescued from the degradation of those surroundings have unexpectedly shown that they can be converted into good husbandmen and fruit growers. The annual stream of Jewish pilgrims who have always poured in from abroad to worship at Jerusalem has also its economic value. But the prospect of a large Jewish immigration of the type contemplated by the leading Zionists was quite another thing. The natural resources of the country may be greatly expanded in time, but at present it cannot support any large addition to the population, nor is there room for such an

addition unless there are large transfers of land from its present possessors to the newcomers.

The feeling of alarm among the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, both Mohammedan and Christian, was all the greater as the most rabid Zionists made no secret of their intention to construe the Balfour Declaration as entitling Jews to a predominant share in the government and administration of the country. The British high commissioner was himself a Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel, but fortunately a man of high character as well as ability, who just because he was a Jew was perhaps more successful than any Christian might have been in keeping the more ardent Zionists within bounds. But the task assigned to him seems to be as difficult as the squaring of the circle, for to reconcile the second clause of the Balfour Declaration with the first seems to me almost to defy the wit of man. At any rate, the Mohammedans, who form over three-quarters of the population, have for the time being composed their ancient differences with the tithe of the population that is Christian in order to show a solid front to the other tithe who are Jews. Occasional affrays bear witness to the bitterness of anti-Jewish feeling, although the small British force maintained in the country has usually proved

ample to maintain law and order, and Mohammedans and Christians have so far persisted in refusing to have lot or part in the proposed Legislative Council on which they were offered what they regarded as insufficient representation. The Jewish population have alone so far perfected their internal organization.

But Zionism has still to show whether it has sufficient vitality to make good. Many of the Jewish immigrants have already lost heart, and the number of those who were brought in during the last year is barely superior to that of those who left the country in disgust. Among the leading Jews in Europe and especially in England there are many who have refused from the beginning to have any faith in Zionism, and even in America, where it has found its warmest supporters, the stream of financial assistance upon which the Jewish immigrants must for a great many years be largely dependent, is reported to have perceptibly slackened. Meanwhile, Palestine can hardly be said to have offered a happy field for the mandatory system.

Nor can Syria. Only the Maronites, an old Christian community in the Lebanon, who had always been special protégés of France, were prepared to welcome a French mandate, and the

Mohammedans were distinctly hostile to it. A congress of Syrian notables tried to force a conclusion on March 10, 1920, by offering the crown of Syria, including Palestine, to Emir Feisal, son of the king of the Hejaz, who accepted it with the title of "king." France regarded him as too closely identified with British interests, and Britain, besides having no wish to quarrel with France over Syria, considered herself bound to see that Palestine was set apart for the Zionist experiment. Feisal was therefore summoned to attend the San Remo Conference, and, when he failed to attend, it was decided to assign mandates for Palestine as well as Iraq to Great Britain, and for Syria (without Palestine) to France.

A French army, taking the place of the British forces withdrawn after the war, was already in occupation of Syria, and after overcoming some resistance from Feisal's troops, entered Damascus and deposed the Emir and ordered him to leave the country. As we have seen, he shortly found another crown in Iraq, and the French began to rule Syria as a mandated territory, but with a heavier hand than was ever contemplated by the authors of the Covenant, even before the attribution of the mandates for the provinces detached

from the former Ottoman Empire was formally approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Since then things have somewhat improved. The Christian Lebanon and the Druse country of the Hauran have been granted their own autonomy, and the three other provinces of Syria have been federated. But beneath the surface there is still much popular discontent.

It cannot, therefore, be contended that the mandatory system in Syria or in Palestine has fulfilled all the expectations raised in the Covenant of the League of Nations, or even wholly conformed to its provisions. The Arab dream of a great and independent Arab state is still far from fulfilment. In theory the independence of each of the mandated states has been recognized, but only in Iraq does it depend upon the people themselves whether or not it shall become a reality in the near future. The Hejaz, under King Hussein, is indeed already an independent Arab kingdom, as that was part of the bargain definitely struck with Great Britain when he decided to throw in his lot with the Allies in 1916. But his methods of government and administration have not proved such as to encourage confidence in the fitness of the Arab tribesmen of the desert to govern themselves on modern lines.

The fact is that the end of the war left the Allies face to face all over the Arab provinces with a number of conflicting commitments into which they had from time to time entered rather recklessly in order to meet the exigencies of a difficult and fluctuating war situation. Had America been willing to burden herself with a mandate for the whole or part of the Arab countries, the problem would have been simplified, for the United States had never been mixed up in the political rivalries which complicated the settlement, and the Arab peoples might have been more easily induced to rely upon her impartiality and good faith. But that was not to be, and the mandatory system, however imperfectly it has operated, is probably the only one by which international conflicts could be avoided while reserving for the Arabs the possibility at least of working out their own salvation in a more or less remote future.

The principle underlying the mandatory system undoubtedly represents a progressive stage in the evolution of the law of nations. For the first time at the end of a great war in which enemy territories had been conquered, the conquerors agreed not only to forego the right of sovereignty which they would formerly have claimed over

them almost as a matter of course, but to assume for them the responsibilities of trusteeship under the supervision of an independent authority. They have to discharge those responsibilities at their own cost and without any definite benefit for themselves. Under the Covenant there seems even to be no provision enabling them to lay down a mandate if they find the burden imposed upon them excessive. They have to send in an annual report as trustees to the League of Nations, which is the final authority to pass judgment on the discharge of their trusteeship. How far in the case of the mandated Arab territories the mandatory system will supply a workable nexus between the Occident and the Orient it is yet too early to say, but as laid down in the Covenant of the League it certainly constitutes a praiseworthy attempt to readjust them in a new and not ungenerous spirit.

VI

THE NEW FACTOR OF BOLSHEVISM AND SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

VI

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Before placing a few general conclusions before you I must invite your attention to the new and demoralizing factor which bolshevism has introduced into the relations between the Occident and the Orient. Bolshevism itself is neither of the Occident nor of the Orient, for while it seeks to undermine the foundations of our Western civilization, it has no affinity with any of those types of oriental civilization upon whose antagonism to the West I have dwelt in some of my preceding lectures. It has so far merely been a destructive force, and in Europe it has triumphed only in Russia. But Russia herself may be said to have always stood psychologically and geographically midway between the Occident and the Orient and to have been, beneath her thinly cultured surface, quite as much Asian as European, and as until the overthrow of the old autocracy she ruled over a large part of the Asiatic continent, she has become as formidable a base for bolshevist

propaganda in Asia as she ever was for the territorial expansion of the czarist empire.

None of the countries of the Orient bordering on Russia has entirely escaped bolshevist penetration. When Turkey suddenly resumed her struggle against the Allies while Western Europe was still countenancing the efforts of the Russian "Whites" to wrest their country from the "Reds," Angora and Moscow were drawn together by their common enmity to the Western powers. Whatever the fundamental antagonism between the Mohammedan conception of a strong theocratic state, rooted in the principle of authority, spiritual as well as temporal, and the bolshevist combination of atheism and anarchism, the two chief figures of Moscow and Angora, Lenin and Mustapha Kemal, were to this extent at one, that they both looked upon the Occident as the enemy, and were both equally implacable in their determination to crush what was called in Russia the "anti-revolutionary" and in Turkey the "anti-national" forces.

I will not labor the analogy between the war waged by the new Turkish state against the ancient institutions of Islam and the bolshevist persecution of the Russian Church, or between the ruthless dictatorship of Lenin and that to which

Mustapha Kemal seems to have attained at Angora. So long as a state of war existed between Turkey and the Western powers it was easy for Moscow and Angora to parade their friendship in solemn treaties of amity and alliance. But they both have separate ambitions which tend to drive them asunder. Nationalism, often of the most extravagant type has been the great driving force in modern Turkey ever since the Revolution of 1908, and soviet Russia has herself been rapidly reverting to the czarist policy of expansion in Asia, and not least in those regions which have long been a battleground between Russia and Turkey, or must eventually become so, if the Pan-Turanian dreams of Turkish nationalists are ever to be fulfilled.

At the outset soviet Russia emphatically renounced before the whole world all the old inheritance of czarist aggrandizement, and promised to all the peoples of Asia, including those who had been formerly subjects of Russia, complete freedom to constitute themselves into new and independent states in pursuance of the fundamental doctrine of self-determination, which bolshevism could alone be trusted to carry into practice. Such counsels of perfection, even if they were ever sincere, did not last very long, and

Moscow soon decided that self-determination must in any case be conditioned on the acceptance of the revolutionary doctrines of bolshevism. Today a half-dozen states on the Caucasian borderland between Turkey and Russia, mostly conquered in former times by Russia from Turkey, have been successfully sovietized and affiliated so closely with the Russian soviet that they are actually as completely under Russian domination as in the days of imperial Russia. But as we are told to give even the devil his due, it is, one must admit, in one of the sovietized republics of Transcaucasus that the name of Armenia, expunged from the Treaty of Lausanne, alone survives today.

All this has naturally caused considerable perturbation at Angora, for a barrier has thus been set up against the expansion of the Turkish Republic in one direction toward which her own militant nationalism was driving her. Already at Lausanne there was a slight rift within the lute. The representatives of Moscow and of Angora did not at all see eye to eye on the question of the Straits and the Black Sea, and though in this case it was Moscow that had to yield, its last word has assuredly not yet been said. For there is little to distinguish the militarism and

imperialism of soviet Russia of today from the czarist Russia of yesterday.

Bolshevist propaganda among the Young Turks probably achieved its greatest measure of success at a great Oriental Congress held in Baku on the Caspian in September, 1920, which was attended by a large Turkish delegation as well as by delegates from soviet Russia, from the Caucasian states, from the north of Persia, and from Central Asia. Many different languages were spoken at this Congress, and the only words which every delegate understood and the vast majority applauded were "soviet" and "bolshevik." Coming events seem on that occasion to have cast their shadows before, when Comrade Zinovieff, while congratulating Mustapha Kemal on his splendid fight against capitalistic Europe, deplored the fact that his government was not yet a communist government. Addressing himself to the Turkish delegates, he warned them not to bolster up the sultan's authority when the last hour had struck for all authority everywhere, and he exhorted them on the contrary to teach their people to shake off all faith in the sultan in the same way as the Russian people had shaken off all faith in the czar. Zinovieff, today still one of the inner ring at Moscow, boldly singled out for reprobation the language

then quite recently held by Mustapha Kemal himself at Angora where he had declared that nothing would ever be done by him to impair the sacred dignity of the sultan and khalif which was above and beyond discussion. Comrade Zinovieff may well have congratulated himself that this warning had not fallen on deaf ears when not so very long afterward Mustapha Kemal himself destroyed both the sultanate and the khalifate.

In Persia conditions have been less favorable to the spread of bolshevism. Anti-European feeling may be only a degree less deep than in Turkey. Sunk into almost hopeless decay under corrupt and feeble rulers, the ancient kingdom of Persia owed even more than the Ottoman Empire its preservation in the nineteenth century to the political rivalry of Britain and Russia, fearful and distrustful of each other in the Middle East as in the Near East. In the presence of the growing German peril they finally composed in 1907 their differences in Asia just as France and Great Britain had for the same reason composed their colonial differences in 1904. But they composed them chiefly at the cost of such little independence as Persia still possessed.

The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 converted northern Persia into a large Russian zone

of influence, and a smaller British zone was created in southeastern Persia, with a sort of neutral "no man's land" between the two in central Persia. Even so backward a people as the Persians could not but resent being dealt with in this offhand way as mere objects of barter. There were some among them, too, who had come into contact with Western ideas of freedom and had acquired some knowledge of the working of nationalist and even revolutionary movements in Europe. The Persian nationalists wrestled in the first place with the shah and wrung from him the grant of a rudimentary parliament at Teheran. But these concessions were as distasteful to the autocratic traditions which he had inherited from his ancestors as to his Russian protectors.

Many Americans must be familiar with the rather pathetic story of the fruitless struggle which the immature Persian reformers tried to wage against the combined influence of Russia and of the reactionary elements in their own country, while Great Britain was constrained by considerations of European policy to look on reluctantly and rather shamefacedly. For the Persians, relying upon the disinterested impartiality of America, had called in an American,

Shuster, to act as their financial adviser, and when he retired, disgusted with the political situation in Teheran which constantly defeated his attempts to clean up the Augean stables of Persian finance, he wrote a vigorous account of his mission which created considerable sensation at the time. He was perhaps not always quite fair to Russia or to England, but in the main the situation which he showed up was one that did no credit to either power, though, on the other hand he was perhaps inclined to deal rather too leniently with the shortcomings of his Persian nationalist friends.

When the Great War broke out, the sympathies of the Persian people were on the whole not with the Western powers in whom they chiefly saw the allies of Russia. After Turkey's entry into the war Persia found herself made a theater of subsidiary military operations conducted upon her territory with little or no regard for her declared neutrality which she was herself powerless to uphold. Turkish troops invaded her western provinces and German and Austrian agents, some of them consuls, merchants, and even professors, who had been preparing the ground beforehand during long residence in Persia, poured into the country to raise bands of Persian mercenaries whose activities were chiefly directed toward

the southern provinces in which British influence predominated. Von der Goltz himself came across from Turkey with a large German and Turkish staff to settle a great plan of campaign. One large band under German leadership actually penetrated into Persian Baluchistan which marches with the extreme western frontiers of British India. The British organized counter-movements from India with a stiffening of Indian troops and finally cleared the nondescript hostile forces out of southern Persia.

Meanwhile, a Russian army, moving down from the north, had not only overawed the capital when the shah had been at one moment on the point of joining the German and Austrian ministers and throwing in his lot with the Germanic powers, but it had driven the Turks out of western Persia and nearly joined hands with the British forces in Mesopotamia. But the Russian forces melted away there as on every other front under the redhot breath of bolshevism.

When the Great War was over and Russia had for the time being ceased to count, British influence seemed for a time to be absolutely supreme at Teheran, and the Persian government readily subscribed to a new treaty with Britain which practically placed the whole task of Persian

reconstruction in British hands. Lord Curzon, who was the author of that treaty, had once more underrated the latent strength of Persian national feeling and also the rapid penetration of Russian bolshevism from the Caucasus into northern Persia and even into the capital, after the withdrawal of the British forces that had at one time reached the Caspian Sea. Even before the war the Persian and Tatar elements in the Russian Caucasus had played a conspicuous part in the Persian nationalist movement, and after the war they generally sided with the bolshevists in the three-cornered hostilities between British and Turkish and Russian bolshevist forces in the Caucasus and on the Caspian littoral, where soviet republics have since then been constituted.

How strong a hold on Persia bolshevism had already got in 1920 may be gathered from the fact that next to the Turkish delegation the Persian delegation was numerically the strongest at the Mohammedan Bolshevist Congress at Baku to which I have already referred. Lord Curzon's treaty was used as a valuable weapon for purposes of bolshevist propaganda, and, as British ministers had never dreamed of imposing it by force on Persia, they ended in wisely allowing it to lapse altogether. The bolshevists, however,

naturally boasted that it was they who had killed it, and a Russian soviet ambassador strutted for a time through the streets of the Persian capital as if it belonged to him.

But the rulers of Persia soon began to dread soviet Russia as much as they had formerly dreaded imperial Russia, and in Persia, which is the only Shiah Mohammedan state in the Orient, there is a powerful class which does not exist in Sunni Mohammedan countries. Among the Shiahs alone there is something closely resembling an organized priestly hierarchy. Extremely bigoted and reactionary, the Persian priests, or *Mujtahid*, soon took fright when they understood what Russian bolshevism stands for.

Scarcely less frightened, though chiefly for their own loaves and fishes, were the parasitic classes from which the corrupt Persian officialdom in the capital and in the provinces is chiefly recruited. The shah himself, as worthless as most of his predecessors, sought refuge from the cares of state in chronic journeys to Europe which merely increase the penury of the treasury. But American advisers have been again called in and have already done some good work, though hampered by many obstructive forces as well as by frequent changes in the Persian ministry.

Only within the last year or so has a figure emerged from the welter of political intrigue in Teheran who promises to give somewhat greater stability to the feeble structure of government. Riza Khan has some features in common with the Turkish dictator. His origin is obscure and his antecedents are not altogether commendable, but he appears to have the same ruthless determination, and, for a Persian, very remarkable powers of organization. He has for the first time in our days created a Persian army capable at least of maintaining order at home, and he is by all accounts the strongest prime minister that modern Persia has ever had. Like Mustapha Kemal, he appeals to the nationalism of his people, and three months ago he was believed to be on the point of following the Turkish dictator's example by deposing the shah and proclaiming a Persian republic. There, however, he found himself confronted with the intense conservatism of the Persian priesthood, who countered him with a solemn declaration that a republic was incompatible with the fundamental principles of the Mohammedan religion. Riza Khan was wise enough to give way for the time being and an official assurance was issued that there would be no republic. The dictator went through the form

of resignation but the short-lived crisis ended with his resumption of the premiership. Whatever his ambitions may be, these are not likely ever to favor bolshevism, though it still carries on an active propaganda through its own organs in the Persian press, and the latest accounts point to a recrudescence of Republican agitation, directed now not only against the shah who still tarries in Europe, but even against the dictator himself.

Whatever may be the case in Persia, it is difficult to believe that Afghanistan provides a congenial soil for bolshevism. Like its Persian neighbor with whom in former times it was constantly in conflict, Afghanistan has figured chiefly in modern history as a buffer state between the Russian and the British empires in Asia, and three times during the nineteenth century the British went to war with Afghanistan in order to check the growth of Russian influence at Kabul, the capital. They were costly wars, and the first one had a disastrous epilogue when in 1842, after having successfully occupied Kabul, the small British Indian force was almost completely annihilated before it could get back to India. Two other British expeditions in 1878–80 ended after costly vicissitudes in establishing on

the throne of Kabul a ruler, Abdul Rahman Khan, who was shrewd enough to realize the value of a powerful neighbor's protection and was satisfied to leave the control of his foreign relations in the hands of the government of India in return for a handsome subsidy and full rights of rulership within his dominions.

On this basis things proceeded fairly smoothly until the Afghans were led to believe that the old Russian menace had disappeared with the Russian Revolution, and that they could even count on the support of their new bolshevist friends if they broke with India. In March, 1919, a new ameer, Amanulla Khan, announced his accession with all the customary protestations of friendship to Britain and India. But the disorders with which the British were just then suddenly and almost simultaneously confronted in Northern India, in Mesopotamia, and in Egypt, and of which the gravity was enormously magnified by bolshevist propaganda, encouraged him to change his tune abruptly, and only a month later he proclaimed a holy war, and boastfully summoned his tribes to follow him as they had more than once followed his ancestors to the facile conquest of the fat plains of India. The Afghan forces were promptly repulsed, and before the end of May the ameer was asking

for peace, which was formally concluded early in August.

But though defeated in the field, the Afghan ruler achieved what had probably been his own chief purpose. The comforting word "self-determination" had reached even to Kabul, and he construed it to his own satisfaction as covering his claim to recognition as an absolutely independent sovereign. This satisfaction the government of India was quite ready to concede to him as, with the disappearance of imperial Russia, it saw no further need to subsidize Afghanistan as a buffer state or to assume any of the responsibilities implied in the control of its foreign relations, which might have led to awkward entanglements with bolshevist Russia pulling the strings at Kabul. The complete independence of Afghanistan was recognized, and though the first use made of his independence by the ameer, or "king," as he was now styled, was to sign a treaty of amity and alliance with soviet Russia, he redressed the balance by welcoming a British mission to Kabul and accrediting an Afghan representative in London.

The king has an uneasy time with the rather loose agglomeration of unruly tribes that make up Afghanistan, and his genuine desire to introduce

certain rudimentary reforms into his administration together with increased taxation has already landed him in serious trouble with them. The influence exercised on public affairs by his wife, who is a very "advanced" lady, is in itself a stone of offense in a Mohammedan country in which women have hitherto been kept in rigid subjection. There is frequent friction, too, between the few Europeans whom he has taken into his service as he has imported them mostly from Germany and from France in order to prevent any one group acquiring exclusive influence. Though he coquetted with soviet Russia so long as he was less afraid of her than of British power in India, he is much too autocratic a ruler to have any real sympathy with bolshevism, and in the havoc which bolshevism has wrought in Central Asia he has had too many unpleasant object lessons at his very door.

Bolshevism has poured forth over the whole of Central Asia like a devastating flood. I have had occasion to allude more than once to Russian expansion in Asia in the old days of the czars and its effects upon British policy toward Turkey. Not only had imperial Russia possessed herself of the whole of Siberia and Northern Asia right away to the Pacific, but she had steadily absorbed

or brought under her overlordship all the Mohammedan states of Central Asia down to the land frontiers of British India as well as along the borderlands of Afghanistan and Persia. The Russians maintained order and did a great deal for the material development of the country which they linked up by two separate railways with the Caspian as well as with their great Siberian trunk line. In all the chief cities there were large Russian garrisons and in some of them considerable Russian settlements, in which there was generally a nucleus of political exiles banished from European Russia. The Russian Revolution shook the whole fabric of Russian domination. The people of Central Asia, all Mohammedans, saw in it an opportunity to shake off an alien and infidel yoke, and soviet Russia encouraged them at first to believe that she would not block their way to freedom.

One of Lenin's earliest measures was to issue a decree proclaiming for all peoples, and not least for all oriental peoples, the right of self-determination. But when Moscow proceeded to organize its vast system of bolshevist propaganda, it was nowhere more active than in Central Asia. In 1920 a Communist University of Workers in the East was founded in Moscow under the direction of

Comrade Broyodo, who had formerly been a lawyer at Tashkend, and branches were soon opened at Tashkend, Baku, and Irkutsk. That of Tashkend, the former seat of Russian government in Central Asia, soon had over 300 students, and there was a special school for women.

Education was based exclusively on communist principles, and translations from the works of Lenin, Kautsky, and Stalin as well as Karl Marx were made into the chief Central Asian vernaculars for the use of students and for general distribution. Some of the older Russian Orientalists were commandeered to form a new scientific association on bolshevist lines as one of the sections of the Commissariat of Nationalities under whose control were placed a number of subsidized institutions created for or readapted to bolshevist propaganda. The remnants of the old Russian garrisons and bureaucracy in Central Asia were at the same time impressed into the service of bolshevism. A number of vernacular newspapers were started to preach bolshevist doctrine and even the theaters and cinemas were mobilized. At the bolshevist schools, which sprang up like mushrooms, Mohammedan boys were taught to look henceforth to Moscow as the Mecca and Medina from which salvation would come to Islam.

As in the Caucasus, the various nationalities of Central Asia were encouraged to constitute themselves into soviet republics, e.g., the soviet republic of Khorezm, once the khanate of Khiva; the soviet republic of Turkestan, with Tashkend as its capital; the soviet republic of Bokhara, also formerly a khanate. Moscow allowed them for a time to enjoy the illusion of independence, but very soon soviet Russia reverted to the old traditions of czarist Russia, which it had originally repudiated as incompatible with its mission of world-liberation. The old Russian agencies as well as the political exiles were employed to preach close affiliation with the Russian union of soviet republics. They were speedily reinforced by commissars from Moscow, accompanied or followed by Red armies and sooner or later treaties, so-called, of alliance, imposed upon the new sovietized republics, brought them once more under the domination of soviet Russia which was no less effective and far more tyrannical than that of czarist Russia had ever been. Risings followed which were ruthlessly crushed, and devastating famines and wholesale ruin.

We need go no farther for evidence than to the official organs of the Moscow government. The *Izvestia* itself once described at great length and

with quite unaccustomed frankness the endless procession of carts with half-naked and more than half-starved people streaming across the Kirghiz steppes to Orenburg. The mortality among children reached 80 per cent. The living, it said, were killed; the dead were dug up for human food. Khiva was pillaged in turn by Turkoman tribes and by Red troops. In the soviet republic of Tashkend, Kokhand, "the charming," a city of over 80,000 inhabitants which had become under czarist rule the flourishing center of the great cotton-growing area of Ferghana, was taken, pillaged, and burned by the Reds, and 10,000 Mohammedans were massacred, not of course as Mohammedans but as counter-revolutionaries.

Repeated and sanguinary rebellions and repressions ravaged the large state of Bokhara, and the ameer, whom czarist Russia had always recognized as a semi-independent feudatory, had to take refuge in Afghanistan. Before death carried him off, the famous Enver Pasha flitted across the blood-stained stage, first as an ally of the bolshevists and then as the leader of a Mohammedan revolt against them. The history of Central Asia during the last five years is a confused and still largely obscured record of destruction and anarchy,

with bolshevism, however, still triumphantly riding the whirlwind.

In oriental countries farther removed from Russia, such as India, bolshevism makes its way underground to the congested urban slums into which the growth of modern industrialism has too often packed its unskilled workers, only half-weaned by the attraction of higher wages from their former village life, almost wholly illiterate and densely ignorant, unorganized, and, until recent legislation for the protection of labor, largely at the mercy of an equally new and irresponsible class of Indian employers, slow to acquire the sense of duty to their men which British employers for the most part bring with them to India.

Gandhi may denounce industrialism and commercialism as among the most Satanic gifts of the Occident. But they have come to India to stay. Indian industry and Indian trade received a tremendous impetus during the war when the great natural resources of the country were for the first time systematically explored and developed for purposes of war production. Indians are now coming to the front at the head of great commercial and industrial enterprises who are in many ways qualified to compete with the best Europeans. The Tatars, for instance, have

created at Jamshidpur in Bengal, round their splendidly equipped iron and steel works, an industrial city which will bear comparison with anything we can show in England. Fiscal freedom has been granted to India under her new constitutional charter, and many Swarajists who profess to be in other respects devoted followers of Gandhi have parted company with him on this point. They have placed the protection of Indian industries and trade in the forefront of their program, and, although they still call themselves non-co-operators, they have found themselves during the last legislative session at Delhi voting in the same lobby as the government in support of tariff measures which they attacked only as falling short of the high tariff wall they would like to build up against foreign and especially, of course, against British competing imports.

Indian labor, in the meantime, has yet to be organized on efficient lines, and, as it has so far produced no leaders of its own, the trade unions which are springing up like mushrooms are mainly in the hands of professional agitators who might almost have themselves graduated at Moscow. For Moscow boasts of the special attention devoted in its various oriental colleges to the training of bolshevist "missionaries" with the requisite

knowledge to arouse as its organ the *Novy Vostok*, or *New East*, puts it: "the whole colonial world of the oppressed not only in Asia but in Africa and America against the capitalistic society of Europe and the United States."

The Orient and the Occident are being drawn together by all the mechanical appliances of Western civilization. Telegraphs and wireless, fast steamers, railways, and motor roads are annihilating distance and time. Outwardly the chief cities of the Orient have adopted or are adopting most of the material equipment of European cities. In many directions intellectual intercourse between the Occident and the Orient is increasing every day. In almost every oriental country there has grown up a Western-educated class that can speak and read and write, sometimes quite admirably, one or other of our Western languages, more especially English. There are judges and lawyers, doctors and engineers, men of letters and men of science, capable of competing in their own field with the men of the Occident who have been their teachers. The textbooks in schools and colleges are for the most part borrowed from the Occident, and it is to occidental research that the Orient owes even its much larger knowledge today of its own past history.

Many Orientals have been brought up almost exclusively on occidental literature of which at first at any rate they preferred the best. Today unfortunately the popular bookstalls of the Orient are littered with its worst, often in vernacular translations, just as cinemas generally parade the worst possible pictures of occidental life. The influence of the press, itself an entirely modern production imported from the Occident, has become ubiquitous. In India many of the leading newspapers, owned and edited by Indians, are written and published in English, though the reverse of English in spirit and tone, and give the cue to innumerable vernacular newspapers far more crude and violent. Under the stimulus of the Occident, the Orient is learning to develop its immense resources, and the markets of the Orient, more and more closely linked up in trade and industry and finance with those of the Occident, respond automatically to every wave of prosperity and depression that beats upon them from London or Paris or New York

Western education has been for the Orient the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Whether the good shall prevail over the evil constitutes the supreme test to which the civilization of the Occident as a whole—the civilization that is as

much that of America as of Europe—is being subjected today throughout the Orient. It is not merely or mainly the political ascendancy of any one European power over these or those peoples of the Orient that is at stake. It is not merely or mainly whether President Wilson's formula of "self-determination" is, or was intended to be, applicable to the nations of the Orient whose independence might very well mean merely a reversion to oriental forms of society and government entirely incompatible with any fruitful relations with the Occident. The fundamental issue is whether the Orient can be brought to adapt itself to that democratic type of human society which the most progressive nations of the Occident have gradually evolved as affording the largest opportunities for individual and collective freedom combined with the restraining sense of individual and collective responsibility.

If one seeks to define what the Orient chiefly lacks, and has always lacked, it is the practice of freedom with the sense of responsibility, or, in one word, character. Almost the only forms of government it has ever known have been theocracy and autocracy with alternating periods of license and anarchy. Nothing can be more undemocratic than the Hindu caste system which still holds a

great part of India in its grip, and Mohammedanism has never risen beyond the conception of brotherhood in the faith within the Mohammedan world—a brotherhood that has constantly broken down in practice—and of the whole non-Mohammedan world as an irreconcilable world of war. It is, nevertheless, among Hindus that some of the finest intellects have been drawn into closer spiritual communion with the Occident than in any other part of the Orient—perhaps because Mohammedanism is not the dominating factor in India—and there are no dogmatic limitations to the elasticity and eclecticism of Hindu philosophies. But nowhere, on the other hand, is the repudiation of all spiritual communion with the Occident louder and more emphatic than it is today in India.

Turkey speaks with another voice, for she has never believed in anything but the sword. All she has borrowed from the Occident is a fierce and narrow nationalism, so narrow that it would seem to be a reversion to the primitive tribalism of the Central Asian hordes that were her forebears. In the new Turkish state we have seen this fanatically Turkish nationalism carried to such lengths that it has not only savagely rid its soil of all alien races at the imminent risk of economic

suicide, but it has even cut itself adrift from the brotherhood of Islam in order to dig itself in the more securely against all contact with the non-Turkish Orient as well as with the Occident.

The Arabs have at least once in the course of history evolved a civilization which found some points of genuine contact with the Occident, and rose, though only for a short time, superior to the rigid dogmatism of their Mohammedan creed. Are they capable of doing so again should they recover with the now vacant khalifate the leadership of Islam which they wielded for many centuries before the Turks wrested it from them? Or will Islam continue to be what it has gradually come to be among almost all Arabs—an element of passive rather than of active resistance to the Occident?

In Asia and in Africa all the ancient lands of the Arab khalifate have passed within the last century under the political control of Western powers, whether by annexation, as in Algeria and Tripoli, or under foreign protectorates, as in Morocco and Tunis, or under the mandatory system as in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. Egypt alone has secured a formal recognition of her independence, but British troops still continue

to garrison her two chief cities. In most of these Arab lands the tutelage of Western nations is now undoubtedly deeply and sometimes fiercely resented, but not so much because its benefits during an admittedly transitional period are denied as because with their growing sense of nationhood, which they owe to the Occident, they claim to have learned enough to dispense with its leading strings. But even among the Arabs there is beneath the surface a much deeper and more passionate resentment which explodes from time to time with elemental energy.

All the manifold discontents of the Orient are bound up together in the clash of color. This is nothing new. Nature herself is responsible for it, since she gave a generally white complexion to all the peoples of the Occident and, in varying degrees, a darker complexion to all those of the Orient. But it has acquired a dangerous significance with the white man's assumption of superior and indefeasible rights based on the superiority of his race. He may couple the exercise of those rights with a fine sense of duty toward the colored races which he regards as his inferiors, as Kipling implied when he wrote of the "white man's burden." But, rightly or wrongly, the Oriental, who for a time admitted and acquiesced with

almost fatalistic resignation, in the white man's superiority, denies it today—denies it sometimes passionately—for all his atavistic instincts, reacting against the aggressive impact of occidental civilization, rebel as never before against it; sometimes contemptuously because increasing intercourse has made him too familiar with the seamy side of our civilization; sometimes though alas! more rarely because he has assimilated enough of its finer spirit to claim the rights of equal partnership in all that is best of it.

So long as personal intercourse between the Occident and the Orient was confined within very narrow limits, the white man laid much less stress than he does today on mere racial superiority. To India, for instance, England has sent out on the whole her best. Social intercourse between people of different races with different beliefs and different customs and different domestic institutions was always difficult, but it has become far more difficult now that increased facilities of communication and the introduction of modern scientific appliances and industrial trading methods have led to the employment in subordinate capacities of a type of Europeans formerly almost unknown to the Orient, but now very much in evidence, with plenty of good qualities, but more prone than

those of better breeding and education to boast of their racial superiority and to impress their sense of it somewhat roughly upon the Indians or other Orientals with whom they rub shoulders. It cannot be denied that racial hatred has often had its origin in the rancor created by personal insults to which the natives of oriental countries even of good position have occasionally been subjected by white men who fancied themselves, but were not, their betters. Industrial competition, at the same time, has intensified so rapidly all the world over that the Occident has been seized with a great fear lest it should be swamped by the cheaper labor and lower standards of life of the countless millions of the Orient which it has itself equipped to become its competitors.

I have touched only on that part of the Orient which has been for many centuries interlocked in history with the Occident, but the same line of racial cleavage is deepening even in those countries of the farther Orient—China and Japan—which I have excluded from my purview, because, having their own great civilizations, they lived their own lives, almost within the memory of living man in almost complete isolation from the Occident, until Europe and America, too, went

and thundered at their gates. Today the racial issue is raised all over the world.

In this country you have the color problem in your very midst. You have it again at your doors in the shape of Asiatic immigration. We in Europe are confronted with it, as I have tried to show you, along the great borderland of the Occident and Orient extending through Northern Africa and across Western and Central Asia, from the northwestern Atlantic to the shores of the Indian Ocean, even beyond. Its solution bristles with difficulties, but, for my own part, I refuse to dismiss it as insoluble. I will say this, at any rates that the more firmly we ourselves believe in the superiority of a civilization which, so far, it has been the privilege of the white man to build up in his occidental homelands, the more are we bound by its principles and the principles of the common Christianity which are its one sure foundation to do all in our power to temper the bitterness of a racial discord which, if it spreads and deepens, may threaten the future of the whole human race.

Often as our own practice may have fallen short of our ideals, the common civilization of the Occident, to which America belongs quite as much as Europe, must surely set before us

definite ideals for which we should all strive as nations and as individuals. May I conclude by quoting to you the words in which those ideals have been so admirably expressed by one of my own fellow-countrymen that the late president of the United States, Mr. Harding, himself quoted them as "seeming to point to the true way out." Sir Frederick Lugard says:

> Here then is the true conception of the interrelation of colour: complete uniformity in ideals, absolute equality in the paths of knowledge and culture; equal opportunity for those who strive, equal admiration for those who achieve; in matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own inherited traditions, preserving his own race-purity and race-pride; equality in things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and material.

In uttering those words Lugard was referring chiefly to Africa, where he earned his great reputation by practicing what he taught. But they afford, I think, equally wise guidance for the solution everywhere of the race problem upon which today more than ever before depends the peaceful readjustment of the relations between the Occident and the Orient, of which I have tried, however inadequately, to sketch the chief vicissitudes and the long evolution in history down to our own times.

INDEX

INDEX

Abbas Hilmi, 83, 84
Abbaside dynasty, 24
Abdul Hamid, 42, 58, 59, 140
Abdul Hamid II, 43, 45, 47, 48; successor to, 49
Abdul Rahman Khan, 196
Abdul-Walid-Ibn-Rushd, 16
Abu Bekr, 10, 11
Abyssinia, 75
Adly Pasha, 93, 95
Adrianople, 21, 35
Afghanistan, 50, 195, 197, 199, 202
Afghans, 196
Africa, 205, 214
Agadir, 156
Akbar, 116
Albanians, 45
Alexander the Great, 37, 109
Alexander II, 41
Alexandria, 14, 74, 77, 91, 99
Algeciras, 155
Algeria, 156, 209; annexation of, 149; conquest of, 154
Algiers, 23, 149
Ali, 11, 129
Allenby, Lord, 88, 97, 171
Allied and Associated Powers, 56, 57, 86, 89, 164, 171
Allies, 51, 53, 57, 64, 85, 140, 166, 170, 177
Almohad princes, 16
Amanulla Khan, 196
Ameer-el-Mouminin, 60
America, 27 f., 30, 54, 178, 189, 205, 207, 212, 213; and Armenian mandate, 54, 55; Zionism in, 175; *see* United States
American advisers, 190, 193
American Civil War, 73
American mandate, 171
American Relief Committee, 53
Amritzar, 137
Anglo-Egyptian relations, 94
Anglo-French Convention of 1904, 155
Anglo-French jealousies, 172
Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, 133
Anglo-Russian agreement, 188
Angora, 20, 58, 62, 104, 142, 184, 186, 188; capital of Turkish Republic, 20
Antioch, 14
Arab, Assembly, 167; blood, 151; conquerors, 19; Empire, 71; independent, state, 170, 171, 177; provinces, 178; science, 15; world, 150; writers, 15
Arabi, rebellion of, 77; Saad Zaghlul Pasha, a follower of, 82
Arabia, 9, 44, 166; Wahabis of, 72
Arabic, 14, 15, 18

Arabs, 5, 12, 13, 25; of the Hejaz, 170; of Iraq, 166; in Syria and Palestine, 170
Aristotle translated, 15, 16, 18
Armenia, vii, 53, 186
Armenian massacres, 47, 52
Armenian question, 48
Armenians, 58, 61; in Asia Minor, 65
Armies, African, 160; British, 55, 58, 63, 77 f., 88, 91, 99, 134, 169, 176, 191, 209; French, 55, 134, 160, 176; Greek, 56, 57, 58, 64; Indian, 134; Italian, 56; Persian, 194; Red, 201; Russian, 191; Turkish, 45, 46, 54, 72, 171, 190
Armistice, 55, 86
Art and literature, 14, 15
Aryans, 121
Asia, 37, 48, 184, 188, 195, 198, 205; Central, 187, 199, 202; Minor, 23, 28, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 64, 66
Asquith, prime minister, 134
Assassinations, political, 132
Atlas Mountains, 151, 157, 161
Austria, 35, 46, 84, 191
Autonomy, 134, 149, 177
Averroes, 16, 17, 18
Aviation, British military, 99
Avicenna, 15

Bacon, Roger, 18
Baghdad, 14, 15, 16, 168; Abbaside dynasty of, 24; Railway concession, 48
Baku, 187, 192, 200
Balfour Declaration, 172, 174
Balkan peninsula, 35, 36
Balkan states, 23, 36, 67
Balkan Wars of 1912–13, 50, 140
Baluchistan, 191
Baring, Sir Evelyn, 79; *see* Lord Cromer
Beaconsfield, Lord, 140
Beer, George Louis, 165
Beirut, 170
Bengal, 117, 142, 204
Berbers, 151, 157
Bismarck, 46
Black Sea, 20, 23, 186
Bokhara, 15, 202; soviet republic of, 201
Bolshevism, 64, 183, 185, 186, 192, 198, 203; in Central Asia, 187; in Persia, 188, 192, 195; Russian, 192; *see* Oriental Congress
Bolshevist influences, 64, 192
Bolshevist propaganda, 192, 200
Bolshevist schools, 200
Bombay, 111
Bosporus, 60
Brahmans, 121, 122 f., 124
"British control," 79, 81, 82, 83, 90, 92, 97, 171; uprising against, 142
British Empire, 60, 78, 98, 141; in Asia, 195; naval power, 37, 55, 113; Parliament, 135
British Indian Empire, 115, 116, 199; expeditions, 195

INDEX

Bryce, Lord, 51
Bryodo, Comrade, 200
Buffer state, 195, 197
Bulgaria, 36
Bulgarian atrocities of 1876, 41
Bulgars, 20
Bunnias, 137
Byzantine Empire, 12, 20, 71

Cabot, John, 30
"Cage," the, 25
Cairo, 16, 29, 78, 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 99
Calcutta, 111, 144; university at, 126
Canning, Sir Stratford, 38, 39
Cantacuzene, 21
Cape of Good Hope, 29, 37, 109
"Capitalistic society," 205
"Capitulations," 22, 66, 99; system of, 100
Caste, 120; *Bunnias*, 137; Brahminical, 121; Hindu, 207; relaxation of, 122
Catharine of Braganza, 153
Catherine the Great, 25
Caucasus, the, 192, 201
Chanak, 58
Charles II, King, 153
Chelmsford, Lord, 135
China, 212
Christendom, 22; militant, 18; Western, 24
Christianity, 6, 7, 13, 17, 213
Christian subject races, 26, 34, 38, 47, 50
Christians, 34
Civilization, 4; Andalusian, 151; Arab, 209; Christian, 22; Greek and Roman, 6, 12, 13; Hindu, 124; Mohammedan, 18, 150; of the Occident, 18, 213; oriental, 136, 212; Persian, 13; Western, 5, 104, 120, 146, 162, 183, 205
Clive, Lord, 117, 125
Codrington, Admiral, 35
Color problem, 213
Columbus, Christopher, 28, 29, 30
"Comity of civilized nations," 40
Commisariat of Nationalities, 200
Commission of Inquiry, 89, 95; Lord Milner's, 91, 94, 96
Communications, security of, 98
Communist University of Workers, 199
"Concert of Europe," 42, 47
Congo, French, 156
Congress of Vienna, 33
Connaught, Duke of, 136
Constantinople, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 104, 170, 171
Constitution, 44, 99, 136, 146
Constitutional charter, 136, 146
Cordova, 15, 16
Council of Ministers, 61
Crimean War, 40, 140
Cromer, Lord, 79 f., 82, 83, 90
Crusades, 19; First, 20; Last, 21

Crusaders, Latin, 19; Western, 21
Culture, Islamic, 15; Saracenic, 17; *see* Civilization
Curzon, Lord, 192
Cyprus, island of, 42
Czar, Russian, 187

Damascus, 11, 14, 16, 47, 176; Arab flag at, 171
Dardanelles, 60
Dar-el-Harb, 7
Dar-ul-Islam, 7
Das, 144
Delhi, 123, 141, 204; capital, 133; government at, 145
Deportation, mass, 52
Disraeli, 41
Druse country, 177
Dupleix, 113
Dyer, General, 137

East India Company, 110, 113, 117, 119, 125; policy of, 114
East Indies, 110, 112
Education, Western, 73, 77, 82, 100, 119, 121, 123, 126, 131, 137, 145, 164, 170, 206; English teaching in, 127 f.
Egypt, 23, 24, 37, 71, 73, 78, 87, 88, 89, 196; aviation base, 99; autonomy for, 72; Bonaparte's invasion, 72; British occupation, 78; British protectorate terminated, 98; constitution for, 99; control of economic life, 100; cotton-growing in, 73; credit of, 75; financial control of, 76; independence, 72, 86, 89, 92, 97, 98, 209; Lord Cromer in, 79 ff.; under martial law, 85; in the Middle Ages, 150; recognized as free state, 98; self-government in, 94; Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, 94, 167; Turkish sovereignty over, 84
Egyptian cabinet, 83, 87
Egyptian government, 89, 98, 101
Egyptians, 51
Elections, 99, 136, 143, 144; boycott of, 138
Elizabeth, Queen, 110
El-Mamun, 15
England, 30, 35, 40, 46, 57, 60, 76, 81, 89, 92, 96, 101, 105, 114, 117, 132, 152, 166, 175, 190
English, 72, 109; newspapers in, 206; teaching in, 127 f.
Enver Pasha, 50, 52, 171, 202
Europe, 37, 44, 48, 73, 156, 193, 205, 207; territories outside, 164
European money, 75
European trade, 28
Evkaf, 62
Extremists, 144

Factories, 111
Fanaticism, religious, 65; Mohammedan, 77
Feisal, Arab king, 167, 176
Ferghana, 202
Fez, 152, 153, 156

INDEX

Financial obligations, 66
Financiers, 66; of Paris and London, 75
Foreign Legion, 160, 161
Foreign relations, 149, 150, 158, 167, 196, 197
Foreign trade, 153
France, 12, 24, 35, 72, 76, 77, 89, 113, 114, 151, 154, 166, 170, 176, 188, 198; mandate for Syria, 176
French in Algiers, the, 149 f.; in Egypt, 72; in India, 112
French Revolution, 35
French scientific mission, 72
Fuad, King, 99, 103, 104; Prince, 85

Gallipoli, 63
Gandhi, Mahatma, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 203, 204
Genoa, 28
George, Lloyd; *see* Lloyd George
George, King, 133, 136
German Military Mission, 64
Germany, 33, 46, 50, 84, 155, 156, 198
Gibraltar, 157
Giralda, 151
Gladstone, 41
Goltz, von der, 191
Gordon, 102
Government of India Bill, 135
Granada, 16, 151
Grand National Assembly, 58, 61, 62; president of the, 61
Grand Vizier, 62; a Tunisian, 45
Great Britain, 39, 42, 72, 77, 93, 94, 154, 177, 188, 196; mandate for Iraq, 167, 176; mandate for Palestine, 176; *see* England
Great War, 4, 50, 51, 54, 57, 64, 84, 133, 140, 141, 146, 166, 171, 190; after the, 54, 160, 164
Greece, 35, 53; independent state, 36
Greek authors, translated, 14
Greek civilization, 6, 12, 13, 66
Greek disasters, 64
Greek war of independence, 36
Greeks, 35, 58; ancient, 6, 28, 66; of Asia Minor, 61, 65; of the Morea, 72

Hadith (*Traditions*), 9
Hamidian Pan-Islamism, 57
Hamidian policy, 51
Harding, President, 214
Hardinge, Lord, 133
Haroun-el-Rashid, 14
Hauran, 177
Hejaz, 166, 176, 177
Hejaz Railway, 48
Hindu philosophy, 208
Hinduism, 120, 137; as a social system, 120
Hindus, 123, 125
Holy Alliance, 33
Holy Land, 19, 20
Holy War, 51, 196
Hungary, 23
Hussein, Prince, 85, 177

Ibn Sina (Avicenna), 15
Ilbert Bill, 129
Imam-el-Kebir, 10
Imperial Conference, 99
India, 12, 29, 30, 73, 109, 110, 196, 198, 203; British Empire of, 110, 113, 191; British experiment in, 146; British policy in, 135; British rule in, 115, 125, 135; civilization of, 110; constitutional charter, 136; Dutch in, 112; early British settlements in, 30; French in, 112, 113; government of, 118, 127, 135 f., 140, 149, 197; Hindu caste, 207; invasion of, 37, 109; independence, 137 142; iron and steel, 204; Mohammedan domination, 142; mutiny, 74, 125, 129; newspapers, 206; peace and progress, 126; period of transition, 146; Portuguese in, 109, 112; Russian power in, 39; self-government, 144; trade and industry, 203; twenty different languages, 128; viceroy, 126; visit of King George and Queen Mary, 133; visit of Prince of Wales, 143
Indian Councils Act, 133
Indian High Commissioner, 145
Indian National Congress, 130, 139, 144
Indian popular assembly, 136
Indians, 5, 29, 51, 130
Industrial competition, 212
International administration of Tangier, 157
International law, 78
International problems, 3
International relations, 33
Iraq, 166, 167, 169, 209; Assembly, 169; independence of, 167, 168; mandate for, 167; *see* Mesopotamia
Irkutsk, 200
Islam, 6, 7, 9, 12, 18, 44, 50, 140, 141, 151, 184, 200, 209; Arab, 27; dominant in India, 116; headship of, 10, 25; sword of, 7, 12, 16, 115, 142; triumph of, 22; Turkish, 27, 63; *see* Mohammedanism
Ismail, Khedive, 74, 75, 76, 77 ff., 81, 103
Italy, 33, 77
Izvestia, 201

Jamshidpur, 204
Janissaries, the, 26, 34
Japan, 132, 212
Jehad (holy war), 51
Jerusalem, 47, 173
Jews, 49
Judaism, 7

Kabul, 195, 196, 197
Kali, goddess, 131
Kautsky, 200
Kemal, Mustapha; *see* Mustapha Kemal
Khalif, temporal power, 59; title of, 24
Khalifa-Rassul-Allah, 10

INDEX

Khalifate, 11, 12, 43, 58, 59, 188, 209; Abbaside, 14; abolition of, 62, 142; Arab, 20, 209; future of, 104; Indian, 139; Islamic, 24; movement, 10, 140, 141; Ommayad, 14; Ottoman, 63, 67; separate at Cordova, 15, 16; Turkish, 42, 45, 51, 57, 67, 152

Khanate, 201

Khartum, 102

Khedive, Ismail, 74, 75, 76, 77 f.; Tewfik, 77

Khiva, 201, 202

Khorezm, soviet republic of, 201

Kirghiz steppes, 202

Kitchener, Lord, 84, 102

Kokhand, 202

Koran, 8, 9, 12, 63

Koreish tribe, 10

Kurdistan, Mountains of, 168

Kurds, 45

Kutubia, 151

Lausanne, 141, 168, 186; *see* Treaties

League of Nations, vii, 60, 118, 164, 168, 169, 170, 177, 179; covenant of, 172

Lebanon, 175, 177

Legislative Council, 175

Legislature, All-Indian, 135

Lenin, 64, 184, 199, 200

Lepanto, 35

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 74

Lloyd George, 55, 56, 95, 97, 98, 99, 134

London, 85, 206

Lugard, Sir Frederick, 214

Lyautey, Marshall, 158, 160, 161, 163

Macaulay, 119; at Calcutta, 119

Madras, 111, 119

Mahdi, 101

Malabar coast, 141

Malta, 41, 88, 89, 140

Mameluke sultans, 24, 29

Mandate, for Iraq, 167, 176; French, 175; for Syria and Palestine, 172, 176, 177

Mandates, 149, 169

Mandatory power, 170

Mandatory system, 164, 175, 209; Syria under, 171, 177, 178

Maronites, 175

Marrakesh, 151, 153

Marx, Karl, 200

Mary, Queen, 133

Massacre, 52, 53

Mecca, 166, 200; sherif of, 141

Medersas, of Fez, 151

Medina, 200

Mediterranean, 23, 28, 37, 71, 74

Merchants, 66

Mesopotamia, 51, 55, 166, 191, 196; *see* Iraq

Middle Ages, 15, 28, 150

Midhat Pasha, 44

Milner, Lord, 90, 93, 167; Report of, 98

Minorities, protection of, 98

Minority, at Baghdad, 168

Moghul Empire, 111, 112, 145; decay of the, 114
Mohamed Ali, 37, 71, 72, 101, 139
Mohamed Burgash, 152
Mohammed, 7, 8, 9, 13; the Conqueror, 21, 22
Mohammedan agitation in India, 60
Mohammedan Bolshevist Congress, 187, 192
Mohammedan conquerors, 115
Mohammedan movement, 139
Mohammedan religion, 57, 152, 194; orthodoxy, 11; Sacred Law, 160, 209; Shiah, state, 193; *see* Shiahs, Sunnis
Mohammedan states under Russia, 199
Mohammedan world, 57, 61
Mohammedanism, 6, 20, 208; *see* Islam
Mohammedans, 25, 26, 45, 49; conservatism of, 164; French, 51; hostile to French mandate, 176; Indian, 51, 57, 124, 130, 139, 140; massacred, 202; orthodox, 159; in Palestine, 174
Monotheism, 9, 124
Montagu, 134
Moorish architecture, 160, 162
Moors, 152; driven from Spain, 150; independence, 150 f.
Moplahs, rising of, 141, 142
Morea, 72
Morgenthau, 51
Morley, John, 132
Morocco, 7, 23, 150, 152, 154, 155, 163; arts and crafts of, 160; economic resources of, 156; under French protectorate, 150, 156, 164, 209; Moorish population, 162; political independence, 156; Sultans of, 153
Moscow, 184, 186, 199, 200, 201, 204
Mosul, 60, 168; oil in, 168
Mudania Convention, 58
Muezzin, 7
Mujtahid, 193
Mulai Hafid, 156, 157, 158
Mulai Yusef, 158
Munro, Sir Thomas, 119, 129
Mustapha Kemal, 54, 58, 61, 63, 64, 184, 185, 187, 188, 194; first president of Turkey, 61
Mutiny of 1857, 74, 125, 129

Napoleon, 37, 71
Napoleonic wars, 35
Nationalism, 50, 77, 82, 185, 194, 208; principle of, 33, 77, 129
Nationalist movement, 78, 83, 86, 105
Navarino, 35
Near East, 54, 66, 188
Newfoundland, 30
New York, 206
Nicolas I, Czar, 38
Nile, 75; the Blue and White, 102

INDEX

Non-violence, 139, 141; *see* Gandhi

North America, 29, 30, 110, 112; French dominion in, 113

Novy Vostok, 205

Occident, 21, 49, 73, 104, 131, 203, 205, 209, 211, 214; civilization of, 12; and the Orient, 3, 19, 27, 33, 40, 63, 64, 67, 71, 94, 115, 164, 173, 183, 205

Oil, 168; *see* Mosul

Omdehs, the, 90

Ommayad dynasty, 11

Orenburg, 202

Orient, 27, 33, 163; Mohammedan, 50; resources of, 206; trade in the, 28; *see* Occident

Oriental Congress, 187; at Baku, 192, 200; bolshevism at, 187, 192

Orkhan, 21

Othman, 20, 25; House of, 59, 62; sword of, 59

Ottoman Empire, 20, 23, 27, 28, 36, 38, 39, 40, 53, 54, 67, 84, 150, 177, 188; Arab lands in, 71, 164, 165; climax of, 25; name of, 21; old, 65; passing of the, 33

Ottoman sultanate, 24, 63; autonomous province of, 79; capitulations surrendered, 99

Palestine, 23, 170, 172 f., 209; *see* Zionist movement

Palmerston, 74

Panchayats, 38

Pan-Islamic policy, 45, 46, 48, 50, 140

"Panther," the, 156

Pan-Turanian Empire, 65, 185

Pan-Turanian movement, 50

Paris, 17, 206; Treaty of 1856, 40

Paris Peace Conference, vii, 55, 88, 164, 171

Peace, 7, 18, 197

Persia, 12, 13, 23, 37, 50, 187, 190, 193, 199; bolshevism in, 188; republic, 194

Persian finance, 190

Persian reformers, 189

Pitt, 118; Government of India Act, 118

Plassey, battle of, 113, 117

Poland, 23, 26, 35

Political ascendancy, 207

Political exiles, 199; *see* Russia

Portuguese, 28, 29, 33; in India, 109

Powers, the, 42; *see* Allies

Protectorate, British, 78, 85, 89, 93, 98, 149, 150; French, 150, 156 f., 161; Russian, 38

Protectorates, 149, 210

Prussia, 35

Punjab, 137

Quebec, battle of, 113

Racial feeling, 129, 160, 173, 211

Railway, Caspian, 199; Hejaz, 48; Siberian, 199

Raleigh, Sir Walter, 30

Reds, 201, 202
Reform Bill of 1832, 119
Religion, 6, 49, 71, 128; Mohammedan, 194; wars of, 19; *see* Christianity
Religious customs, 111
Religious discord, 173
Religious fanaticism, 65
Renaissance, 18
Riff tribesmen, 157
Rights, hereditary, 72, 149; of minorities, 61
Ripon, Lord, 129
Riza Khan, 194
Robert College, at Constantinople, 170
Roman Empire, 71
Romans, 28
Rome, 22
Rumania, 36
Russia, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, 65, 140, 183, 190; in Asia, 195; bolshevist, 197; czarist, 187; Imperial, 198; influence in Persia, 189; political exiles from, 199; Soviet, 66, 185, 186, 187, 193, 197, 199, 201
Russian anarchism, 131, 184
Russian Church, 184
Russian government in Asia, 200
Russian protectorate, 38
Russian Revolution, 196, 199
Russo-Turkish War, 43

St. Sophia, 22
Salisbury, Lord, 46
Salonica, 49
"Samarkand, Golden Road to," 14
Samuel, Sir Herbert, 174
Sanders, Limon von, 63
San Remo Conference, 176
Science, 15, 16, 138
Scot, Michael, 18
Self-determination, 86, 101, 185, 186, 197, 199, 207
Self-government, 119; local, in Egypt, 83, 90, 94; in India, 119 (*see Swaraj*); in Iraq, 167
Selim the Grim, 24, 42, 71
Seljukide Empire, 20
Seraglio, 26, 43
Serbia, 36
Serbs, 20; rebellion of, 35
Seville, 16, 151
Shiahs, 11, 13, 168, 193
Shiekh-ul-Islam, 62
Shiva, 131
Shuster, 190
Siberia, 198
"Sick man," 27
Slave trade, 118, 153
Smyrna, 53, 58
Sobiesky, John, 26
Soliman the Magnificent, 25, 43
Soviet delegates, 187; *see* Russia
Soviet republics, 192, 201, 202
Spain, 12, 17, 151; Arabs driven out of, 18, 150; conquest of, 15, 151; dominions of, 33

Spaniards, 28, 29
Spiritual power, 10, 24, 43, 44, 59, 121, 159; and temporal, 10
Stalin, 200
Stamboul, 44
Strikes, political, 88
Sublime Porte, 44
Sudan, the, 75, 98, 101; reconquest of, 102
Suez, 74
Suez Canal, 51, 74
Sultanate, 58, 188; Ottoman, 63
Sulva Bay, 63
Sunni Mohammedans, 193
Sunnis, 11, 13
Supremacy, racial, 59
Surat, 111
Swaraj, 134, 136, 138
Swarajists, 204
Syria, vii, 23, 51, 55, 88, 170, 175, 176, 209
Syrians, 45, 171

Talaat, 52, 171
Tangier, 152 f., 157
Tashkend, 200, 201, 202
Tatars, 192, 203
Teheran, 189, 190, 191, 194
Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 77
Tewfik, Khedive, 77
Theocracy, 10, 59; Islamic, 44
Thrace, 53, 58, 60
Tilsit, 37
Toledo, 16
Trade unions, 204
Trade, Western, 73, 206
Traders, Dutch, 112
Transcaucasus, 186
Translations, 14, 15, 18
Treaty: of alliance between Egypt and Great Britain, 94; bilateral, 167; of Lausanne, 59, 66, 99, 186; of Paris in 1856, 40; Persian with Britain, 191; of San Stefano, 42; of Sèvres, 53, 60; of Ungkiar Skelessi, 38; of Versailles, 54, 90, 172
Treaties, of alliance, 116, 201; international, 78; of subordinate alliance, 149
Tripoli, 23, 50, 209; Italian invasion of, 140
Tsargrad, 37
Tunis, 23; protectorate over, 150, 209
Turkestan, soviet republic of, 201
Turkey, 23, 26, 35, 42, 46, 47, 54, 65, 77, 85, 184, 191, 198; banished from Europe, 53; capitulations surrendered to, 99; claimed Mosul, 168, 170; defense of, 40; European, 34, 35, 36, 41; hardships of, 65; lost Arab provinces, 60; new, 66; population of, 65; resurgence of, 140; revolt of Mecca, 141, 166; terms of peace, 55; war with Western powers, 185
Turkish conquest, 23; of Egypt, 29
Turkish Empire, 38, 51, 56; rule of, revised, 60; savagery in, 52; sultans, of, 152; traditions of, 59

Turkish Republic, 11, 63, 186; declared, 61
Turkish Revolution of 1908–1909, 49
Turks, 5, 19, 23, 25, 30, 53, 57, 60, 187; atrocities of, 52; *see* Young Turks

Ulema, 91
Union and Progress Committee, 49, 171
United States, vii, 118, 172, 178, 205; *see* America
University at Beirut, 170
University of Calcutta, 126
University of El Azhar, 91, 104
University of Fez, 152, 163
University of London, 126
University of Padua, 17

Vedas, 120
Venice, 28
Vernacular newspapers, 200, 206
Vespucci, Amerigo, 28
Victoria, Queen, 126
Vienna, 23, 26

Wahabis, 72
Wales, Prince of, in India, 143
War of Independence, American, 117
West African colonies, of France, 154
West Indies, 29
Whitehall, Indians at, 145
Wilberforce, 118
William II, of Germany, 46, 48, 50
Wilson, President, 86, 164, 171, 207
World-dominion, 46

Yeldiz Kiosk, 44, 45, 46, 47
Young Turks, 50, 51, 72, 139

Zaghlul Pasha, Saad, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 95, 99, 103
Zanzibar, under British protectorate, 150
Zinovieff, Comrade, 187, 188
Zionist movement, 173, 175, 176
Zionists, 173, 174

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